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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is an attempt to trace the philosophical 
presuppositions of Jefferson's social theories. The tools 
to be used are primarily philosophical, not historical; 
because of the very nature of the study a considerable 
amount of space will be devoted to the historical setting but 
it will always be consigned to a secondary or auxiliary 
position. The dissertation is not based on the assumption 
that the philosophical was the most important factor involved 
in the American experiment in self-government. However, it 
is clear that it was a factor, and perhaps not the least 
important. Therefore, an investigation of the philosophical 
presuppositions of Jefferson's social theories is a 
contribution to Jeffersonia, Americana, and the philosophical 
enterprise as a whole. 
The problem of whether or not ideas do influence history 
is a field of investigation in its own right and will 
receive only brief treatment here. The Peverse relationship, 
the effect of events on ideas, will be treated at length. 
Tnere is little question but what ideas arise from history; 
on this point, at least, few disagree. Just why there is 
some question whether or not ideas, in turn, influence 
history or whether there is an ultimate sense in which 
ideas and events can be said to maintain external relation-
ships, is not clear. It is assumed that they do influence 
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events as the cognitive factor in an overall process, that 
they are one means of analyzing events. 
2 
This dissertation will drew upon history for the origin 
of the philosophical concepts but it will not seek to 
establish the degree to which Jefferson's theories were 
determinant factors in subsequent P~erican development. 
That is left for others. 
When the curtain was drawn over the Middle Ages bringing 
to a halt the scientific, religious, and political thought 
of the Hellenistic era, there was little capable leadership 
to remind the people of their rich heritage in these 
respective fields. The religious and scientific disciplines 
stepped from the cocoon of history some two centuries before 
practical attempts were made to construct their corollaries 
in the body politic. 
Luther was born in 1483 and Francis Bacon in 1561; 
during the lifetime of each, the principles for which they 
strove in their respective fields were placed into practice. 
It is true that even as early as 1291 the League of The 
Three Forest Cantons, a union of mutual defense, was formed 
in what is now Switzerland, but in any study of continuous 
political development the Swiss Confederation must be under-
stood as a backwater, an historical eddy. Perhaps it is 
because theirs was not a self-conscious evolvement that their 
more recent counterparts have not found the Swiss endeavor 
a fruitful prototype. A spirit of nationalism sundered the 
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Holy Roman Empire but the absolutism found in the papacy 
was merely transformed to the absolute monarchies. Only 
here and there as in Switzerland did the negligence of 
sovereigns permit outbreaks of liberal political practices 
based on mutual contract and the attendant implied individual-
ism. Although the Protestant groups strongly resisted 
the tendency toward continued atomization, the gates forced 
by Luther loosed an uncontrollable flood, many of whom had 
little sympathy with the original religious motivation. 
The rejuvenated natural sciences found patrons among 
contending princes. 
Unlike the religious and scientific thinkers, the 
political theorists did not live to see liberal principles 
of government instituted. It was in the British colonial 
system that the recrudescence of earlier Greek and Roman 
political thought took place. It is to the credit of that 
system with all of its faults that such a metamorphosis trans-
pired when it did not in the German, French, Dutch, and 
Spanish colonies. Although the "mother of parliaments" did 
not achieve maturity until the early part of the 19th 
century, its first tentative efforts in gradually undermining 
the autocratic power of the monarch were to have considerable 
influence on its colonial governments. It is with one phase 
of that development that this study is concerned. 
Primarily, because of the distance between England and 
its American colonies, the latter enjoyed considerable 
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independence from the very first and as a result became 
informal schools in political mechanics. They managed 
4 
their local affairs and dealt with Indian border difficulties. 
But they were not free of a burdensome taxation, control 
over international relationships, and the foreign trade 
agreements that were forced upon them. The works of the 
political theorists found a ready market and although they 
were in no sense prepared for self-government at the time 
of the Revolution, when pressed by the exigencies of social 
upheaval, there were some few scholars who contributed, and 
who were capable of contributing, to the alternative 
foundations fer an indigenous social philosophy. It was 
necessary to find a basis for the new government, a foundation 
that could support it against the established monarchies of 
the old world. The need was both pragmatic and theoretical, 
politically and intellectually necessary. 
This was particularly true for peoples who had been 
accustomed to the theory of the "divine right of kings." For 
them, the intellectual was a part of the pragmatic need. It was 
necessary to give the new nation a theoretical justification, 
a feeling of the basic rightfulness of the Revolution. 
Only from such a belief could the necessary hope and faith be 
derived for the arduous and burdensome conflict ahead. Every 
revolutionary element must possess such a mythos before it 
can be nerved to the battle; it may be nothing more than a 
fiction or it may convey religious authority, but it must be 
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genuine, vivid and comprehensible in the minds of a subject 
people before they will confront established authority. 
Adams, Madison, Hamilton, Washington, and Jefferson, 
to name but a few, were outstanding leaders in this develop-
ment though not all were by any means students of previous 
political thought. The term democracy was certainly not 
unknown; Plato and Aristotle had used it in their political 
treatises, but only Aristotle had maintained that it might be 
given serious consideration. No one had dreamed that it 
could be applied to a large and growing nation. The Greek 
city states and Swiss cantons were not acceptable models 
because of their size. Aristotle's use of the term was in 
fact what now would be considered an aristocracy, only the 
upper middle class was dest1ned to rule. The term itself 
precipitated visions or the mobs swelling the Roman streets 
and was frequently paraphrased by the term mobocracy. There 
was the deep.set and uneasy feeling that it was a sophisticated 
name for anarchy or lawlessness, that trade and commerce 
could never prosper in a democratic state. It carried over-
tones of the barbarous, of leather clad teutonic warriors 
striking their shields in clamorous disapproval or rollicking 
approbation. The men mentioned above, along with others, were, 
because of their respective background and experience, 
called upon to provide theoretical and practical solutions to 
the factious problems of self-government. 
They responded in various ways; reflecting in their 
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writings and leadership many conflicting factors such as the 
religious, cultural, economic, geographical, scientific, and 
philosophical, they were not always in agreement. But to-
gether, the Founding Fathers were instrumental in providing 
temporary answers to many of the most pressing problems. 
There are at least two ways in which the presuppositions 
of Jefferson's social theories may be studied. In the first 
place there are the men and the writings mentioned by Jefferson 
himself as having had a direct influence on his thought. 
Possessing one of the largest private libraries in the colonies, 
being an omnivorous reader, and carrying on a voluminous 
correspondence throughout his life, the writings present a 
considerable problem in this regard. Letters written in one 
context frequently contradict letters written in another. At 
one time or another he described several books on political 
theory, some of ~ich presented distinct and contradictory 
views, as "the beat" in the field. He castigated few 
previous thinkers, Plato and Hume among them: he applauded 
many. Jefferson published only one major work, the 
celebrated study in geography, botany, colonial life, and 
government, known as the Notes on Virginia. His common-
place books may be likened to personal diaries in their 
respective fields, but they do not include commentaries, only 
passages collected from others. By themselves they would be 
of little use in determining the nature of his thought. 
Nevertheless it is from all of these writings that the 
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political theories of Jefferson may be gleaned and streams 
of influence traced. Chapters II and III are devoted to 
preleminary studies concerning the life and times of 
7 
Jefferson and his work in the House of Burgesses; Chapters IV 
through VII, however, are devoted to a study of the historical 
streams of influence directly influencing Jefferson in so far 
as they can be determined. 
Secondly, the philosophical presuppositions of Jefferson's 
social theories may be studied by comparing him to other 
political theorists to determine the ones he most resembled, 
regardless of whether or not he had read them. Chapters VIII 
and IX are devoted to just such a comparison. This method 
also provides a means of comparing him to men on whom he did 
not depend. 
Cicero, Hobbes, and Locke are studied in Chapter VIII 
and their political philosophies are compared to Jefferson's 
commentary on the Constitution in Chapter IX. It is readily 
seen that Jefferson stands in the Ciceronian and Lockian 
tradition and that he is unalterably opposed to Hobbes. It 
is further concluded that Jefferson is a political positivist 
in the Humian sense of that term having handled previous 
realistic theories of the state in the same way that Hume 
handled previous theories of substance, of space and time. 
The problem of this paper therefore is to determine first the 
historical concepts that most influenced Jefferson's social 
theories, and secondly to compare the philosophical 
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presuppositions of those theories with other outstanding 
thinkers. It must be added that the distinction is functional, 
not ultimate. The conclusions should be an aid in delineating 
those theories, both political and metaphysical, which have 
contributed most to the democratic tradition. 
Although more than Jefferson's theory of the state will 
be treated in this dissertation, only his doctrine of religious 
freedom will receive comparable consideration. His other 
theories such as the theory or education, agrarian economy, 
and slavery will be mentioned only in passing. It is 
important to remember this when it is claimed that Jefferson 
is a political positivist; this label is not extended to 
include his moral philosophy. As will be shown, it is the 
conclusion of this dissertation that in spite of his interest 
in moral philosophy, every time he tenders it individual 
treatment he is caught up in an elementary conflict, an 
ambiguit~ that concludes in an impasse. The central problem 
here is his political philosoph~ and the manner in which it 
is related to previous doctrines of natural law. 
Adrienne Koch, in her extremely well-written The 
PhilosophY of Thomas Jefferson, bas most nearly approached 
the objectives outlined above. Her volume was published in 
1943 and has the advantage of being based on a much more 
comprehensive survey of Jefferson's writings than most previous 
works dealing with the same problem. Although there is a 
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plentitude of excellent bibliographies of Jefferson and 
compendious works on his special interests such as architecture, 
botany, etc,, few volumes have been devoted to a thorough 
investigation of his commentaries on philosophy. Unquestionably, 
contributing factors to this lack or recognition are to be 
found in his checkered and purely pragmatic interest in the 
field plus the manifest contradictions in his moral philosophy. 
!his essential pragmatism may be found in almost any 
ot his letters wherein is discussed the works of some out-
standing philosopher. !he works of the philosophers are used 
when they are relevant to specific questions and no further. 
They are not developed for their own sake nor does he trace 
the logical implications of his theories. Throughout the study 
this shall be noted in various ways. Considerable caution 
should be employed when the phrase •philosophy of Jefferson• 
is heard or read. !he degree to which these scattered 
commentaries can be lifted from his other writings and maintain 
a collective identity is slight indeed. Koch's title, for 
that reason, is somewhat ambiguous it not question begging. 
It is nearer the truth to say, •the theories of Jefferson• 
or •Jefferson's commentaries on philosophical problems.• 
Because or the close similarity or Koch's work and this 
dissertation, some attention will be given to a comparison 
of the two. Koch's Philosopbl of Thomas Jefferson is much 
more comprehensive than the problem here outlined and the 
investigation of Jefferson's social theories is limited to one 
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section. Koch maintains that Jefferson was a philosopbe 
because he was willing to search and compare, but not a 
philosopher. The distinction turns on the method, not on the 
subject matter; as she defines and employs the term, it is 
so all-inclusive that it adds little to a comprehension of 
Jefferson's thought. Almost any student conditioned by a 
particular discipline is willing to search and compare; 
furthermore, even the most implacable and doctrinaire thinkers 
are willing to experiment in some field or other. For that 
reason the term will not be employed in this study although 
the negative aspect of her conclusion is valid; he was not a 
philosopher either of the first or second rank. Not only that, 
but he had a penchant for reading thinkers that were not 
destined to achieve subsequent feme. Some of his theories 
are so manifestly contradictory, theories treated in the same 
letter, that there is no question but what he did not appreciate 
their implications. On several such occasions Koch becomes 
an apologist for him, tending toward hagiography and making 
of him what he was not. Jefferson's primary interest was law 
and his most scholarly piece of work is in that field; it is 
his astute analysis of the degree to which Christian dogma 
had influenced the Common ~aw.1 
In the first chapter of her work Koch attacks Chinard's 
statement that Jefferson was first a Stoic and then an 
1. Jefferson,~or~ IA 360. "Whether Christianity is Part 
of the Common Law. 
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Epicurean; Koch maintains that he was neither but was 
influenced by both about equally in his moral philosophy. 
Koch traced the Epicurean development through Gassendi and 
made a much more thorough study of the problem than did 
Chinard; consequently she arrives much nearer the truth. In 
her treatment of Jefferson and Bolingbroke, Koch dismisses 
lightly the conflict between Jefferson's moral sense theory 
and his theory of Epicurean utility. She designates it as a 
stage in his development but as a matter of fact it stayed 
with him the rest of his lite; it is a basic ambiguity and 
reveals nothing more than his general distaste for metaphysical 
problems. This dissertation agrees with Koch that the theoreti-
cal influence of French thought on Jefferson was practically 
nil. At best it serves as an index to concepts already well 
developed; at worst it is a blind alley. There was consider-
able French influence in other areas but as will be pointed 
out later, in the field of social thought, Jefferson went to 
France as an instructor, not a student. 
Jefferson stood in the English deistic tradition drawing 
on Bolingbroke rather than Voltaire, Locke rather than 
Montesquieu. Tracy demands and receives separate treatment 
but even here Jefferson stands in a slightly superior position, 
that of an established American patron for the French author. 
The primary concepts of Ideology Tracy freely admits were 
taken from Locke, concepts with which Jefferson had long been 
familiar. Therefore care should be taken in assuming that 
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because Jefferson considered France his "second home" that 
there was a direct philosophical influence. The compilations 
or Chinard in cooperation with both the Johns Hopkins Press 
and Lea Presses Universitaires de France may have unintentionally 
contributed to an overstatement of that influence. or course, 
the letters addressed to Jefferson's contemporaries in Franca 
are stressed and frequently bound separately. 
There is a rather strong tendency for Koch to make of 
Jefferson an accomplished metaphysician. That be frequently 
employed a metaphysical terminology is true, that he read 
from metaphysicians, notably Bolingbroke, is likewise true, but 
he was not a metaphysician as such. As will be pointed out in 
the chapter on the Commonplace Book, he did copy a section 
or Bolingbroke's metaphysics but Chinard's contention in the 
introduction to the contrary, that does not of itself imply 
agreement, disagreement, or even that he thought more of ito 
Koch does not make an adequate distinction between What 
Jefferson himself said on the one hand and what she believes 
were the logical implications or those statements on the other. 
There is a difference. Regardless of the accuracy achieved in 
the most acute logical analysis they are still not his theories 
but her judgment of them. For the metaphysician, all consistent 
theories convey metaphysical implications and Jefferson's are 
no exception. Furthermore much is to be gained by indicating 
those implications, but they still do not make or the subject a 
metaphysician and the distinction at all times should be clear. 
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To be rational is a right assumed by every thinker but 
that right is misconstrued by a reader who refuses to admit 
that a thinker can sometimes be irrational. 
The last seven chapters of Koch's work is devoted to a 
more detailed study of his social philosophy. She ascribes 
to Jefferson a political relativism similar to that of 
Monteaquieu. The great French thinker contributed the rather 
startling observation that the government of a country is 
determined by ita climate, an interesting adaptation of natural 
law theories. He does not evaluate the systems sa such, 
claiming that one is necessarily superior to another but only 
that one may be better in a specific climate. There is one 
sense in which it can be said that Jefferson was a relativist 
in so far as each society was to determine its own government, 
but it can never be said that he equated the monarchical, the 
aristocratic, and the democratic forms of government. Neither 
did he place so much stress on climatic determinism. 
Jefferson was a relativist in that he believed each culture 
should determine its own government by social compact, the 
constitution. But he assumed that every social compact would 
automatically become democratic. There is a further distinction 
to be made, Montesquieu did not develop his social theory to 
the point of a temporal relativism as did Jefferson. 
Jefferson believed that some provision should be made for a 
complete overhauling of the compact with each generation. 
This goes much further than Montesquieu and makes of Jefferson 
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not a mere relativist but a political positivist. Jefferson's 
contribution at this point was just ss significant as that of 
Montesquieu and for the most part it has been ignored. 
In return for the honor it has bestowed upon Jefferson, 
history has demanded that he submit to the inevitable 
sterot~pe, that he be equated with all that has since endeared 
itself to what may be called the American tradition. Inasmuch 
as the constitution does not provide for its extinction with 
every generation, this phase of Jefferson's thought has been 
passed by. 
Jefferson and Madison, also by Koch, is an attempt to 
prove the two men were interdependent in their political 
thought, that the one balanced the other. Although it is an 
excellent contribution to the field of Earl~ American thought, 
it is not of great value to this study. 
Ch1nard is second only to Koch in time spent interpreting 
the philosophical passages in Jefferson's writings. But 
Chinard is a historian first, a philosopher second, and is 
generall~ impatient with attempts to trace ideas as such;- his 
primary interest is to be found in the biographies of men, 
their active participation in the great historical events. 
Characteristicall~, he comments in an off-hand manner that 
Jefferson derived his social theories from the early democratic 
experiments in Britain during the 4th, 5th, and 6th centuries. 
Chapter III treats the problem in some detail. It is through 
such unguarded statements in biographies that many popular 
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errors have arisen; the biography will always command a much 
larger reading audience than the more scholarly published 
treatises such as those of Koch. The introductions to the 
Commonplace Books by Chinard are likewise marked with a consider-
able degree of carelessness, particularly in the assumption that 
What Jefferson copied he believed, The opposite might well 
be true. 
The Commonplace Books, for that reason, have only a 
secondary value. Only when he evaluates them in a letter do 
they come into prominence as a practical channel to an under-
standing of his thought. At most, they support and elaborate 
a thesis found elsewhere. 
The works of Beeker and Freidenwald on the Declaration 
of Independence have been of considerable assistance as will 
be noted in Chapter IV. Beeker, particularly has been used; 
there is little doubt but what he has given the Declaration 
the most thorough treatment it has been accorded from a 
philosophical point of view. The first and last chapters have 
been of great assistance. 
Beard's Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democraci has not 
been considered relevant to this study. It is an effort to 
interpret the economic determinants involved in the agrarian 
movement as opposed to the financial and trading centers. In 
its field it is an excellent study and the inference is not to 
be drawn that there were not strong economic forces involved in 
the election of Jefferson to the presidency in 1800; there were, 
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but they do not constitute the subject matter of this study. 
Other than the Memorial Edition of Jefferson's writings, 
the Ford Edition has been used for the most part. The 
references to the Memorial Edition in the footnotes are not 
designated as such but simply as "Jefferson." The 
Jefferson Cyclopedia by Foley has also been helpful as a 
primary reference work. 
The fl.rst volume of the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
edited by Julian P. Boyd, and published by Princeton 
University Press, was received by subscribers in 1950. The 
project will not be completed until some fifty or more 
volumes are printed; needless to say it will be definitive and 
many letters will be printed that haTe not been heretofore. 
Some three or more volumes are completed as this is being written 
so it has been of little value to this dissertation. There 
is one sense in which this edition constitutes a Sword of 
Damocles for all studies or Jefferson made while the work is in 
progress. The knowledge that it is being published has been 
an active deterrent to placing great emphasis on isolated 
selections1hat might be innundated in the flood of letters 
soon to be released. A studied effort has been made to treat 
only the central themes, not the theories stated only in a few 
letters to friends, but theories that run throughout his 
writings, both personal end public. With the publication of 
the Princeton edition the time will be ripe for the detailed 
studies of individual letters that constitute the variations 
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on the main theme. It might be added in this connection that 
some books have been read of recent date in which the authors 
claimed to have had access to the additional material. 
Nothing of consequence to the intent of this study has been 
uncovered so far. Unquestionably such a monumental study will 
contribute to a better understanding of Thomas Jefferson and 
his times. 
The method employed has been, so far as possible, derived 
from the nature of the material under study. Within given 
limits a chronological order has been followed beginning with 
the early years of Jefferson's life. Historical analyses have 
been used in addition to the writings of Jefferson as such; 
this is particularly true with the chapter treating the 
revolt against the church. The chapters have been grouped 
around those events during his life which were most significant 
from the viewpoint of this study and throughout there has been 
an attempt to treat more than the isolated statements concerning 
the subject at hand. A general view of bia life, the times in 
which he lived, and the issues uppermost in the minds or the 
people at the time, have been considered. 
After reading what Jefferson has had to say on a particular 
subject, other secondary sources have been employed. An 
effort was then made to place Jefferson historically, that is, 
discover what streams of thought had most influenced him in 
a particular area of his social theories. Then comparisons 
have been made with prominent thinkers in the philosophical 
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tradition. The latter is a judgMent based on point by 
point comparisons; but it is felt that therein lies the 
greatest value of this study. In the concluding chapter it ia 
pointed out that Jefferson was a political positivist in the 
tradition of Hume and J. s. Kill. One conclusion of this 
dissertation is that what Jefferson meant by the state was the 
mutual agreement of two or more people on a method of 
government for a stated period of time; the ideal or normative 
state would constitute mutual agreement on a method of self-
government. 
The personal character of Jefferson is primarily a problem 
for his biographers. However it is almost impossible to read 
any phase of his works without being impressed with the 
qualities of magnanimity, daring, and cultural breadth. 
Throughout his life there was profound and indefatigable sympathy 
for the oppressed. This is revealed in his concern for 
slaves, minority sects and the poor who could not afford to 
educate themselves. His personal habits were intemperate only 
as they tended toward austerity. His lifelong gregariousness 
and hospitality constituted a continual temptation for others 
to impose upon his time and wealth. It is due to his 
conscientious habits of correspondence, habits which led him 
to write detailed letters to people he scarcely knew, that 
thia investigation and many more like it are possible. The 
theory that governments are to be altered with each generation, 
the only political theory that was uniquely Jeffersonian, ia 
I. Introduction 19 
one indication of his ingenuity, an inventiveness expressed far 
more in the problems of technology than in the classic 
questions of political thought. 
There are qualities in the character of Jefferson 
reminiscent both of Aristotle and Cicero. He had a passion 
for reform found in neither, but more so in Cicero than in 
Aristotle. He was himself an aristocrat as both Aristotle and 
Cicero were. The level of his comprehension was closer to that 
of Cicero than Aristotle but the breadth of his interests were 
Aristotelian. He was more inventive than Cicero but much less 
so than Aristotle. He was self-assured but not overbearing, 
patient but not given to procrastination. 
Jefferson was not the Great Legislator in the tradition 
of either a Lycurgus or Solon although he bears a historical 
relationship to the founding of the nation similar to theirs 
in Sparta and Athens. He was never so convinced of the 
rightness of his opinion that he would oppose himself to the 
majority will. He was in every sense of the word a Founding 
Father of the United States and the experiment in government 
which it heralded, but he was a father who was unwilling to 
assume the responsibility of a patriarchy and had infinite 
respect for the rights and opinions of his political descendents. 
He did not covet for his generation the distinction of being 
a landmark in history, only that it fulfill its obligations. 
It was not with reluctance that he contemplated the fundamental 
changes to be wrought in succeeding generations but with 
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faith, hope end high expectation. If he had any word of 
guidance to pees on to the future it wes that it not 
imitate .its forbears. Jefferson did not foresee the dogmatic 
implications involved in this sdmoni tion. But the schole.r 
will look fer to find another political theorist who 
recommended that the fundamental document of government carry 
its own seeds of necessary self-destruction. 
~here conclusive evidence is lacking end where forthright 
statements are scattered sparsely, in a word, where there is 
a paucity of definitive date, there hypotheses flourish end 
bloom in abundance without being mutually contradictory. 
Those suggested here ere expected to widen end deepen the 
sesrch, t~ bring to light views heretofore unexpressed end to 
place variant emphases upon others already introduced by 
previous thinkers. 
CHAPTER II 
EARLY EDUCATIOB 
Although the immediate boundaries of this dissertation 
are defined as Jefferson's social theories, it will soon be 
evident that the total intellectual development will demand 
some investigation. Jefferson's relation with the past will 
only become relevant When it is seen in the light of his 
immediate background and environment. '!'his is not an attempt 
to deal with one work by an individual author but with a 
person who saw clearly and distinctly an immediate relationship 
between his thought and what he accomplished each day. 
When the student attempts to evaluate a published work, he is 
interpretinglbat the author wished to reveal to others. 
However when the material of the investigation includes 
personal notations and letters to friends plus the published 
documents, there is a real sense in which he is interpreting 
what the author wished to clarify for himself. 
Jefferson's interests knew no boundaries. His tireless 
curiosity sought out every crevice of human thought and 
endeavor, past s.nd present. His social theories were nothing 
apart from his daily life. He discoursed with equal readiness 
on philosophy, government, art, natural science, ethics, 
history, religion, agriculture, education, and language. Even 
this list is not inclusive. One of the student's first problems 
is to be found in the fact that in most of his communications 
these subjects fall out in a jumbled mass. All too often, 
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their connections exist only in the mind of Jefferson. 
Padover states that there has never been anything to compare 
with his range of interest since the Italian Renaissance.1 
Certainly no individual rises from the pages of American 
history to challenge that assertion. 
Just what is meant by the term presupposition in this 
context may be further clarified. We may with justification 
for instance, draw a line from the best Stoic teachings now 
available to the Declaration of Independence in its first 
draft. It would greatly simplify the study. Thus an identity 
might or might not be established, but it is certain that the 
comparison could be relstively accurate. The problems involved 
here are much more complex. It is one thing to show similarities 
existing in reference to concepts; it is quite another to prove 
that they have a direct historical relationship. Also, as in 
this instance, it might be found that While the Declaration 
of Independence had much in common with the Stoic teachings, 
the former was only one aspect of Jefferson's social theories 
and that even they may have been subsequently altered. 
Therefore only a hypothesis or possibility will be proposed 
when identity is established between the works of Jefferson 
and his predecessors. Except in the cases wherein Jefferson 
credits one of his predecessors with directly influencing him, 
this will remain in hypothetical form. However an indirect 
1. Padover, TCJ, x. 
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approach by way of necessary implications might serve to reduce 
the possibility of error. Since this study deals with a man 
Who changed and developed his social theories over a period 
of time, every reference to his thought must be qualified 
by a definite point in history. This is particularly true of 
his attitude toward organized and institutionalized 
Christianity. 
Jefferson's first tutor was the Reverend William 
Douglas Who had come from Scotland in 1750.1 His second tutor 
was Reverend James Maury.2 The latter was always spoken well 
of in Jefferson's later correspondence while the former was not 
regarded as a suitable teaeher.3 His criterion consisted of 
the instructor's ability to teach the classics, Latin and Greek. 
Both of Jefferson's tutors were clergymen and doubtless did much 
to influence his attitude toward the church. It is possible 
that this early negative experience with a clergyman lowered 
his respect tor the church in general. Likewise it is possible 
that it had no measurable effect. It is also possible that 
his experience with the second tutor heightened his respect 
for the church. Actually, the problem cannot be pursued 
further tor lack of relevant evidence, although in view or 
1. Malone, JiT, 40. 
2. In addition to being historically important as one or 
Jefferson's tutors, Maury is remembered f~r his fight 
against the "Two Penny Act." 
3. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 4. 
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Jefferson's later relationship to the established church, 
interesting hypotheses present themselves to the reader. 
Until 1760 we know practically nothing of Jefferson's 
personal thought life except by implication.l In a letter 
to Ralph Izard in 1788 Jefferson makes the following 
statement on education: 
I have never thought a boy should undertake 
abstruse or difficult sciences, such as 
mathematics in general, till fifteen years 
of age at soonest. Before that time they are 
best employed in learning the2languages, which is merely a matter of memory. 
The most adequate hypothesis is that Jefferson left 
Douglas and started studying under Maury because Maury 
entertained a much more thorough grasp of the classics. 
Another use of the term presupposition as it will 
1. Koch, POJ, 1. The Ford and Princeton editions which are 
printed in chronological order, give the first letter 
as January 14, 1760. Jefferson was not quite seventeen 
years of age at the time. The next entry is a letter 
to Page two years later on December 25, 1762. There 
are only a few letters previous to 1770 when Jefferson 
was twenty-seven years old. Most of these deal with 
an early love affair. Koch points out that there are 
few sources previous to 1785 when Jefferson was forty-
two years old, which give a day to day development of 
his thought such as subsequent letters furnished. 
However, much can be gained from the Common8lace Book 
which was being written during this time. f course 
later letters often discussed his earlier thoughta 
but will not be used when an earlier letter can be 
found. All too often memories eimprovee with age, even 
the memory of Jefferson. Most of this chapter must 
necessarily deal with Jefferson's surroundings and 
friends. 
2. Jefferson, to Ralph Izard, 1788;Qwashingtonh II, 428. 
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be used here may now be introduced, It will also be employed 
to indicate the metaphysical implications of Jefferson's 
social theories apart from historical precedents, But in this 
sense it will be used sparingly because of the tendency 
to read into what are otherwise explicit and objective 
statements. The difficulties in tracing the historical 
evolvement of his theories are considerable but the problems 
involved in labeling him a materialist or an idealist, in 
metaphysic~ or a hedonist in morals are overwhelming. It 
is the finding of this dissertation that it cannot be 
accomplished without serious injury to What is etated 
explicitly. 
It is relevant that When Jef!erson was only fourteen 
years old he placed the study of the classics above all 
other disciplines, This is a point of view which, While 
developed very early in life, was maintained until his 
death. The Commonplace Book has extracts from Homer, 
Euripides, Herodotus, Anacreon, Virgil, Ovid, Horace, 
Cicero, and Seneca. He was able to read these authors in 
their native tongues and also could read French. However 
his firsthand knowledge of French authors was to come later 
with his stay in Paris. All subsequent education was over-
shadowed by his thorough training in the classics for it 
became the norm tor his later judgments and constituted the 
core of his philosophy of education, 
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Most of the boys of his age had received some introduction 
into the classics but had discontinued their schooling 
earlier. Education in Virginia and the other southern states 
was not considered so vitally important as it was in the 
northern states. In the development of the southern colonies 
the same motivations did not exist and the culture as a whole 
seemed to rebel against the best laid educational schemes. 
loon after the establishment of the northern colonies pro-
visions had been made for adequate schooling. Schoois for the 
clergy were constructed in order to furnish a literate leader-
ship within each parish. Also it was necessary that the laymen 
be able to read the Bible and converse intelligibly on the 
doctrines taught in the catechism. As a consequence schools 
were also constructed for the laymen. MeanWhile in Virginia 
those planters who were able to do so, sent their children 
to England there to study in the private schools maintained for 
the landed gentry; those who were not, frequently hired 
tutors from among the clergy. This constituted a supplementary 
income and may have been one of the contributing factors 
in discouraging the development of public schools. The poor 
inthe South remained illiterate. Although the South was 
not so interested in education as the North, the content of 
What they did teach was often of a superior quality. Since 
the motivation stemmed from two very diverse sources, the 
subject matter varied likewise. The upper classes in. the 
southern colonies received an education in the classics while 
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the northern schools were more concerned with teaching those 
subjects designed to help the students understand the 
catechism. The Anglican clergy were much broader in their 
interpretation of curriculum requirements than were the 
ministers of the Puritan tradition. Primarily because of 
its ecclesiastical ties, the South maintained a much closer 
relationship to English educational systems.1 Although some 
of these conditions were changing during Jefferson's lifetime, 
the fundamental educational habits altered slowly and 
conservatively. Jefferson's early interest in the classics 
can best be understood in the light of this tradition.2 
In 1760, at seventeen years of age, Jefferson enrolled 
in William and Mary. 1760 is also the year of his first 
extant letter wherein he discusses the reasons for the projected 
step toward higher education.3 He stated that if he remained, 
the loss of one fourth of his time would be inevitable, a 
loss due to the continual arrival of guests at the plantation. 
Thus it would "lessen the expenses of the estate" for him 
to leave. Also he wanted a "more universal Acquaintance" 
and to "learn something of the Mathematics." William and 
Mary (est. 1692) was located in Williamsburg, the capital of 
the colony. It was the pride of colonial Virginia and was 
at that time some 68 years old. Constituting the educational 
1. Hill, Art., VII, 991-996. 
2. Bruce, IHV, I, 293-462. A very comprehensive treatment. 
3. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 340. 
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and social center of the colony as it did, William and Mary 
had also become a focal point for colony wide critical attacks. 
It had undergone criticism from every aide that ranged from 
student morals to curriculum standards. It had a powerful 
influence over the clergy of Virginia and had done much to 
raise the cultural level of the colony; there was a ratio of 
six clergyman to one layman on the faculty. William Small 
was the sole layman and it was he who first instructed Jefferson 
in physics, metaphysics, and mathematics.1 On the resignation 
of the professor of moral philosophy, the lectures on ethics, 
rhetoric, and literature also fell to him. Jefferson valued 
the friendship of Small more than anyone he had known up until 
that time and credited him with having influenced many of 
his later decisions.2 Throughout Jefferson's student days at 
William and Mary, the faculty members were in continual 
conflict with the local authorities. Much of the unrest 
stemmed from the question concerning the authority of the 
Bishop of London in directing the activities of the school. 
The faculty was on the whole a riotous and drunken lot and 
during Jefferson's stay three members either resigned or were 
dismissed because of ungentlemanly behavior. Of the seven 
faculty members, in his Autobiography, Jefferson only mentions 
Small although doubtless, he studied under others. It was 
1. Malone, JHT, 51. 
2, Jefferson, WOJ, I, 4. 
3. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 1-153. 
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Small who, in addition to introducing him to the disciplines 
mentioned above, also introduced him to Wythe and Governor 
Fauquier,."the ablest man who had ever filled that office."1 
The four frequently dined together and spent the evening 
in serious and enlightening conversation. "To the habitual 
conversations on these occasions I owed much instruction." 
From these references it is easy to see that Jefferson had 
little in common with the local clergymen. "The seeds of 
anticlericalism ••• were probably sown in his mind while he 
was in college or soon afterwards, when he became intimate 
with Francis Fauquier."2 There is no direct evidence for this. 
Yet we do know that Fauquier was not on the best of terms with 
the clerical authorities and also that he was one of Jefferson's 
closest friends. As Malone points out, it is probable that 
Jefferson knew of this conflict and chose the side of Fauquier. 
Historians generally agree that Jefferson was right in 
stating that Fauquier wa.s the best governor Virginia had ever 
had even though there had been some very able men in the 
governor's chair.3 "A man of broad education, liberal 
outlook and charming manners, he was instantly liked. 114 
Fauquier was against the' infamous Stamp Act and did all he 
could to prevent it. His objectivity was tested thoroughly 
in the days which led up to the Revolution. 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 4. 
2. Malone, JHT, 53. 
3. Jefferson, XIV, 230. 
4. Hawthorne, WON, 76. 
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If it is true that Jefferson did develop his first 
anti-clericalism on the basis of Fauquier's conflicta, he 
did not find an intellectual basis for his judgment until he 
read the works of Bolingbroke. It is imperative to point 
out here that Jefferson's anti-clericalism was not necessarily 
• 
anti-Christian. In his twentieth year Jefferson wrote this 
simple statement of faith enclosed in a letter to John Page. 
Perfect happiness, I believe, was never intended 
by the Deity to be the lot of one of his creatures 
in this world; but that he has very much put in 
our power the nearness of our approaches to it, 
is what I have steadfastly believed. The most 
fortunate of us, in our journey through life, 
frequently meet with calamities and misfortunes 
which may greatly afflict us; and to fortify our 
minds against the attacks of these calamities and 
misfortunes, should be one of the principle 
studies and endeavora of our lives. The only 
method of doing this is to assume a perfect 
resignation to the Divine will, to consider that 
whatever does happen, must happenJ and that by 
our uneasinesa, we cannot prevent the blow before 
it does fall, but we may add to its force after 
it has fallen. These considerations and others 
such as these, may enable us in some measure to 
surmount the difficulties thrown in our way; to 
bear up with a tolerable degree of patience under 
this burden of life; and to proceed with a pious 
and unshaken resignation, till we arrive at our journey's end, when we may deliver up our trust 
into the hands of him who gave it, and receive 
such riward as to him shall seem proportioned to our 
merit. 
This was penned three years after his first acquaintance with 
Fauquier. Chinard2 points out that he had retained his 
early Christian faith. "This note of Christian stoicism is 
exactly what might be expected from a young Protestant whose 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 350. 2. Chinard, TJ, 20-21. 
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mind was Rot particularly perturbed by metaphysical problems.wl 
Koch2 is correct in stating that Chinard was overly anxious 
to label Jefferson a Stoic, when he did so on the basis of 
this letter. Stoicism, entering through no less a person 
than St. Paul, had for centuries been sufficiently influential 
within the walls of orthodox Christianity to justify Jefferson's 
statement. Jefferson, a student of Cicero, was certainly not 
unmindful of the Stoic position, but it was not necessary for 
him to go beyond the Christian tradition in order to 
subscribe to this statement of faith. Stoic principles which 
became firmly embedded in all Roman literature from the very 
beginning of the Christian era and had particular influence 
among the kings and governors of western culture since that 
time, entered the Christian tradition in the teachings of 
Paul.3 
Although Paul had embraced the Christian religion, 
there is considerable evidence to indicate that he retained 
many Stoic concepts. Inasmuch as Paul did not refer to the 
Stoics as such, it is impossible to trace the strands of 
thought with certainty. However, for Paul, the human body 
was given an inferior status, a subsidiary position 
compared to the spirit. This psychological dualism and his 
references to the heavenly and celestial bodies indicate the 
1. Chinard, TJ, 20. 
2. Koch, POJ, 4. 
3. Arnold, Art., XI, 863o 
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degree of his reliance on the Stoic teachings. They were 
not peripheral, but lay at the very core of his thought. 
Paul's emphasis upon withdrawal and acceptance in addition to 
his lack of concern for social reform further support this 
contention. "It may be fearlessly maintained that the 
Christian cult of the "Holy Spirit" and the ecclesiastical 
dogma of the Trinity grew great in a soil enriched by Stoic 
speculation and experience."1 De Officiis and the Discourses 
of Epictetus for all practical purposes became Christian 
manuals.2 Arnold goes on to say that the Stoic philosophy 
was a "nursing mother to the church.n3 
In Paul's speech on Mars Hill (Acts, 17,24-28.) there 
are several verses which reflect this influence to a 
considerable degree, particularly his affinity for Stoic 
pantheism when speaking to the Greeks. 
God made the world and all things therein, ••• 
bath made of one blood all nations of men for 
to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath 
determined the times before appointed, and the 
bounds of their habitation; That they should 
seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after 
hiM, and find him, though he be not far from 
every one of us: For in him we live, and move, 
and have our being: as certain also of your 
own poets have said, For we are also his 
offspring. 
To be sure, there is much here that would also reflect the 
strict dogmatism of the Pharisee, but there is also the 
all-encompassing spirit to be found in Stoicism along with 
l. Arnold, ~., XI, 864. 
2~ Gifford, SOF, 155. 
3. Arnold, Art., XI, 864. 
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the acceptance of God's purposes as unwsvering snd deterministic. 
Likewise there is sn admission that he had studied the Greek 
thinkers of the past. In Chapter XII of First Corinthians 
Paul outlines his doctrine_ of Christian vocation stating that 
each ls granted particular talents and that the body of Christ, 
his church, consists in the combination of specific vocations. 
It is incumbent upon the believer to accept his position in 
life as a gift of God, not to question or seek promotion. 
Although direct influence cannot be proven, it is in fact, 
a system of organic harmony which anticipates the ecclesiasti-
cal hierarchy that was to develop later, a doctrine which 
parallels, if it did not draw upon, Plato's Republic.l 
Of the many trends of Stoic thought within the 
Christian religion, one of the most conspicuous is the 
basic belief in a heavy handed determinism which found its 
way into the Anglican doctrine through the teachings of 
Augustine and Calvin.2 At this time in the life of Jefferson 
we may assume that he was anti-clerical but had not yet 
altered his orthodox Christian views. Later, this was not the 
case for he definitely placed the purer forms of the Stoic 
1. Cf. First Corinthians XIII, 1-7. 
2. The influence of Calvin on the Anglican doctrine of faith 
is adequately discussed by Orr, Art., III, 146-154. He 
also refers to the Augustinian influence on Calvin. 
Gifford, SOF, 389f., discusses the relation of Calvin's 
thought to that of Augustine also. Augustine was not 
the only church father influenced by Stoicism but he 
was the most important. Ambrose was influenced by the 
Stoic view of the natural virtues. Gifford, SOF, 608f., 
discusses at some length the relation of the Christian 
and Stoic philosophies. 
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philosophy above that of the Christian. 
Jefferson only attended college formally for two years 
after Which time he continued to study under William Small. 
This continued for two additional years. He spent his 
mornings studying law but ln the afternoon and evening he 
turned to the disciplines which have successfully thwarted 
the attempts of subsequent interpreters to divide his activities 
into specific categories. There were only two professions 
open to men in the colonies of his ability and 'background. 
They were the law and the ministry. Without hesitation 
he chose law; there is no evidence whatsoever that he ever 
considered the ministry. 
There were no law schools ln the Virginia colony and 
Jefferson decided against studying in England. Candidates 
for the bar studied in local law offices until they were 
ready to pass an examination before a board of lawyers 
appointed for the purpose. Henry Clay finished his studies 
and took his examination in six months;l Jefferson presented 
himself for the bar examination six years after leaving the 
university. He studied in the law office of George Wythe, 
attended the court sessions and spent the rest of his time 
studying at home. These were some of the great formative 
years of his life during which he drew heavily on the 
friendship of Small, Wythe, and Governor Fauquier. 
1. Chinard, TJ, 28. 
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Although Jefferson did not pay Wythe for tutoring him, 
he did assist the well-known Williamsburg lawyer in legal 
research. In all probability he did not spend many hours in 
the law office itself, but it was from Wythe that he received 
his books and assignments.1 WJthe, like Jefferson, was largely 
self•taught and up until thirty years of age had spent most of 
his time studying law and the classics.2 In the opinion of 
Jefferson, Wythe was the best classical scholar in Virginia.3 
Although he was a devoted and ardent student of Plato, 
Wythe failed to instill a similar devotion for the great 
idealist in the young mind of Jefferson. While Wythe 
limited his study to law and the classics, Jefferson was 
interested in about every field of formal knowledge and 
though Wythe did not join him in his pursuits, he probably 
did not discourage him. Wythe was "not quick of apprehension, 
but with a little time, profound in penetration and sound in 
conclusion."5 All in all, Wythe was a demanding tutor and 
did much to shape the mind of Jefferson. 
No man ever left behind him a character more 
venerated than George Wythe. His virtue was 
of the purest tint; his integrity inflexible 
and his justice exact; of warm patriotism and 
devoted as he was to liberty, and the natural 
and equal rights of man, he might truly be 
called the Cato of his country, without the 
avarice of the Romai; for a more disinterested 
person never lived. 
1. Malone, JHT, I, 68. 4. Jefferson, TCJ, l034f. 
2. Jefferson, I, 167. 5. Jefferson, I, 170. 
3. Jefferson, TCJ, 927. 6. Jefferson, I, 169. 
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That their medium of conversation was not limited to legal 
terms is suggested by the fact that Jefferson continued to 
refer to him in later years and guarded their friendship 
closely. 
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It was Wythe who introduced Jefferson to Coke upon 
Littleton, a stodgy, heavy, and difficult primary treatise 
by Littleton with annotations by Coke. As Jefferson 
commented, its "matter cannot be abridged.nl There were no 
shortcuts to a study or law at that time; on the basis of 
later evidence, it is certain that Jefferson mastered this 
work.2' Sir Thomas de Littleton'• (1407-1481) work was not 
a product of the Enlightenment. Within its pages the concept 
of a dynamic, changing theory of law was hard to find. 
But it was the culmination of some of the great decisions 
which had contributed to the English Common Law. It was 
the standard work of lawyers, both in England and the 
colonies. It had gone through some twelve editions and held 
sway over the minds of jurists throughout the previous 
century. Obviously there was a tendency for lawyers during 
the time of Jefferson to think of it as the law book to 
end all law books. It was accepted as the point of departure 
for members of the bar as well as students. In content, 
Coke upon Littleton is a discussion of primary legal terms 
on the practical day to day decisions of the bench having to 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 361. 
2. Malone, JHT, I, 71. 
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do with property laws. Jefferson could speak the technical 
language of a case involving an acre of disputed property 
or a stolen horse long before his interest in philosophy began 
to mold his thinking toward the concepts presupposed in the 
Declaration of Independence. Coke Upon Littleton was one part 
of the four part Institutes of the Laws of England edited by 
Coke. Littleton's work on tenure was one of the first ten 
books published in London and had the honor of being the 
earliest treatise on English law ever printed. It does not 
borrow from other legal traditions but deals exclusively 
with English law. The method employed was to begin with a 
definition or "class" and then illustrate the definition 
with hypothetical eases. It treats English land law up until 
the time of equitable rights in property.1 
Later, Jefferson took up in chronological order the 
remainder of the Institutes. The second covered the period 
beginning with the Magna Carta and ending with James I, the 
third discussed criminal law, and the fourth was a treatment 
of jurisdiction. Beginning with these works he began to study 
the revisions based on them, reading in particular Matthew 
Bacon, Lord Kames, and Bracton.2 
Of the three just mentioned, Lord Henry Home Kames 
(1797-1782) was probably the most influential author. 
Chinard3 states that it was from Kames that Jefferson 
1. Anon, Enc. Brit., XIV, 225. 
2. Malone, Ja±, I, 72. 
3. Chinard, TJ, 30. 
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derived his concept of civil rights. "The Scottish was for 
him a master and a guide."1 Lord Kames was strongly 
influenced by Locke and both had much influence on the mind 
of Jefferson. While Chinard's statement concerning the 
origination of civil rights in the mind of Jefferson is debatable 
and will be taken up to some extent later, the degree of influence 
asserted by Chinard rests unchallenged. Kames served as a 
commentator on Locke and expressed the fundamental ideas in a 
more readable and practical language. Kames, like Jefferson, 
was a lawyer interested in legal philosophy. In 1751 he 
published the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Religion. In this treatise he supported the doctrine of 
"innate ideas" as opposed to freedom of the will. His innate 
ideas not only structured human thinking but contained it. 
The doctrine drew immediate protests from the clergymen and 
Christian apologists.2 
In about the year 1764 Jefferson wrote a strikingly 
astute piece of work in the appendix of his Reports of 
Cases Determined in the General Court of Virginia. He 
discusses 
the most remarkable instance of Judicial 
legislation that has ever occurred in English jurisprudence or perhaps in any other. It is 
that of the adoption in mass of the whole code 
of another nation, and its incorporation into 
the legitimate system by usurpation of the 
Judges alone, without a particle of legislative 
will having ever been called on, or exerc3sed 
towards its introduction or confirmation. 
1. Chinard, TJ, 30. 
2. Kames also wrote treatises on agriculture, a subject of 
immediate interest to Jefferson. 
3. Jefferson, WOJA I, 360. "Whether Christianity is Part or 
the Common Law was written circa 1765. 
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In this short discussion Jefferson ably illustrates the 
inclusion of Hebrew law into British Common Law. He claims 
that it was not done by legislative procedure but through the 
autonomous actions of the judges. Although it begins by being 
purely technical, before the reader is through, he suspects 
that Jefferson was already formulating his thoughts on the 
necessary separation of the church and state. As a matter 
of fact, almost all homogeneous systems of law are~rmed by 
the continual interaction of legislative bodies and judges. 
His central criticism turns on the point that when the 
state and church trade functions, they are neutralized. The 
state is incapable of interpreting the scriptures and legal 
terminology is unsuitable for the appropriation of spiritual 
meanings. He adds to this an evident distrust of the close 
cooperation theretofore existing between the judges of England 
and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It is not surprising that 
there should be a close relationship between church and state 
law in England because of the very nature of the Establishment. 
In England and Wales complications arise 
owing to the close connection between church 
and state, which involves the result that 
the church's law cannot ~ecome binding unless 
the state assents to it. 
There is no doubt as to the authenticity of Jefferson's 
claim. In Chinard 1 s2 treatment of this early development 
in the mind of Jefferson, he oversimplifies Jefferson's 
motivation by laying it to a single factor. 
1. Griffith, Art., VII* 840-847. 
2. Chinard, TJ, 31•32o 
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Chinard makes the following analysis. Jefferson believed 
English Common Law to be common law plus the biases and 
alterations induced by subsequent jurists, priests, conquerors, 
and kings. He attempts to return to the original and the 
work discussed above is only one instance of the attempt. 
Jefferson claims that the additions made by the hierarchy 
are not only technically illegal, but more important, the 
Hebrew laws contained in Exodus are not indigenous to England 
and the colonies. Chinard points out that this was not 
necessarily new for it was fully discussed in the last chapter 
of Blackstone's Commentaries.1 But the motivation for 
Jefferson's early acceptance of the thesis Chinard leys 
solely to Jefferson's provincialism. 
True, Jefferson was a resident of a lonely intellectual 
outpost within the British Empire. He did not have recourse 
to the intellectual battles then raging in Europe and could 
lay his hands on few current periodicals. But he did have a 
friend in the person of Governor Fauquier who was competent 
in undertaking the task of enlightenment. In those days of 
1. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) produced in the 
Commentaries a popular exposition of the laws of England. 
11He propounds in terms the doctrine that municipal or 
positive laws derive their validity from their conformity 
to the so-called law of nature or law of God." Sherwood, 
Enc. Brit., discussed Blackstone's wor.k as an unsc1entific 
Handbook or English law for laymen. It has a beautiful 
style but in trying to reduce the heterogenous body of 
law to reasonable ~recepts, he has violated much of its 
content. It is a genuine outcome of 18th. century culture 
and a true exposition of the 18th century standpoint." 
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relatively poor systems of communication most thinkers 
worked in comparative isolation. Jefferson's early thought 
on the church and the state cannot be explained and justified 
on the basis of his isolation. His criticism in the appendix 
was scholarly and technically correct. That it was only one 
phase of his thought on the subject goes without saying; he 
had already had a number of negative experiences with the clergy. 
As late as 1814 he sent a copy of the dissertation to Thomas 
Cooperl in evident justification of his former thought even 
though he had by then become a true citizen of western 
culture.2 
At this point, by way of summary, a number of statements 
can be made concerning the early life of Jefferson ~ich 
are of particular interest to the subsequent chapters. 
Jefferson was an aristocrat and is always to be understood 
in that light; he possessed independent means and unlike 
many of his contemporaries was able to avail himself of an 
advanced education. From the first his financial independence 
provided him with the conditions for a wide latitude in the 
choice of his studies. He could afford to spend long hours 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 306, fn. 
2. Chinard 1 s statement concerning the provincial nature of 
Jefferson must be placed in the larger context of an 
argument which Chinard attempts to develop throughout 
his works on Jefferson. He holds that Jefferson was 
only slightly influenced by contemporary thought and 
places the whole range of Jefferson's thinking between 
the two poles of Stoicism on the one hand and Epicureanism 
on the other. This, in spite of the fact that throughout 
his discussion he lists the names of English and French 
thinkers, particularly those of Bolingbroke, Milton, 
Shakespeare, Buchanan, Dryden, Thompson, Moss, Pelloutier, 
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with the classics, in that day and age, a mark of the true 
gentleman. Doubtless, they meant more than that to him for 
they became the substrata of his thought, the great back-
ground of his later studies. 
Jefferson had as personal friends the outstanding 
political and intellectual leaders of the colony, but little 
or no acquaintance with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. For the 
most part they were indifferent to the church if not 
antagonistic to it. With the exception of his tutors, 
Jefferson seldom mentions the leaders of the colonial church. 
It is significant that quite early in life he associated 
himself with a secular fraternity which drew upon the ancient 
humanists for its intellectual fare. 
Before acquainting himself with the theoretical aspects of 
law, Jefferson gained a thorough knowledge of cases and 
the empirical studies of cases. His introduction to civil 
processes was immediate and practical; the studies in the 
ultimate justification for governments were to come later. 
However, the studies which were later to eventuate in his 
doctrine of the separation of church and state began at a 
relatively early date. 
Kames, and Voltaire as having been read by Jefferson and also 
as having influenced him. Although it simplifies the 
discussion it is not necessarily accurate. His basis for 
labeling Jefferson a Stoic in his early years is based 
entirely on the first letter discussed at any length in this 
chapter. It is an unstable basis at best. This is 
discussed further in Koch, POJ, 4. 
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It is far too early to classify Jefferson as a Stoic, 
particularly on the basis of the letter to Page quoted above. 
It is quite possible that the Stoic overtones cames to Jefferson 
through the writings of Paul, not Cicero. It is the finding 
of this dissertation that Chinard was overly anxious to pin 
the label of Stoicism upon him, so anxious that he based the 
claim on a rather ragged thread of questionable evidence. 
Jefferson's most scholarly work in historical research 
was accomplished at a relatively early age and anticipated 
his later attitude toward the church, it was his 8 Vfuether 
Christianity is Part of the Common Law." 
Already, the trend of his later thought is clearly 
evident and it is to be noted that there is little or no 
French influence. 
With the names of Small, Wythe, and Fauquier we may outline 
the extent of Jefferson's future interests. As a student 
of Small, he arrived at his interest in philosophy and the 
sciences. From Wythe he achieved his interest in law and the 
classics. Indirectly from Wythe he also found an interest 
in government, and current European thinking. No one of 
these men answered all of Jefferson's intellectual demands 
during these formative years but all three did much to shape 
his future development. Of the three, it was from Wythe 
that he gained the most. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 
With Jefferson's election to the House of Burgesses in 
1769 he began the legislative phase of his life. Although 
he was subsequently to occupy several executive positions, 
he always maintained a rigid and consistent deference for the 
legislative department of the government. It was, for him, the 
source of good government and the judge of the executive and the 
judicial. He was not nafflicted with the morbid rage of 
debaten1 and therefore made most of his outstanding contributions 
in committee. Early recognized as an outstanding writer, he 
was called upon to draft various public papers that he did and 
did not initiate. 
It is difficult to compare the Virginia House of 
Burgesses in 1769 with the present state legislatures. It 
was the top of the political ladder; the governor was appointed 
by the king and the upper house was appointed by the governor. 
The House of Burgesses was the greatest height that could be 
attained by popular suffrage. 
There is little of consequence for this discussion 
between the years of 1769 and 1774. In 1770 fire destroyed 
practically all of Jefferson's books, a catastrophe that has 
been shared by all of his subsequent biographers, as they have 
been at a loss to determine his earlier reading habits. At 
the same time it has furnished an index to his primary interest 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 81. 
III. Rights 45 
in books if it is assumed that he first purchased the ones 
he desired the most. In the legal argument, "Howell va. 
Netherland"1 he very effectively argued against extending 
slavery to the grandchildren of a mixed union. The technical 
details of this argument are unimportant for it was a problem 
in litigation. Yet it is evident that Jefferson was already 
developing an uneasy conscience on the question of slavery. 
It is highly probable that Jefferson wrote the "Resolutions 
ot Albemarle County," July 26th, 1774 but the contents are so 
similar to the "summary View" which it is known that he did 
write, there is no need of discussing it in detail. 
His first public paper of great consequence, "A Summary 
View of the Rights of British America," was published in 
1774 at Williamsburg. The occasion was the departure of the 
delegates from he colony of Virginia to the third general 
meeting of the Colonies. He introduced it as a resolution to 
be confirmed by the House of Burgesses; it was designed as a 
guide tor the delegates. The resolution was voted down and 
tamer sentiments were drafted. However many who did agree 
with the resolution written by Jefferson had it printed in 
pamphlet form. Widely circulated in the colonies, it soon 
found its way to England and there met with detailed 
refutations and popular repercussions. The "Summary View" 
forms an excellent outline of his social philosophy at thirty-
one years of age. It is a potpourri of numerous and 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 373f. 
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heterogenous arguments having as their common goal the 
establishment of British }merica on a political basis 
comparable with that of Great Britain proper. 
The most significant political query in the document 
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is: "Why should the British parliament be above our colonial 
assemblies?" The question that is of considerable 
pertinence for social theorists and one that is repeatedly 
asked by Jefferson is: ~at is the basis of property owner-
ship in1he colonies?" By answering the second, and more basic 
of the two, he also answers the first. The answer stems from 
two distinct sources, history and philosophy. The answer from 
history is an attempted revival of Anglo-Saxon institutions 
(c. 500-700, 1066?). The philosophical answer in this 
instance is from John Locke's fifth chapter of the Second 
Treatise on Government and has to do with individual property 
rights. If the colonial soil in America is allodial, then the 
British parliament is on a par with the colonial assemblies. 
Thus the king forms a synthesis of the "parliaments," but he 
is not a feudal overlord; he is a bond and symbol, but not the 
full measure of sovereignty. On the other hand if the soil is 
not allodial Britain holds the colonies as feuds--a historical 
retrogression and recapitulation against Which every freedom-
loving individual will feel it necessary to bear arms. Since 
the adoption of the "Declaration of Rights" on February 13, 
1689 British subjects had maintained that among other things 
taxes could not be levied without the consent of Parliament. 
Jefferson's statement amounted to a clarification and extension 
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of this act as it applied to the legislative assemblies in the 
colonies. 
Jefferson had reason to believe that he was voicing the 
"united complaints" of the American subjects. Since it~s 
the firstttme that he had spoken for all of the colonies it is 
evident that he had been perusing many of the pamphlets then 
enjoying a wide distribution. In writing this paper, he 
introduced few concepts Which were original with him. He rode 
the wave of indignation which had begun before his birth and 
within the next two years was to culminate in the Revolution. 
In order to evaluate the wide acceptance of the pamphlet it will 
be necessary to review briefly some of these accumulated griev-
ances. Beard, in his Basic History of the United States 
summarizes this mounting feeling of unrest as it approached a 
climax. Stephenson in his A History of the American People 
likewise devotes considerable space to an evaluation of the 
social, intellectual, political, and religious trends.1 
Any attempt of this sort is admittedly walking on very shaky 
ground as historical cause and effect is difficult to trace~ 
Countless forces and motivations tended to separate the 
colonies from Great Britain. Middle class merchants, artisans, 
and farmers released on a "free" continent with infinite 
capacity for the increase of wealth destroyed the ancient lines 
and social distinctions which could only exist under a limited 
1. Stephenson, HAP, Chapters VII and VIII. 
2. Stephenson i~troduces the theory that the Great Awakening 
was the first event in the colonies to transgress colonial 
boundaries, HAP, 155. 
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economy. Learning was quickly disseminated and literacy 
climbed to unprecedented heights. Although the degree of 
literacy cannot be ascertained accurately, it was undoubtedly 
high as compared with the older countries of Europe. This 
is evident from the large distribution of magazines, books 
and newspapers.1 
An enquiring mind such as Jefferson's had ample 
opportunity to familiarize itself with distinctively American 
problems as they developed. One of the indexes to the 
increased opportunities for advancement, learning, and the 
accumulation of wealth may be found in the fact that during 
the seventeeth century approximately one hundred thousand 
servants rose from bondage to freedom. 2 As early as 1676 an 
armed rebellion led by Nathaniel Bacon broke out in Virginia. 
In 1717 John Wise of Ipswich, Massachusetts preached the 
philosophy of equal rights, equality, and a definition of 
government which provided for the earthly happiness of the 
individual.3 Individual, this-worldly happiness was a thought 
foreign to most pulpits of 1717. The doctrine of natural rights 
appeared in the uprisings in New Jersey between 1745 and 1754; 
it was directed, not against the British, but against an 
American brand of oligarchy, the great landlords of New Jersey. 
The petitioners maintained that the land was to be owned by 
1. Davidson, PAR, 209f. Davidson estimates that one half of 
the men and one fourth of the women were literate. 
2. Beard, BUS, 53. Ct. Stephenson, RAP, 145, for a discussion 
of this neglected element in American development. 
3. Beard, BUS, 54. 
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the man who improved it; to deny this was to rebel against 
the provisions of "natural justice."1 This Lockian theory of 
property will be discussed later when it is echoed in the 
"Summary View." 
The Paxton Boys, a revolutionary group from Western 
Pennsylvania were prevented from firing on Philadelphia only 
by the foresight of F'ranklin who consented to accept a formal 
petition maintaining their "Natural Privileges of Freedom and 
Equality."2 There was general unrest in other colonies among 
the disaffected tenants end small landholders. North Carolina, 
Georgia, and New York may be mentioned in particular. In the 
letter, the Levellers of the Hudson River Valley were in open 
and armed conflict, a disturbance which lasted until troops 
were summoned.3 In Massachusetts a series of incidents spread 
into a general conflagration over the revocation of the 
Charter; the appeal here was made to religious doctrines.4 
According to Beard, the leaflets and other provocative 
writings of the period were concerned with four major 
questions. 
What is the origin of human government and by 
what right does one set of men make laws for, 
and govern, all the rest of the people? What 
is the place of the colonists in the British 
Empire and what rights do they and should they 
enjoy as British subjects in America primarily 
as human beings? What are the sciences, arts, 
end opportunities of commerce which will promote 
the economic and social welfare of the American 
l. Beard, BUS, 55. 
2. Davidson, PAR, 33f. Cf. the Colonial Records of 
Pennsylvania, 1683-1790, IX, 138. 
3. Davidson, PAR, 33. 
4. Van Tyne, CWI, 33-36. 
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people? What after all, are the great ends 
of human liff and how may men and women best 
attain them? 
In 1765 John Adams repeatedly placed pen to paper in 
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order to call for a great experiment in freedom. The armed 
conflict came as a result of a cultural revolution which 
had been in progress for over a century. The three thousand 
miles of rough Atlantic symbolized a breach, a wedge that 
penetrated into every area of human life. The break was so 
thorough that the best minds in America were free to search 
the whole history of human thought in justification of their 
violent act and for guidance that would lead them in building 
not only a new nation but a new culture. The extent to which 
the new freedom influenced every walk of life may be 
appreciated by referring to the various fields of endeavor 
from which sprang the leaders of the new era. Clergymen, 
lawyers, physicians, and publishers joined in defense of their 
rights and when they defended their own rights, they defended 
the rights of all. The works of Edward Coke (Coke upon 
Littleton, 1628), John Locke (Treatise on Government, 1690), 
Montesquieu {Esprit des Lois, 1748), and Adam Ferguson 
{An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 1757) were drawn upon 
and widely distributed among the laymen, directly and 
indirectly. The doctrines of natural right, pursuit of 
happiness, and utility became common property.2 
1. Beard, BUS, 56. Ct. Davidson, PAR, II. 
2. Beard, BUS, 63-4. 
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Even though the cultural background had readied the 
people for the great break, it still would not have been 
possible if it had not been for two other factors. The 
charters of the colonies had provided for local governments 
and these began at the town and county level. Also, the 
economic opportunities made it possible for the colonists to 
carry the ideals into effect. A hasty glance at the above 
list will show that all of the basic authors who inspired 
the revolution were themselves citizens of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Europe. The books were published there 
firstl Yet the people in Europe who read them could not 
put them into effect. When Jefferson was seated in the 
Virginia House of Burgesses in 1769 it was exactly 150 years 
old, only 26 years younger than the American Congress in the 
year 1952. Over six generations had sent delegates to the 
colonial capital to present their case to the king's personal 
representative. 
the colonists.l 
Thus partial self-government was not new to 
In spite of the fact that only a small 
percentage, sometimes as low as two percent of the people, 
participated 1n the regular elections, it was of primary 
interest to many more. The county court house offered daily 
lessons in local administration and litigation. The seed, 
when blown to new soil, found rootage and a climate suitable 
to reproduction. 
The governor of the colonies was the point of contact 
1. Van Tyne, CWI, 40f. and 86f. 
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with the foreign overseer, the king of England. He had in 
most cases the power to dissolve the assembly, to choose 
the members of the upper house, and to veto bills. In many 
cases by indirection he was able to bring about arbitrary acts 
of injustice without the consent of the people in any form. 
Because of these arbitrary acts the people had long accustomed 
themselves to the conviction that they could limit his powers. 
Before the time of Jefferson they had sent six back to England 
and made life intolerable for many others. Most legislatures 
agre~d on the following nine prerogatives. 
To introduce and enact bills on all matters of 
local and general interest in the colony, subject 
to the terms of the charter and English law. 
To fix the kinds and amounts of taxation to be 
laid on the people. 
To pass upon the governor's actions in the 
nature of legislation. 
To control the voting of money to pay salaries, 
including the governor's, and audit the disbursement 
of funds. 
To create courts of law and regulate the salaries 
of judges. 
To choose and pay agents charged with lobbying for 
or against measures pending in the Parliament or before 
royal officers in London. 
To elect the speaker of the house. 
To decide disputes over contested seats and check 
any resort to corruption on the part of the governor 
in elections. 
To have periodical electionf of menbers fixed by 
law at from two to five years. 
At one point the American colonists were lacking in 
experience. During most of the colonial development the 
British government had sharply regulated inter-colonial 
trade. Parallel strings extended from the British crown to 
1. Beard, BUS, 80. 
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the American colonies; at few points were they tangled and 
intertwined. In effect, all important inter-colonial 
business involved a government three thousand miles away 
although only a few miles might have separated the participants. 
In spite of this division, the colonies had taken 
steps in later years to express their common interests and 
grievances. Newspapers began to leap the colonial boundaries 
and the colonial assemblies established committies whose 
business it was to communicate with other assemblies.1 
Circular letters were instituted by one assembly and quickly 
found their way to others. Previous to the congress to 
which Jefferson addressed his "Summary View" the colonists had 
had occasion to call two other representative meetings. The 
first was held in Albany, New York in 1754; it was intended to 
cement the common interests of all the colonists. Although 
immediately ineffectual, it defined the problems which were to 
be encountered by succeeding assemblies. The second was the 
Stamp Act Congress which met in October, 1765. Between the 
years 1763 and 1767 nine repressive acts were passed which 
rocked the colonies to their foundations and brought about 
the classic rebuttals of Patrick Henry and others. They 
were: The Royal Order (1763), the Sugar Act (1764), the 
Currency Act (1764), the Stamp Act (1764), the Quartering 
Act (1765), the Declaratory Act (1766), the Customs Collecting 
Act (1767), the Revenue Act (1767), and the Tea Act (1767). 
Six of the nine were strictly economic in character and were 
1. Jefferson, I, 171. 
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related to the collection of taxes. The Royal Order 
reserved western lands for the king. The Quartering Act 
was an order of requisition and made all colonists liable for 
the upkeep of the soldiers. Onl~ the Declaratory Act dealt 
specificall~ with the theory of government. It was a 
declaration of supremsc~ on the part of the British parliament 
stating that it had the right to levy taxes on the American 
colonists. With this brief survey in mind the principles 
involved in Jefferson's "Summary View" ma~ be better understood. 
In the opening sentences Jefferson speaks of the "united 
complaints" of the American subjects. In making this state-
ment he was on firm ground; the first Continental Congress 
presupposed just such communit~. Referring to the rights which 
"God and the laws have given equally and independently to sll,nl 
Jefferson asserts the doctrine of equalit~. Apart from his 
personal piety, the reference may have been intended to strike 
a chord of response among the religiousl~ inclined as well as 
to place a limitation upon natural law. In a previous appeal 
he had joined with John Walker in asking the people of the 
parish of St. Anne to join in fasting and prayer "to implore the 
divine interposition in behalf of an injured and oppressed 
It is almost certain that the motivation in this 
appeal was intent on using religious sentiment to crystallize 
the opposition to British oppression. It was not customary for 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 429. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 418. 
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the House of Burgesses, which initiated the appeal, to call 
on the people to fast and pray. No religious authorities 
were consulted before it was agreed upon and the political 
opportunism involved is obvious. 
The use of the term God in the "Summary View" might 
well have had similar motivation. That God might be mindful 
of equal rights was proposed for the most part by Deists, the 
religiously enthusiastic sons of the Enlightenment. Finding 
its basis in the first feeble attempts in the field of com-
parative religions rather than in the Christian Bible, it was 
a novel doctrine for most laymen of 1774. God as judge, God 
as wrathful, God as vengeful, God as virtuous, even God as 
beneficent, were familiar enough, but not God as the guarantor 
of equality. As has been pointed out previously many laymen 
were familiar with Locke's political theories but few had become 
thoroughgoing Deists. Up until this time it had been thought 
that God was always on the side that not only placed race over 
race but within the race itself supported sharp class 
distinctions. 
The depository of English legal theory, the English 
constitution was that to which Jefferson referred when he said 
that the laws also guaranteed equality. Here he was on firm 
ground. Beard offers a summary of the British constitution 
to this effect. 
Und~r the English 'constitution' Englishmen 
everywhere in the realm have certain rights 
which cannot be taken from them, such as the 
right to share, through their representatives, 
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in the making of laws and the laying of taxes; 
the purpose of government is to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of the people; 
when tyranny or oppression takes the place 
of protection, the people have a right to 
change the government by revolution if 
necessary; all human beings are equal and 
have a right to obtain the land necessary to 
a 11velihood.l 
56 
If the appeal to God was for the religiously inclined then 
the appeal to law was directed toward the secular. Between 
them, they were designed to place the "Summary View" on a 
firm basis. But other arguments were to be used, arguments 
with a much deeper motivation than the ones quoted above. 
In the same paragraph, Jefferson, using some eight 
lines to define the duties of the king, refers neither to 
God or law as a source. Using the terminology of a 
Bolingbroke or a Locke, but not a Hobbes, he draws a line 
around the monarchy which, if read by King George III, 
doubtless made him writhe with indignation • 
••• When he LKing George III7 reflects that he is 
no more than the chief officer of the people, 
appointed by the laws, and circumscribed with 
definite powers, to assist in working the 
great machine of government, erected for their 
use, and, consequently, subject to their 
superintendence; and, in order that these, our 
rights, as well as the invasions of them, mey 
be laid more fully before his Majesty, to take 
a view of them, from the origin and first 
settlement of these countries.2 
This definition of kingly duties could well have been 
taken directly from Locke's Essay Concerning Toleration 
written in 1667. 
l. Beard, BUS, 90. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 429. 
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The whole trust, power, and authority of the 
magistrate, is vested in him for no other 
purpose but to be made use of for the good, 
preservation and peace of men in that society 
over which he is set, end therefore that this 
alone is and ought to be the standard and 
measure according to which he ought to square 
and proportion his laws, model and frame his 
government. 
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But there was no need for Jefferson to read this directly for 
over one hundred years separated the ttEssay" and the 
"summary View,tt a century during which the eruption of the 
idea of natural rights as interpreted by Locke had ample 
time to find its way into numerous articles, books, and 
pamphlets. Doubtless the walls of the House of Burgesses had 
echoed to similar thoughts before. The impertinence of the 
definition is not found so much in the words themselves as in 
the fact that a subject, what is worse, a colonial, was 
attempting to circumscribe the duties of a magistrate. 
Although many monarchs would have subscribed to most of the 
definition, it was the king 1 s prerogative, not the subject's, 
to define the office. The wise ruler always made it appear 
as if each hard-won concession was actually a gift, never a 
right. 
It must be noted that Jefferson in writing the "Summary 
View" implied that there was a third ground to which he 
could appeal. Every ruling implies a judicial prerogative, a 
position of objectivity. Jefferson in the "Summary Viewtt 
strives to establish such a position. Nature is appealed 
to as having given man the right to change the place of his 
1. This essay is quoted in part by William s. Carpenter, Art., 
xi. The complete essay is ~rinted in Fox Bourne, ~ 
of John Locke, I, 174-194. (1876). 
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habitation if it is not his choice. But since nature was the 
touchstone of his day, there is little evidence that he, 
himself, had thought through the metaphysical implications 
involved, at least, by this time in his career. 
Jefferson had evidently been turning through the 
relatively few pages of British history covering the time 
from Hengest and Horsa (449) to the beginning of the eighth 
century When he wrote the following lines. 
That their Saxon ancestors had, under this 
universal law, in like manner, left their 
native wilds and woods in the North of 
Europe, had possessed themselves of the 
Island of Britain, then less charged with 
inhabitants, and had established there that 
system of laws Which has so long been1the glory and protection of that country. 
Later 1n a letter, which was probably addressed to Edmund 
Pendleton on August 13, 1776, he goes into greater detail. 
Are we not the better for what we have 
hitherto abolished of the feudal system? 
Has not every restitution of the antient 
Liic7 Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not~etter now that we return at once into 
that happy system of our ancestors, the 
wisest and most perfect ever yet devised 
by the wit o~ man, as it stood before the 
8th century? 
In the Journals of Congress there appears the notation 
stating that Jefferson recommended the two Saxon chiefs, 
Hengest and Horsa, be placed on the federal sea1.3 In the 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle immediately following the notation 
that "John the Baptist revealed his head to two monks ••• on 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 430. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, II, so. 
3. Chinard, TJ, 86. 
III. Rights 59 
the spot which was formerly Herod's residence,w there appears 
the relatively extended discourse to the effect that Hengest 
and Horsa landed (449-450-455) in Britain to assist King 
Vortigern against the Picts.l This was the first recorded 
Saxon invasion although there were probably others.2 Jefferson 
chooses the period from 450 to 700 as the golden era in 
English history. The near decade of 690-699 marks the time 
during which Theodore of Tarsus, Archbishop of Canterbury, 
"Created a new concept of kingship.w3 Actually, the English 
nation did not appear until about the ninth century with the 
ascendancy of the West Saxons.4 It is substantially true that 
during this time a system of government prevailed in the seven 
Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, the Saxon Heptarchy, which was unlike 
anything to be practised again until the reforms during which 
parliament gained control. There is likewise a rough analogy 
between the thirteen states and the Saxon Heptarchy. But the 
conclusion which Jefferson drew had to be based on facts which 
were stretched and forced into place. It was not a system of 
government that an impartial observer would wish to recreate 
in the eighteenth century but only one which a revolutionary 
scholar might find useful in furnishing a precedent for an 
essentially novel act. 
The Angles and the Saxons were the most dominant tribes 
which finally evolved into the English nation. During the 
1. Anon, ASC, 309f. 3. Langer, ~H, 166. 
2. Stenton, ASE, 17. 4. Baldwin, GE, 21. 
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days of the seven kingdoms they maintained a hereditary 
nobility along with commons, serfs, and slaves, The commons 
or ceorls were the freemen in each kingdom and varied in 
their legal value to the kings, The serfs and slaves can be 
known only by inference, There is no direct mention of their 
conditions or place in the various Anglo-Saxon institutions. 
That they existed is proved almost beyond a doubt and it may 
be that this is one of the facts that Jefferson overlooked in 
his study of early English institutions. For contrary to the 
thought of Jefferson, feudalism had made serious inroads into 
the political institutions of the people long before the 
eighth century. Yet there was one fact which slipped with 
extraordinary ease into the American brief, The freemen, the 
ceorls, participated in a government which is described by 
Baldwin as proto-democratic.l One hundred freemen comprised 
a 1moot, 1 They were assembled by a moot-hom and the act of 
mooting was jealously guarded, But even the democratic moot 
could have little to say about national decisions; they only 
settled local conflicts and proclaimed local laws. The king 
presided over a council of his own appointees, Even though 
they were appointed by the king, there are records to indicate 
that they had the power of deposition and often asserted that 
right.2 The witan or the national moot chosen by the king 
could choose another king from the royal family without regard 
1, Baldwin, GE, 23. 
2. Baldwin, GE, 23. 
III. Rights 61 
to primogeniture, a cornerstone of the evolving feudal system 
Which was to be hewn later. Therefore the king was not a 
sovereign but a leader. The basis of local government rested 
in the freemen, that of the national in the members of the 
witan. Undoubtedly it~s this proto-democracy which attracted 
Jefferson. 
Jefferson, returning to the subject again in the "Summary 
View" makes some further statements on this, one of his 
favorite subjects. 
In the earlier ages of the Saxon settlement, 
feudal holdings were certainly altogether 
unknown and very few, if any, had been 
introduced at the time of the Norman conquest.l 
In the year 1066 William the Norman or as he 'is often called, 
William the Conqueror, defeated the Britons on October 14th, 
in the battle of Hastings. According to Jefferson, therefore, 
there were few characteristically feudal institutions before 
the later half of the eleventh century, He specifically 
states "feudal holdings;" yet, even with the sparse character 
of early English history it is certain that the seven Saxon 
kingdoms were largely feudal by the time of the eighth century, 
possibly even the sixth. The aristocratic element was 
significant in the latter part of the seventh century according 
to the laws of Ine.2 The freeman was already called upon to 
pay a food-rent, a feorm and serve in the military forces, the 
!I!£• In Wessex the normal annual dues to a lord, according 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 443. 
2. Stanton, ASE, 275. 
III. Rights 62 
to the laws of Ina, clearly indicate the "management of an 
estate for a lord's protit."1 It was e common practice for 
the commoner to be called upon to support the king and his 
retinue when the king passed his way. Couriers, and hunters 
tor the king also claimed this right and it could be evaded 
only by heavy fees. Holders of unenfranchised land were forced 
to cart goods, build roads, and bridges end repair the estate 
of the king. It is almost iMpossible to know just When these 
feudal holdings began. In the middle of the seventh century 
however there is a record of the king giving a large estate 
to a lord.2 Stanton states that there were probably such grants 
in the sixth century. Grants from the king to the members of 
his retinue and friendly ecclesiastics laid one of the first 
bases for the feudal economy. The people had originally had 
some defense against this but it was not effective. As the 
lords and bishops assumed control they appropriated the lands 
to themselves, if by no other means, then through overburdening 
taxes. Since the king had the power to do the same thing it 
is probable that from time to time such was the case. Under 
the year 855 in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle the following state-
ment is found. "And the same year king Ethelwulf gave by 
charter the tenth part of his land throughout his realm for 
the glory of God and his own eternal salvation." The laws of 
Ine establish irrevocably the fact that a manorial economy 
penetrated back to the seventh eentury.4 In this economy the 
tenant is still tree in the sense that he can leave, but the 
1. Stenton, ASE, 285. 3. Anon, ASC, 349. 
2. Stenton, ASE, 298. 4. Stenton, ASE, 309. 
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land very plainly belongs to the lord. Obviously if a king 
made a gift of an estate it had to be his in the first place 
to give. Jefferson is partly correct in his short summary 
of Anglo...Se.xon lsncl ovr::.ership but he overstresses the point. 
His conclusion that British common law was based on allodial 
holdings is, however, in serious error. The laws of Ine, one 
of the three authorities quoted by Alfred and one of the most 
complete records available today, show many instances of feudal 
economy. Much later, William the Conqueror played an important 
role in hastening the feudal development but it cannot be said 
that his actions were decisive. 
In spite of the fact that Jefferson was largely wrong, 
his argument would have been welcomed by the struggling colonists 
if it had not been for three factors. It is patent that it 
did not catch the imagination of the people or the leadership. 
In the first place, Jefferson falls into the error of 
Rousseau and Locke on the question of origins. To prove ~hat 
a certain institution existed at the beginning of a certain 
era is not to prove its worth; in itself, it is nothing more 
thsn antiquarian research.1 Every institution, original or 
derived, must come under the scope of reasonable comparison 
according to certain general principles. On the question of 
early Anglo-Saxon institutions Jefferson became suddenly 
gullible. He accepted the seeds of feudalism along with this 
early manifestation of democracy. He implies that the 11basis 
l. Cp. Bowne, POE, 2-3. 
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or groundwork of the common law"1 is the best part of that law 
because it is the original, not because it is judged best by 
comparison. 
In the second place, Jefferson makes a sharp break in 
English history at the time of the Norman conquest which is not 
justified. This schism serves to emphasize the distinction 
between the pure Anglo-Saxon heritage and the foreign impurities 
imported with William the Conqueror. Thus the American 
colonies become, for Jefferson, the first reestablishment of 
the pure heritage; the foreign is sloughed off. 
The third reason why Jefferson's reasoning did not catch 
the fancy and imagination (or condemnation) of others was 
because it was based on an era that was almost totally unknown. 
Whatever the institutional types in the fifth and sixth 
centuries there was certainly no prize for the scribe. 
Jefferson's argument was in error and it was not accepted 
by the people along with the rest of his thought. In spite of 
this~ct there are historians who attempt to explain his Whole 
political philosophy by this key. Nothing could be further 
from the truth but it was necessary to discuss it in some detail 
to disprove their contentions. Chinard, one of the outstanding 
biographers of Jefferson has this to say: 
This L6arly Anglo-Saxon principl!J is the true 
foundation of Jefferson's political philosophy. 
No greater mistake could be made than to look 
for his sources in Locke, Montesquieu, or 
Rousseau. The Jeffersonian democracy was born 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 444. 
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under the sign of Hingest and Horsa, not of 
the Goddess Reason. 
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Falling prey to the chronicler's temptation, Chinard denies 
the wider aspects of history. The forced alternative is 
deceptive; it is not either the Saxon brothers or reason, 
but both and much more. They are not exclusive but readily 
combine; it was the reasonableness inherent in the Anglo-Saxon 
system of government that made him think it might be 
applicable to 1774. It was the reasonable mind of a lawyer 
that led him to search tor a precedent and believe that he 
had found it in the early Anglo-Saxon culture. 
Chinard is quite right when he says that Jefferson did 
not find the sources of his political philosophy in Rousseau; 
few have claimed that he did. Likewise, as will be shown, 
Montesquieu made only a slight contribution. But Locke is in 
an altogether different category. Those parts of Jefferson's 
thought Which this dissertation traces to the writings of 
Locke can hardly be found in the thought of Hengest and Horsa. 
Chinard has placed himself in the position of either finding 
such a source or relinquishing the claim. 
In the treatise written by Jefferson in 1764, "Whether 
Christianity is Part of the Common Law?"2 he draws the same 
line in British history, that is, the early eighth century. 
Previously the common law gathered and written by Alfred had 
quoted only from Ine, Offa, end Aethelbert, not from the 
scriptures. But an officious monk appended sections taken 
1. Chinard, TJ, 87. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 360-7. 
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from Exodus, sections which are contrary to the common law. 
The abuses which followed the eighth century were therefore, 
in the mind of Jefferson, not only legal but religious. By 
referring to the true Anglo-Saxon civilization between 450-
?00 A.D., he was not only defying the absolutistic monarchy 
but also the domination of the church, He ignored the fact 
that most people would believe that a system Which had lasted 
ten centuries was more indigenous to the race than one that had 
lasted only two. He felt secure in ignoring it because be 
believed that the cultural distinctions between England and 
Colonial America justified a break so complete that the 
colonists could choose their own heritage. 
The "Summary View" makes clear that the debt owed to 
England could be repaid by trade alone, and that the king, 
not the Parliament, was the proper link binding together 
Britain and all her colonies, The Parliament had no right to 
levy taxes. The king is reminded that the people in the past 
(James II in the revolution of 1688) had asserted the right to 
depose the king, Although it is to be used only in cases of 
"extreme necessity," it nevertheless is a right, 
The phrase "natural rights" is used repeatedly, Just 
as for Locke there was no difference between Nature and 
"nature" there was likewise no distinction for Jefferson except 
that they were the two parts of the same plant: "nature" 
being the utilitarian branches and Nature the metaphysical 
root.1 There is little evidence to indicate that Jefferson 
i. Locke, ECG, II, 118-124; Windelband, HOP, 503, 
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had fully explored the implications of the root except that he, 
like Locke, equated the laws of God and the laws of nature.1 
In the "Summary View" at least he used the terms God and 
natural rights interchangeably.2 In saying that Jefferson used 
these terms with little or no distinction between them does 
not mean that he, like Locke, equated reason and revelation 
or the law of Nature and revealed religion. At least one way 
in which the ideas of Locke came to Jefferson was through the 
works of Bolingbroke. On many important questions Locke and 
Bolingbroke agreed but Bolingbroke, unlike Locke, used the same 
principle of lnvestigation in regard to the revealed religions 
that Locke used in regard to monarchies. Therefore ~hen 
Jefferson used the terms God end nature in the "Summary View" he 
did not mean, necessarily, natural rights as revealed in the 
Old and New Testaments. Reason was for him at all times and 
places the judge of revelation, neither equal or subservient to 
it. With the help of Bolingbroke, he had advanced much further 
in this respect.3 The efforts of the early leaders of the 
enlightenment--Hooker, Rousseau, and Locke--to establish the 
reasonableness of the Christian religion4 had been dashed on the 
rocks by men who had placed reason above revelation without an 
attempted reconciliation. Jefferson reconciled reason and religion 
but at the expense of the seventeenth century revealed religion. 
In a letter probably addressed to Edmund Pendleton on 
1. Windelbend, HOP, 503. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 429, 432. 
3. Locke, ECG, 122, 11. 
4. Cf. Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity. 
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August 13, 1776, Jefferson refers to a hasty production in 
which he states that the lands held in the American colonies 
are allodial. The "hasty production" could be no other than 
the "Summary View" for it was intended to have been "put under 
a course of severe correction"1 but because of his illness on 
the road he had to send it on without the correction. 
Referring to the colonial soil as being allodial, he said: 
"This opinion I have thought and still think to prove if ever 
I should have time to look into books again."2 In the "Summary 
View" he did not prove it by the original charters but 
rather by the twin appeal to Hengest and Horsa on the one hand 
and Locke on the other. Here he refers to "certain other sets 
of the British Parliament, by which they would prohibit us 
from manufacturing, for our own use, the articles we raise on 
our own lands, with our own labor."3 Chapter Five of Locke's 
An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and end of 
Civil Government, discusses property rights and develops the 
viewpoint that since every man has "property" in his own 
person, "The labor of his body and the 'work' of his hands ••• 
are properly his."4 It was this doctrine to which Jefferson 
appealed in the "Summary View." Although specific quotations 
from the original charters showing that ~he colonial lands were 
allodial would have meant more to the king, he was not adverse 
to using this principle of Locke's which indicates that it was 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 78-83. 3. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 434. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 78. 4. Locke, ECG, 130, 26. 
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rather generally accepted at the time; however, it was not 
accepted by the king. 
Since the "Summary View" was not presented at court but 
was published for all to read, it may well be true that 
Jefferson gained more for the cause by appealing to this 
universal principle or property rights than if he had proved 
it tnrough the traditional method of litigation. Locke's 
point of origin is comparable to the Cartesian principle or 
existence. Both are egoistic and individualistic. The "I am" 
or Descartes becomes the "I own" in Locke's doctrine of 
property rights. Locke's premise cauterizes physical slavery 
in the same way that Descarte 1s premise eliminates the tyranny 
of other minds. If we are to know through the senses we must 
own the physical body in a unique and private sense. That 
is, we are to develop freely and the body must have freedom or 
action. We must not only own it but we must be able to 
own property sufficient to feed and clothe it. This is not far 
from Hegel's theory that property is implicated in the idea of 
personality. 
Obviously other doctrines had made similar provisions and 
Locke's thought was only a shift in emphasis. But any shift 
away from a society which found the ideal life in the monastery 
or the feudal manor seemed good to the freemen of America in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
It is because the repressive measures of the king had the 
potential power to check the "population of our country"l 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 444. 
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that Jefferson believed the time had come to stop them. It 
is the "nature and purpose of civil institutions" to 
appropriate "all the lands within the limits which any particular 
party has circumscribed around itself. 111 If the social 
organization does not perform this task, "each individusl of the 
society, may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds 
vacant, and occupancy will give him title. 112 
In summary Jefferson states that the "whole art of 
government consists in the art of being honest."3 This is 
an oversimplification to which he did not accede, even in the 
treatise containing the statement, but it does point to the 
fact that he was trying to give the appeal a moral basis. 
This is echoed in the closing paragraph of the "Address to 
Governor Dunmore"4 in which Jefferson suggests that "we commit 
our injuries to the even handed justice of the Being who doth 
no wrong.n5 The Jeffersonian "Draft of Declaration on taking 
up Arms" is another catalogue of tyrannical acts and an appeal 
to "supreme reason."6 In a letter to John Page in 1775 under 
the stress of armed conflict Jefferson momentarily breaks with 
his Deistic terminology of "supreme reason" and in reference to 
British arms states that "the hand of God is upon them."7 
This outburst follows the news that a forty gun British ship 
had accidentally exploded in the harbor. 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 444. 5. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 459. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 444. 6. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 462-76. 
3. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 446. 7. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 495. 
4. Jefferson, WOJ, I, 459. 
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The letters of Jefferson during the year 1775 are filled 
with the cares and details of war. Having little time for 
further study he relied upon his earlier knowledge to furnish 
a justification for the break and subsequent revolution. 
Jefferson was early associated with the great lawmakers 
of the colony who dwelt on the smaller problems of the colony 
with the same care they were to employ later in its reorganization. 
From them he gained a considerable amount of practical knowledge 
in the routine processes of law making. Jefferson was interested 
in the early foundations of the common law in English history 
but having tried the method of antiquarian research to establish 
his point and found that it carried little weight, he did not 
take it up again. Rather, he turned to philosophy to justify his 
political theories. Jefferson was from the first swept up in the 
revolutionary ferment and although he retained his ability for 
objective and critical analysis, there is no indication that he 
ever favored the Tory movement. 
It is to be noted in this discussion which covers the time 
up to the writing of the Declaration of Independence, that 
there is nothing in the thought of Jefferson that was not in 
the minds of numerous other thinkers and writers of the period. 
The degree to which he had thought through the metaphysical 
implications of Locke's works is not known. Later in life 
it is certain that he had given them very thorough consideration. 
In his religious life he had probably found a correspondence 
between the Stoics and the contemporary Deists that he 
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appreciated and followed to some degree. But the evidence 
here is sketchy. The only ground for it is found by 
inferring from scattered phrases here and there in his 
writings which are not always consistent. The Sage of 
Monticello after the tum of the century could look back on 
these earlier days and arrange his thought according to 
metaphysical principles, but whether or not Jefferson was 
conscious of them at the time is another question. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DECLARATI(}! OF INDEPENDENCE 
The Autobiography, the one hundred and sixty-four page1 
journal beginning with the family background and concluding 
on the 21st of March, 1790, was written by Jefferson in 1821 
When he was seventy-seven years old. The Declaration is the 
only public paper reproduced in full in the Autobiography and 
the occasion of its authorship is described in the first 
person.2 In order to be "consistent with European delicacy" 
the decision to draft the Declaration was resolved by Congress 
assembled in a committee of the Whole.3 The deference and 
regard for European delicacy was prompted by the fear that 
without a Declaration, American ambassadors would not be 
acceptable to continental courts. 
The relatively few pages in the Autobiography which 
precede the actual text of the Declaration were written in 
retrospect. They are pages filled with the accumulated wisdom 
of a lifetime which had sifted and reexamined the original 
basis for independence taken down in note form at the time and 
found it sound. However, in spite of the considerable lapse 
of time, the proceedings related by Jefferson in the Auto-
biography correspond closely with other reports written at 
the same time. The formal debate lasted only two days. 
1. Jefferson, I, 1-164. Unless designated otherwise, 
references to Jefferson's writings will be made from 
the Memorial Edition. 
2. Jefferson, I, 28-38. 
3. Jefferson, I, 24. 
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"Wilson, Robert R. Livingston, E. Rutledge, Dickinson, and 
others" constituted the opposition and their arguments are 
faithfully recorded.1 Then he turns to the counter arguments 
presented by those with Whom he classed himself and the ones who 
were eventually triumphant, John Adams, Lee, Wythe, Who was 
Jefferson's early mentor, and others. Far from being dilatory 
or digressive, they are concise, conclusive, and arranged in 
legal style. 
The opponents of the bill claimed that although they were 
"friends to the measures," the time was not yet ripe for the 
following reasons. The sovereignty of the king was not in 
question; that had long since been disclaimed, but the 
sovereignty of Congress and the mechanics of representation were 
brought forth as impediments to capital action. Congress could 
take such action only with the mandate of the constituency,2 
Any formal declaration without such support would be so much 
wasted parchment. It is undeniably true that many of the dele-
gates did not have the required authority. In addition, the 
colonies were independent and a Congressional majority could 
not coerce a particular colony if it proved to be recalcitrant. 
The delegates assembled were there only for purposes of 
investigation and recommendation, each colony at this stage 
being understandably jealous of its individual prerogatives. 
Coercion, even implied coercion, might well have partitioned 
the infant Congress and further weakened it in international 
1. Jefferson, I, 18. 
2. Jefferson, I, 18. 
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eyes. As has been noted, the growing international 
consciousness constituted not an inconsiderable part of the 
slowly hardening mortar of union.l Further, France and 
Spain would be jealous of the rising power "which would one day 
certainly strip them of all their American possessions."2 
At any rate, the opponents argued, the mechanics of union would 
have to be investigated before the Declaration could be written. 
That would be in the distant future for the machinery had hardly 
begun to move. 
Those who demanded immediate action reminded their opponents 
that no one had argued for submission to the English monarchy. 
It had been one year, two and one half months since the battles 
of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. The boundaries of 
the debate itself proved the extent to which the colonies had 
divorced themselves from the mother country; the very 
implications of the arguments introduced by the opponents were 
of themselves pleading for explicit statement. The action 
having been virtually agreed upon, expediency was the only point 
of disagreement. That the assembled representatives considered 
the following arguments sound is evident for they readily 
voted in favor of the bill. 
The colonials enjoyed rights equal to those of the 
Englishman resident in England and as such were not subject to 
the British parliament which had been supplanted by the 
1. Jefferson, I, 20. 
2. Jefferson, I, 20. 
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representative ruling bodies of the respective colonies. 
From the beginning theirs had been a federation; they were 
subject to the king alone and that by their own consent. 
The ambiguous relationship of the colonial assemblies to the 
English Parliament will be treated later. Here it need only 
be noted as an index to the seeming paradox evident in the 
lack of sympathy on the part of the English whigs for a 
corresponding political philosophy then extant in the American 
colonies. 
The colonies which were existing in a state of war with 
the British crown were no longer obligated to it in any way. 
There can be allegiance only when there is protection and with 
the cessation of protection in an act of war, allegiance is 
likewise dissolved. Obligation implies reciprocity. 
Philosophical justification was not lacking and happily it 
could be couched in te:rms that had a familiar ring in English 
ears. Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government had long 
been current, both in ~ngland and the colonies. Chapter III 
is devoted to the "State of War" and justifies not only the 
cessation of allegiance but the total destruction of one's 
former government on the basis of equal rights and self-
preservation. "It being reasonable and just I should have a 
right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction.nl 
Likewise, Locke ably presents the doctrine of government by 
contract in the Second 'rreatise. 
1. Locke, ECG, III, 16. 
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For I have reason to conclude that he who would 
get me into his power with out my consent, 
would use me as he pleased when he had got me 
there, and destroy me too, when he had a fancy 
to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his 
absolute power, unless it be to couple me by 
force to that which is against t~e right of my 
freedom, i. e., make me a slave. 
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The proponents of immediate action further argued that the 
representatives should lead the way instead of erecting 
barriers. Using an argument that has long echoed in the halls 
of parliaments, it was further urged that the opposition did not 
represent their constituency. The assumption that a majority of 
the people were, at that time, in favor of the Declaration was 
precarious indeedl A historical precedent was recalled as 
attention was drawn to the revolution deposing James II and the 
opponents were reminded that the king did not officially declare 
the people out of his protection but his actions were considered 
sufficient to do so. "No delegates then can be denied, or ever 
want, a power of declaring an existing truth. 112 The brutal truth 
confronting them was that they were in a state of war with their 
former ruler and were under the necessity of formulating an 
independent government immediately. 
The clinching argument revolved around the participation 
of foreign powers in the war, especially France. It was 
pointed out that with the publication of the Declaration those 
countries sympathetic to the cause would be free to carry on 
commerce with the new nation and thus furnish supplies, possibly 
even armies. But this could not be hoped for previous to the 
1. Locke, ECG, III, 17. 2. Jefferson, I, 22. 
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Declaration. With this, the comparison of the two views will 
be concluded and attention will be drawn to the unique position 
of the British Parliament. 
Colonial unwillingness to accept parliamentary sovereignty 
constitutes a multi-faceted problem and furnishes ample opportunity 
for a comparative analysis of their respective political 
philosophies. On hurried examination it would seem that the 
colonists would have welcomed the jurisdiction of the Parliament 
as opposed to that of the king. Presumably the Parliament 
represented the interests of the people in England and would 
therefore be amenable to colonial interests. This is particularly 
true since the forces which were pressing for more power in 
Parliament were also those which were called upon to lead the 
fight for colonial independence. Inspired by the popular 
uprisings in England which were shaking the power of the throne 
with religious and political revolts, the Parliament had risen 
to new heights of power. And the scattered seed of revolt had 
taken root in American soil. But with the Declaratory Act, an 
act of Parliament discussed in the previous chapter, it is clear 
that the doctrines of equality, toleration, and natural rights 
were to be limited to Englishmen living on English soil. The same 
tyranny, though in a more impersonal form, was to be meted out 
to the colonials. Thus it was the king ~o repealed the stamp 
act when it was proved to be impractical and the Parliament 
which voted the arbitrary Declaratory Act which could do little 
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but produce resentment among the colonists. This is an instance 
in which the political descendants of Locke in England were 
in direct opposition to his followers in America and it was the 
Tories who offered the only means of arbitration, meagre as it 
was. An attempt will be made to trace the thread in this 
skein of contradictions. 
The origins of the British drive for freedom under represen-
tative government are to be found, not in philosophical or 
even political systems but in the insufferable conditions of 
religious and economic tyranny or tragic stupidity. The great 
English political philosophers wrote during and after the great 
revolutions, the principles of Which they attempted to summarize 
and justify. Richard Hooker (1554-1600), the great systematizer 
and first English thinker to write on ecclesiastical polity, 
used reason as a guide to sectarian peace. But it was written 
only after the Puritans and Anglicans had been in continual 
conflict for years.1 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was the most 
prominent apologist for the Stuarts but James I came to the 
throne in 1603 long before the publication of the Leviathan in 
1651. James had already introduced and in part, reaffirmed the 
divine right of kings, naive and ineffective as it might have 
been in bridling the rising power of Parliament. Although the 
Leviathan was published in 1651, it did not receive recognition 
1. The Anglican Church was established as the state church in 
1563 but the conflict preceded this. By the time Hooker 
wrote, the dissenters had become compartmentalized into the 
Separatists, Presbyterians, Brownists, and Congregationalists 
plus many smaller groups. 
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until much later.l 
John Milton (1608-167,), the poet-philosopher who yielded 
his pen in unison with the sword of Cromwell (1599-16,6}, that 
is, the revolution stretching from 1642 to 1646, did not write 
The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates until 1649. Although he 
wrote numerous tracts during the revolution, he was hired as 
a professional apo~ogist and had done little to precipitate the 
outbreak of the war. John Locke returned to England in 1689 
with William and Mary but the Two Treatises on Government were 
not published until after the deposition of James II and the 
adoption of the Declaration of Rights. The Treatises were a 
justification of the revolution of 1688; they followed, but did 
not precede it. The point is not being made that the rights of 
man did not receive serious consideration before 1600. They did! 
But it is evident that the great systems were initially apologetic, 
results rather than causes. This may be taken ss a partial 
explanation for the fact that the English Whigs were unsympathetic 
with their American counterparts. Those who were deeply stirred 
regarding the rights of English representative government did 
not extend that concern to include the rights of the colonials. 
Their response to the opportunity for colonial exploitation was 
unabashed and positive. The English ~bigs were Lockian only to 
the water's edge.3 
1. Locke, in writing the first Treatise (1689) was not concerned 
with Hobbes but with Sir Robert Filmer who was much better 
known then, although but for Locke he would not be known today. 
2. Ct. Chapter VIII. 
3. cr. Beeker, DOI, 226f. for a comparison of the way in which 
the Decla.ration was received in England and France. Even a 
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The English political philosophies written as revolutionary 
apologies became in America the germinal idea. One of the points 
which this chapter will seek to prove is that While undoubtedly 
various other sources were used, Locke furnished a completed 
system, an alternative ready at hand. Whatever else he might 
have used, Jefferson needed nothing more than the metaphysical 
lumber that had been cut and hewn by Locke. 
The first and second paragraphs of the Declaration present 
a social theory and a political philosophy on which the remainder 
of the treatise is based. The catalogue of facts submitted to 
a candid world would be meaningless apart from the first two 
paragraphs for they are an indictment of the king, an indictment 
submitted by a subject people. This doctrine Which was not new, 
but dates from the earliest attempts of man to frame a political 
system, is one that was nevertheless novel to the American 
colonists. Augustine, drawing on the hierarchical system of 
Plato and revising it in his City of God to form a theory of the 
state whereby the king was subject to the pope alone, had set 
the stage for the divine right of kings doctrine. Once established, 
it was difficult to dislodge. Not until the break with the 
Catholic Church had freed the kings from the control of the Pope 
did the opportunity arise for its dissolution. Even then, the 
Protestant kings claimed that they were subject only to God, that 
their sovereignty was not conferred by the people. But from the 
question so non-political as literary style was violently 
debated between the two countries. Some British critics believed 
that while the king's government had been subjected to in• 
sufferable embarrassment, it was his English that had sustained 
the greatest injury. 
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beginning it was imperative that a people who had tasted freedom 
in their parishes would also devise a means of self-rule at 
the political level. Later, attention will be given to the 
various channels through which this current flowed on the 
continent. England permitted the newly discovered freedom to 
find its voice in the slowly evolving power of Parliament. So 
much for the bare historical outline; the primary problem is 
one of political theory and the balance of this chapter will be 
confined to a study of the philosophical presuppositions implied 
in Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration. 
Hobbes, the materialists, and Sir Robert Filmer, author of 
the Patriarche, were the spokesmen for the absolute monarchies. 
It was Hobbes, the Stuart apologist, who became the predominant 
target for the religiously motivated darts of the Puritans. The 
Puritans had as their spokesmen John Milton, Ralph Cudworth, 
Henry More, and Lord Herbert of Cherbury. But the outstanding 
exponent of the democratic ideal, an ideal that included but 
was not limited to religious motivation, was John Locke. His 
philosophy furnished the most systematic alternative to a freedom 
impoverished people. 
In the year 1669 Locke drew up the Fundamental Constitutions 
for the colony of Carolina, which according to Langer, "provided 
for an archaic feudal regime totally unsuited to the needs of 
a frontier colony.nl It was in this way that the new world first 
1. Langer, EWH, 513. 
IV. Declaration 83 
came to know of Locke and from that time on, his writings 
circule.ted among the colonists as well as the people of the 
continent. The Essay published in 1690, found its way into the 
Yale library sometime before 1775; the complete works were 
in the Princeton Catalogue before 1760 and at Harvard before 
1773.1 British universities Where many of the early colonial 
leaders were educated, had long used Locke's works es standard 
texts. Furthermore, private libraries throughout the continent 
contained his writings either in whole or in part.2 
The influence of Locke on Jefferson was both direct and 
indirect. Indirectly he received the doctrines of Locke through 
such men as Bolingbroke,3 Paine, and Sidney plus many other 
popular pamphleteers. Although there is no positive evidence, 
there is every reason to believe that Jefferson, by the year 
1776, had also read most of Locke in the original. In e. letter 
to James Madison written during the August of 1823 in which he 
reviews the charges made by Adams that the essence of the 
Decle.ration of Independence was contained in Otis' pamphlet, 
Jefferson states that he had not read the pamphlet mentioned. 
But in the same letter he takes up the charge of Richard Henry 
Lee that it was copied from Locke's Treatise on Civil Government; 
he does not deny having read it. He simply states that it was 
not before him at the time of writing.4 Lee's charge does bear 
investigation, especially inasmuch as Jefferson did not attempt 
1. Becker, DOI, 75. 3. Bolingbroke, WOB, IV, 333, 335. 
2. Becker, DOI, 75-6. 4. Jefferson, XV, 461-2. 
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to refute it directly, In a letter to Lee, himself, Jefferson 
states that the Declaration was "intended to be an expression 
of the American mind,wl 
All its authority rests, then, on the harmonizing 
sentiments of the day, whether in conversation, 
in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary 
books of public right as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Locke, Sidney, etc,2 
Locke was a part of the American mind of 1776 and the 
political philosophy outlined in the first two paragraphs of 
the Declaration could have been copied from the Second Treatise 
even though they were not, It should be noted at this point 
before proceeding further with Locke, that by the phrase 
American mind, there is no evidence that Jefferson adhered to a 
social mind theory. It is a universal without substance and 
implies nothing more than consensus of individual opinions. 
It is not infrequently pointed out that the Declaration 
is based on an appeal to God, the implication being that it 
is the God of traditional orthodoxy; nothing could be further 
from the truth. It was an outright reversal of the popular 
conception of God current at that time for it appealed to a 
doctrine ot God which was non-transcendent, a doctrine popular 
only among Deists. True, he was self-revelatory, but he revealed 
himself only in a particular way, that is through the laws of 
nature. Jefferson had something very definite in mind when he 
referred to nature. The Declaration of Independence is an 
1. Jefferson, XVI, 118, 119. 
2. Jefferson, XVI, 118, 119. 
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assertion of natural law which is at the opposite pole from 
the doctrine of revealed law or divine law popularly conceived 
as resting on treditional and scriptural verification. The 
political application of the natural law philosophy was framed 
by John Locke and on it he based the four principles outlined 
in the first two paragraphs of the Declaration.1 According to 
Locke's doctrine of natural law, "all men are created equal," 
among their "inherent and inalienable rights," which have been 
endowed by their Creator are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness;" governments are to derive their just powers from 
"the consent of the governed."2 In addition to the doctrines 
of equality, inalienable rights, and consent, which were based 
directly on he theory of natural lew, there was a fourth which, 
although not based on the natural law theory, is an attempt to 
describe natural phenomena. It is the doctrine of prudence end 
it approaches a word for word correspondence with the last 
chapter of Locke's Second Treatise.3 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments 
long established should not be changed for light 
and transient causes; and accordingly ell experience 
hath shown that mankind ere more disposed to 
suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right 
themselves by aiolishing the forms to which they 
are accustomed. 
In a letter to T. M, Randolph written in 1790 Jefferson 
states that "Locke's little book on Government, is perfect as 
far as it goes,n5 Obviously, it went far enough to furnish the 
1. Locke, ECG, 4, 54, 220, 222, 225, 230, 
2. Jefferson, I, 29. 
3. Jefferson, I, 29-30; Locke, ECG, xix, 223. 
4. Jefferson, I, 29-30. 5. Jefferson, VIII, 31. 
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basic principles for the Declaration. But the little book on 
Government was not all that Jefferson had absorbed of Locke: 
in adopting the basic principles of Locke's Second Treatise 
he had also adopted a position in metaphysics for Locke's 
principles of government were based on his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. Beginning with chapter two, "No Innate 
Principles in the Mind," Locke devotes the first part of the 
Essay to a discursive analysis of the epistemological theories 
which would attempt to find certain basic mental forms 
originating outside of the mind.1 
It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced 
readers of the falseness of this supposition, if 
I should only show (as I hope I shall in the 
following parts of this discourse) how men, barely 
by the use of their natural faculties, may attain 
to all the knowledge they have, without the help 
of any innate impression, and may arrive at 
certainty, without any such original notions 
or principles.2 
One after the other in hurried succession he approaches 
the arguments in favor of innate ideas and analyzes them into 
his doctrine of atomistic sensory perceptions. A consideration 
of these arguments is of primary importance to this study 
because they precipitated a sharp break with established beliefs. 
The first is that of universal consent.3 Two propositions are 
discussed, propositions customarily granted universal validity. 
"What is, is," and "it is impossible for the same thing to be 
and not to be." But Locke points out, this is not necessarily 
1. Locke, EHU, 134f. 
2. Locke, EHU, 134-5. 
3. Locke, EHU, 134-5. 
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true; children and idiots are human beings, yet they do not have 
imprinted on their minds these two abstract propositions,! 
Only one exception is required to disprove the theory of universal 
consent; Locke believed that he had found several, It cannot 
be argued that an idea is innate even if it is true of all 
those who approach the age of reason, Reason is the ability to 
deduce unknown truths from principles already known. Thus 
for Locke, and this is eminently important for an understanding 
of his doctrine, reason was not a quality of the mind or even 
a capacity of the mind in the sense that it was an innate form, 
It is learned, an achievement of those minds willing to submit 
to the rigors of logic. Locke meant by reason nothing more than 
logic, a tool of the disciplined mind, a means of reaching 
certain conclusions once the premises were known. Obviously 
reason is not innate. Otherwise everyone would be logical. 
In even using the phrase Hcome to the use of reason,H Locke2 
could mean nothing more than that most minds reach a stage of 
development at which time they are capable of examining 
critically all experienced phenomena with the aid of logic. 
Without going further into the matter here it should be 
noted that Locke found another realm in which to deposit the 
universal laws of reason. In the Second Treatise reason 
becomes something more than a mere tool for it originates in 
nature. The world in which we live is rational. 
1. Locke, EHU, 136. 
2. Locke, EHU, 138. 
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Just as there are no innate, abstract principles of logic 
embedded in the mind, there are likewise no innate moral 
principles. Even the moral conscience arises from education, 
society, and the customs of the country to which a person 
belongs as a citizen.l He draws on numerous examples from 
history to prove that this is the case; one man abhors what 
another considers divine and both act with the full justification 
of their respective consciences.2 Thus Locke seeks to destroy 
the doctrine of innate ideas by carefully surveying those which 
have been presented as innate and pointing out that they are 
not innate in all people, certainly not in newborn children 
where they should be strongest. 
It is easy to foresee, that if different 
men of different sects should go about 
to give us a list of those innate practical 
principles, they would set down only such 
as suited their distinct hypotheses, and 
were fit to support the doctrines of their 
particular schools or churches; a plain 
evidencg that there are no such innate 
truths. 
The first part of the Essay is a refutation, an attempt 
to clear the ground for the positive epistemological hypothesis 
which is to follow. The transition is not strained for 
Locke finds in his refutation of innate ideas the basis for 
his epistemology. If, he argues, the mind has within its 
very nature ideas which are common to all minds then those 
ideas must be similar to other ideas, "for where the ideas 
1. Locke, EHU, 161. 
2. Locke, EHU, 163f. 
3. Locke, EHU, 170. 
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themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no 
mental or verbal propositions about them,ttl When the so-called 
propositions are broken down into ideas, it is found that 
they do not exist. Simple ideas therefore do not arise as 
a constitutive part of the mind; they are impressed on the 
mind from without. Some might argue that the idea of God is 
simple or that it is innate in the mind, but even this varies 
from culture to culture.2 Thus neither simple ideas nor 
propositions relating simple ideas are innate. Locke concluded 
his arguments against the doctrine of innate ideas in his 
Essay by outlining what he believed to be the basis for the 
theory in the first place. It arose from two sources; the first 
was mere laziness, an unwillingness to question and search; 
the second was a systematic attempt to mislead. 
It was of no small advantage to those Who 
affected to be masters and teachers to 
make this' the principle of principles, 
'That principles must not be questioned; 1 
for having once established this tenet, 
that there are innate principles, it 
put their followers upon a necesssty of 
receiving some doctrines as such. 
Although the motivation of those Who attempt to promote 
the doctrine of innate ideas is of secondary importance in the 
Essay, it becomes of primary importance in the Second Treatise. 
It was through such authoritarian reasoning that the idea of 
the divine right of kings had been instilled in the subjects.4 
1. Locke, EHU, 179. 
2. Locke, EHU, 196. 
3. Locke, EHU, 203. 
4. cr. the works of Filmer and Hobbes, 
IV, DeclaratioD 90 
In the Essay it was a rebellion in the realm of epistemology 
alone; in the field of political theory it became a rebellion 
against tyrants, It was for this reason that Locke made 
explicit the political implications of his doctrine in support 
of the Revolution in 1688.1 But before his specific political 
doctrines are treated as such it will be necessary to outline 
Locke's epistemology. It was not only the theories themselves 
that Jefferson had in mind when he penned the Declaration, it 
was Locke's approach to all natural phenomena. If, asks Locke, 
the ideas are not innate, if there are no constitutive forms 
within the mind which structure the way in which we know, how 
do we know, what is the nature of mind? 
It is generally agreed that men think and they use ideas 
in thinking. But the ideas in order toreach the mind are 
perceived through one of two channels; they are simple if they 
are perceived through sensation and they are complex if they 
are constructed through reflection. The mind in its initial, 
passive state is similar to a piece of paper, one on which no 
characters or lines are drawn. It is not even ruled with the 
laws of logic. Since the mind cannot act or reflect without 
first having perceived simple ideas, it is a mere potential and 
apart from the ideas received through sensation it is uncom-
prehending. Once the ideas have been received they may be 
manipulated by the mind, arranged and rearranged to construct 
ideas that could never arise from the senses. Thus our doubt, 
1. Wormser, TL, 300. 
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our reasoning, our willing, and our believing arises in this way 
but they are bastcally sensual.l The mind recetves the 
sensations passively but with reflection it is active; as active 
it may be reasonable but the one does not necessarily follow 
the other, However if the mind is to become discursive, if it 
is to accept, formulate and reject it must become reasonable. 
Thus reason is a tool of the active mind but it is not a part 
of its original furniture. 
The discrete simplicity and sharp clarity of the ~ockisn 
epistemology produces a spontaneous appeal even today. It is 
not difficult to understand the influence it had on minds Who 
were just emerging from the dogmatic and subtle complexities 
of the middle ages. This unified and quantitative analysis of 
the knowing mind had an immediate appeal for those who had been 
trained in the double truth theory of a Duns Scotus or the 
triume divisions of a Thomas Hooker who divided laws into divine, 
human, and natura1.2 For Locke, there is only one means of 
gaining knowledge of the external world and that is through 
experience. 
Locke had certainly not been the first to present this 
view. Heraclitus and Protagoras along with other Greek 
Cosmologists equated knowledge with sensation,3 Democritus, 
the Epicureans and early Stoics had similarly based their 
epistemology on sensation.4 Hobbes presented an extreme form 
of sensory cognition which was to have a direct effect upon 
1. Locke, EHU, 206-8. 
2. Hooker, EP, I, 3. 
3. Windelband, HOP, 64, 
4. Windelband, HOP, 204, 
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Locke.l Thus it was not novel in the history of human thought 
but it was the best contemporary presentation of en empirical 
epistemology.2 
This is of particular importance to the purposes of this 
study. Jefferson was not primarily a metaphysician even though 
he did commit himself to certain metaphysical presuppositions. 
The metaphysical positions which best upheld his views were 
positions similar to or identical with those of Locke. Actually, 
he had little to choose from among modern metaphysicians. 
The works of neither Kant or Hegel were available to him. Hume 
was a contemporary but his works had not been recognized. Other 
then the British thinkers mentioned, he had only the ancients 
on which to draw if he was not to accept some phase of 
scholasticism or e watering down of the same. For many reeders 
of his day Locke's philosophy produced the same sensation that 
the captain of a ship must experience when as the ship leavea 
the harbor, he sees the last tug boat cast off, the last marker 
disappear in the distance, end the harbor pilot descend to his 
boat. 
It is something of this self-sufficiency and self-confidence 
that Jefferson had in mind when he wrote in 1808 to Reverend 
Samuel Miller that "every one must act according to the dictates 
1. Windelband, HOP, 413. 
2. This is not to be confused with degrees of certainty in 
which intuitive and demonstrable knowledge precede the 
sensory. We have an intuitive knowledge of the self end 
a demonstrable knowledge of God's existence as the first 
cause. 
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of his own resson."l In 1791 he wrote "I hope that we have not 
labored in vain snd that our experiment will still prove thst 
men csn be governed by reason.2 Thus reason, as Jefferson 
understood it, was the tool of the mind, the criterion of 
truth which was to be relied upon above all else. Unfortunately, 
it is not clear whether he limited it to logic as such or 
merely intended to distinguish between the cognitive and affective 
functions of the mind. 
Men once surrendering his reason, has no 
remaining guard against absurdities the 
most monstrous, and like a ship without 
rudder, is the sport of every wind. With 
such persons, gullibility which they call 
faith, takes the helm from the hand of 
reason, and the mind becomes a wreek.3 
It will be noted that the above statements followed the 
writing of the Declaration by several years, years during 
which the principles implied beesme explicit in his own thinking. 
It is not certain that he had read the Essay by the time he 
wrote the Declaration but it is certain that he approved of 
the point of view presented by Locke and that he had absorbed 
some of it from other sources if not from the Essay itself. 
Before taking up the Second Treatise it will be instructive to 
compere Jefferson's approval of the above principles with his 
categorical rejection of another outstanding philosopher, Plato. 
A thinker may be understood by that of which he disapproves as 
well as by that of which he approves. There is every reason 
to believe that previous to the authorship of the Declaration, 
1. Jefferson, XI, 429. 
2. Jefferson, IIII, 124. 
3. Jefferson, XV, 409. 
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he had read Plato because of his interest in the classics. 
Sharp denunciatory rejections sometimes bordering on 
irrational tirades are sprinkled throughout his later 
correspondence. 
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Concluding one of his longer criticisms of Plato in s 
letter written to John Adams in 1814, Jefferson employs the 
terminology of Locke in s parody of the twin supports of 
authoritarianism, intuition and innate idess.1 In the ssme 
letter2 Jefferson states that when Plato is brought to the 
test of reason, he is proven to be only a Sophist who has 
escaped condemnation because of his style and incorporation 
into the "body of artificial Christianity."3 Jefferson admits 
that he has seldom had the patience to complete a whole dialogue4 
and doubtless that accounts for much of his extreme and 
frequently unwarranted criticism. But since he also adds that 
he had attempted most of them, it is clear that at least a 
cursory acquaintance had been lifelong. Much of his biblical 
criticism later in life is based on an attempt to separate the 
sayings of Jesus from the Platonisms which had been interpolated.5 
If the arguments for immortality, he claimed, rested on the 
principles of Plato scarcely anyone would believe in the 
unbroken life. This, he affirms, in spite of the fact that Plato 
is frequently appealed to in support of the belief.6 
Jefferson sharply resented Plato's use of Socrates in the 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 150. 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 148. 
3. Jefferson, XIV, 149. 
4. Jefferson, XIV, 148. 
5. Jefferson, XIV, 149. 
~· Jefferson, XIV, 149. 
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dialogues for he thought him to be a philosopher of the highest 
order. The rule of thumb method by which he distinguished the 
two consisted in deciding What was worthwhile in Plato's works 
and attributing it to Socrates.1 All in all, he considered 
the dialogues a libel on the person of Socrates.2 Arbitrary 
and ill-advised as it may be, this naive distinction indicates 
the exact doctrines in Plato3 with which Jefferson disagreed. 
Socrates as a moral philosopher was the founder of an area 
of study in which Jefferson was intensely interested. Plato's 
great contribution to philosophy was in the fields of 
metaphysics and political theory; Jefferson distrusted the 
first4 and disagreed violently with Plato's doctrines in the 
second.5 The one exception in his general distrust of 
metaphysics were the works of Bolingbroke, particularly those 
sections which he laboriously copied in his Commonplace Book.6 
Even if conclusive evidence were lacking, evidence that 
Jefferson was a student of Bolingbroke, it is clear from the 
above that the theories expressed in the Declaration and 
elsewhere imply a definite metaphysics.7 Furthermore it is a 
metaphysics which is not inconsistent with that of Locke~ 8 
1. Jefferson, XV, 258. 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 150. 
3. Jefferson was not alone in his dislike of Plato. Of his 
friends, John Adams was an outstanding critic also. However 
Adams gave a more considered appraisal of Plato's metaphysics 
and was probably better acquainted with him than Jefferson. 
Jefferson, XIII, 373f. 
4. Jefferson, X, 404. 
5. Jefferson, XIV, 149. 
6. Jefferson, CBP, 40f. 
7. Cf. Chapter V. 
8. Of conrse Bolingbroke 
a student of Locke. 
was also 
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Since it was not formulated and made explicit in the mind of 
Jefferson, it cannot be described as a system. 
In the terminology of the scholastics, Jefferson was a 
nominalist as opposed to a realist, he was a child of the 
Enlightenment to the degree that he could join with Bolingbroke 
in saying that "no hypothesis ought to be maintained if a single 
phenomenon stands in direct opposition to it. 111 Not each man, 
but the reason of each man, was the measure of all things for 
he was saved from sophistry by the laws of reason. He was for 
all practical purposes a materialist but a materialist that 
did not bother to explain the relationship of the mind to the 
body.2 He had a basic revulsion to mysticism, eternalism, 
mentalism, and Plato's theory of universal concepts. The God 
that could not be known through the laws of nature was a God 
that either did not exist or was not worth contemplation. 
With this survey of the metaphysical system implied in the 
Declaration of Independence and other writings of Jefferson 
contemporary with the Declaration, the latter phase of the 
problem for this chapter will be discussed. That is the relation 
of the Second Treatise to the Declaration of Independence. 
Jefferson wrote the Declaration for the same reason that 
Locke wrote the Two Treatises on Government. The first Treatise 
is a detailed answerm Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarchs and as 
such is of no particular importance to this study except that 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 41. 
2. Jefferson, X, 404. 
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it was a refutation of absolutism. If it had been a refutation 
of Hobbes it would have been worth much more but only one short 
reference to Hobbes is contained in either treatise. It is to 
be found in the introduction of the Second Treatise and is only 
implied.1 Jefferson refutes the divine rig~t of kings doctrine 
through omission when he appeals to natural law. It can only 
be thought of as divine law if it is remembered that for 
Jefferson God could only be known through nature, not through 
the traditional religious institutions which had supported the 
European monarchies. 
The natural state, as Jefferson understood it, was not 
Hobbes's state of nature which was one of continual conflict 
and war, but the state of nature outlined by Locke in his 
Second Treatise. Although Hobbes's theory is much nearer the 
truth according to modern studies in anthropology, Locke offered 
an alternative that was more consistent v;ith the temperament of 
the day. Locke's "state of nature" was not based on even the 
most rudimentary findings in anthropology. The Second Treatise, 
unlike the Essay, does not appeal to specific examples for 
verification. His studies in the genesis of social customs are 
normative rather than descriptive; they are not observed 
phenomena but imaginative abstractions. It is an imaginary 
description of how he believed men would live if they were suddenly 
stripped of all customs and forms unique to civilization. 
1. Locke, ECG, I, 1. 
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We must consider what state all men are naturally 
in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions and dispose of their 
possessions and persons as they think fit, within 
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking 
leave, or depending on the will of any other 
man.l 
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It migbt seem that the law of nature referred to here 
would be a physical law such as the law of gravity, of 
relativity, etc., but such is not the case. The law of nature 
is reason, a discipline Which must be consciously cultivated and 
consulted; therefore it is not innate.2 Natural man is able, 
by his own reason, to guide and order his habits and customs. 
Locke leaps far too easily from the assumption that everyone 
could be reasonable in the state of nature to the belief that 
everyone would be reasonable, at least, that a majority would 
be. His distinction between the possible and probable is far 
from adequate. The fundamental reasonableness of the majority 
constitutes the foundation for the complete Second Treatise.3 
The majority will know and recognize the public good. They 
are the worthy as opposed to the unworthy, the populace as 
opposed to the criminals and reason is the tool which furnishes 
the worthy with the necessary advantage of rulership. Not finding 
a positive reason why one should be placed above another, he 
introduces the doctrine of equality, again, a doctrine that is 
normative rather than descriptive. 
There being nothing more evident than that creatures 
of the same species and rank, promiscuously born 
to all the same advantages of nature, and the use 
1. Locke, ECG, II, ~. 
2. Locke, ECG 1 II, 6. 3. Locke, ECG, I, 3. 
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of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another without subordination or 
subjection ••• l 
Conceivably, political equality could rest only upon one 
basis; if God had so ordained it, His right to do so could not 
be questioned. Since Locke had disposed of that thesis in the 
first Treatise, it was a safe door to leave ajar. The only type 
of inequality that would exist in a natural society would be that 
between parent and child.2 But even the children would be 
granted political freedom and protection. 
It must be remembered that Locke wrote at the beginning of 
the Enlightenment; he was not a part of it, but a forerunner 
and this to some degree accounts for many of the older thought 
forms. One such instance is evidenced in the ease and facility 
with which he makes sharp distinctions in social and political 
theories. The fact that he was himself a metaphysical atomist 
may also partially account for the way in which he could apply 
the knife to such a concept as equality and declare that there 
are many kinds, that one kind does not necessarily influence 
the other, that although age or virtue may give one man precedence 
it does not mean that he has more freedom than another.3 
Today, evidence to the contrary is patent; not only do the 
various types of equality become interdependent, but factors 
of which Locke never dreamed combine to prevent men from being 
equal, politically or otherwise. 
1. Locke, ECG, II, 4. 
2. Locke, ECG, VI, 64. 
3. Locke, ECG, VI, 54. 
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From the discussion in the Second Treatise it is impossible 
to know for certain whether or not ~ocke intended for his 
state of nature to be descriptive of human origins. If he did, 
as has been stated before, he did not bother to give specific 
historical examples. But whether he did nor not, it is now 
evident that a man living in the state of nature according to 
the law of nature as defined by Locke would be the end product 
of a highly developed and fruitful society, not its progenitor. 
Actually, natural man differed from ~ocke 1 s contemporaries in 
one respect only: that is, he would not be dominated by an 
arbitrary king but would be left to his own devices. With the 
aid of reason he could, and would, participate in his own 
government. 
The first sentence of the second paragraph in the 
Declaration "we hold these truths to be self evident: that all 
men are created equal;" is a manifest error unless (1) it is 
inflated to meaningless dimensions, or (2) it refers only to 
a limited and possibly specious category. In the latter case 
it does have meaning; all men are created equal to the extent 
that no one man can become the depository of their collective 
rights if a strong society is to endure. At least Jefferson 
would have some historical justification for such an application. 
The rights of the people were inherent to the degree that they 
could be recalled at will. That is, governmental abuse cannot 
continue with impunity but must result in the dismissal of the 
government. The rights were in one sense ultimately inalienable. 
The means by which they might be recalled was not immediately 
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important. In England Jefferson had evidence that the slowly 
evolving power of Parliament was in such a process; in America 
another means was already in use. But first there must be a 
rational justification for either evolution or revolution and 
Jefferson believed that he had found that justification in 
Locke's doctrine of natural law. 
Among the inalienable and non-transferable rights of man 
are at least these three: life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.l They are the product of, and limited by, natural 
law. A murderer forfeits his right to life according to the 
very law which grants it to the reasonable. This, Jefferson 
would have argued, can be seen from an observation of nature 
itself; at least it is not dependent upon the will of an 
arbitrary monarchy. 
Liberty is based on Locke's doctrine of equality and has 
already been discussed as freedom. The right to the pursuit 
of happiness is evident in nature as the end of life. This 
likewise does not depend on a monarchy for its justification. 
Since it is the duty of government to secure these rights, 
either Jefferson contradicted himself or he meant that the 
rights were normative, that, they should be achieved. Govern-
ments are constituted to secure them and when they are abridged 
the people have a right to declare themselves independent for 
the rights are ultimately inalienable. Jefferson is here 
arguing that if there are rights at all, if anyone is to have 
1. Jefferson, I, 29. 
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the opportunity to enjoy them, it is the people, not the 
government. Rights originate with, and are indigenous to, 
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the people, not the constituted authority which has as its duty 
only the security of those rights. The doctrine of consent 
is nothing more than another way of saying the same thing.1 
The government is a tool to be used in the attainment of the 
public good.2 For Jefferson the nation and the state are 
to be equated with the government which has only methodological 
significance. There is no substantial entity apart from the 
people and their method of self government. Vfuen it is said that 
the rights ere ultimately inalienable it is meant only that they 
reside in the people as potentially attainable. 
It may seem from the above analysis that this is an attempt 
to rationalize the evident contradictions in the Declaration 
but such is not the case. It is an attempt to present what 
Jefferson had in mind. Although Jefferson was untiring in his 
efforts to leave a "fair copy" or his thoughts for posterity, 
interestingly enough he never did write a commentary on the 
Declaration. Even with the theories of Locke in mind it offers 
ample opportunity for ambiguity in interpretation; without Locke 
and other writings current at the time, it is almost 
inexplicable. 
Jefferson goes on to say that "When a long train of abuses 
and usurpations, begun at a distinguished period and pursuing 
1. Jefferson, I, 29. 
2. Locke, ECG, 220-2. 
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invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them 
under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their 
duty to throw off such a government.•1 Locke used some of the 
same terminology in a similar argument found in the Second 
Treatise. He expressly mentioned "a long train of abuses" and 
"design" in the same connection.2 The emphasis on destgn so 
impressed Jefferson that he did not feel he had proved his case 
until it had been shown that the king was acting according to 
design. 
After giving the basis for his political philosophy and 
listing the positive rights which are the property of every 
individual, Jefferson goes on to say that "prudence ••• will 
dictate that governments long established should not be changed 
for light and transient causes." 3 Appealing to and reflecting 
personal experience he argues that instead of men being over 
anxious to change their governmental forms, they are, as a matter 
of fact, slow in doing so. They are slothful and passive until 
the evils become insufferable. 4 In a similar vein Locke writes 
"people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some 
are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to 
amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have accustomed 
to~5 These observations are not a constitutive part of either 
philosophy but it does indicate the close similarity that exists 
between the Declaration and the Second Treatise; it is to be 
1. Jefferson, I, 30. 4. Jefferson, I, 29-30. 
2. Locke, EGG, 225, 230. 5. Locke, EGG, 223. 
3. Jefferson, I, 29. 
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remembered that Jefferson did not deny this.l 
The remainder of the Declaration is concerned with the 
specific application of the principles listed above to the 
government of King George III. Contemporary commentaries on 
the Declaration are inclined to dismiss the catalogue of facts 
which were submitted to a candid world as a long list of 
unrelated errors in government. But Jefferson did not see them 
as such. To him, they were the studied attempts of the mother 
government to drain the wealth from the colonies. Thus he 
arranged the list in such a way that they would reveal this plan~ 
Until George Grenville came to power (1763-1765), the 
colonies had been given free rein and were permitted to do 
about as they pleased. It was Grenville who turned on the 
colonies when they reached maturity to teach them what they had 
not been taught in infancy. A cursory glance at Machiavelli's 
The Prince would have taught him that a free people are not to 
be handled as those who have not tasted of freedom. At any 
rate, the acts which immediately followed were the acts to 
which Jefferson referred in his bill of grievances. He 
referred to no act by name but only by indirection. Only once 
1. Those passages in Locke of particular relevance to the 
Declaration are paragraphs 4, 54, 220, 222, 225, and 230. 
2. Becker, DOI, 14. Becker makes much of the design within 
the catalogue of facts and with it proves to his own 
satisfaction that the Declaration is primarily a philosophy 
of government, not merely a list of grievances with a 
theoretical prologue affixed. His argument is also 
supported by the fact that the list does not exceed the 
bounds of the theory presented in the second paragraph. 
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did he make specific reference to the Parliament and that was 
deleted in the congressional editing. His references were to 
specific violations and not to general policies such as the 
extremely narrow economic policy which had been promoted by the 
English government in order that the colonies would not compete 
with the manufacturers in England. Either he did not think of 
this as being serious or he did not wish to weaken his argument 
with appeals to unverifiable generalities. By in large it was 
the following restrictions Which he most resented: the necessity 
for sending legislative measures to England for approval; the 
refusal of the king to permit newly formed counties to be 
represented; the removal and dissolution or assemblies; the 
quartering of soldiers; the high prices imposed on new lands; 
the undermining of the colonial courts by the admiralty courts 
over which the colonies had no control; the multiplication or 
tax commissioners; the institution of military rule in Massach~• 
setts;: the inability of the colonial courts to try English 
troops caught in criminal acts; the importation of English 
criminals as settlers and the refusal to permit the naturalization 
of continental immigrants. 
The remainder of the grievances have to do with specific 
acts of war such as the plundering of the cities and the 
importation of mercenaries. However, there is one exception 
and that is the proscription of slavery which was not accepted 
by Congress. This is of vital importance to the study and will 
be dealt with to some degree here since it is one of the 
strongest statements Jefferson made against the institution of 
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slavery, and one that would have had most effect if it had 
been accepted. It is the original inclusion of the proscription 
on the part of Jefferson which made his copy of the 
Declaration more than a list of petty grievances. It is 
extraneous to the matter at hand only if the Declaration is 
viewed as a mere catalogue of woes. Actually, it underlines 
the universals implied in the Declaration, 
Jefferson states that the clause was deleted in deference 
to two groups, the first, as was to be expected, consisted of 
South Carolina and Georgia, "who had never attempted to restrain 
the importation of slaves, and who, on the contrary, still 
.wished to continue it."1 The second group consisted of "our 
northern brethern" who 11felt a little tender under these censures; 
for though their people had very few slaves themselves, yet they 
had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others."2 
Jefferson, in the Declaration, speaks of slavery as a cruel 
war waged against human nature end it is evident from the wording 
of the proscription that it need presuppose nothing more than 
Locke's doctrine of equality outlined in the second paragraph 
of the Declaration. In the Notes on Virginia he again speaks of 
slavery as a moral and political evil and looks forward to the 
"complete emancipation of human nsture,tt3 
Only five years after the writing of the Declaration, 
Jefferson set down his thoughts concerning slavery in some 
1. Jefferson, I, 28. 
2. Jefferson, I, 28. 
3, Jefferson, II, 124. 
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detail; they are found in his Notes on Virginia and consist of 
a consideration based on the abnormal development and eventual 
destruction of human values under the system of slavery. It 
is not an appeal to a theory of human rights and equality but 
consists of a minute scrutiny of the deterioration of manners 
consequent to the institution. HThe whole commerce between 
master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous 
passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and 
degrading submissions on the others,tt1 Not only do the adults 
take part in this display of passion on helpless individuals 
but they likewise teach their children to do so. Gradually the 
nature of the learning process intensifies the tendency from 
generation to generation until Hthe man must be a prodigy who 
retains his manners.,.undepraved by such circumstances,tt2 
The institution of slavery threatens the morels and industry of 
the owners, reduces the slave to an animal, and embarrasses3 a 
nation newly founded and established on the principles of 
liberty. 
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect 
that God is just; that his justice cannot 
sleep forever; that considering numbers, nature 
and natural means only, a revolution of the 
wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation is 
among possible events; that it may becime 
probable by supernatural interference, 
For a person who did not believe in supernatural events this 
is no mean condemnation. Since this appeal to the supernatural 
is inconsistent with the rest of Jefferson's thought, it must 
1. Jefferson, II, 225-6 
2, Jefferson, II, 226. 
3, Jefferson, XIX, 41, 
4. Jefferson, II, 227. 
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be considered as the overstatement of a man who was basically 
disturbed by a situation Which he believed to be morally wrong. 
Apart from1he appeal to the supernatural, his reasoning is 
ample to prove the basic error of slavery. They are reasons 
which for the most part rest on the argument for the increase 
rather than the decrease of human values. 
Throughout the correspondence frequent references are made 
to the practice of slavery and always with the same feeling of 
shame, embarrassment, and contempt. However he did not free 
his own slaves until the time of his death and then only those 
Who were "worthy."1 Even this overt action was not unique to 
him; many large plantation owners did the same. Jefferson's 
thoughts on slavery, unlike most of his statements in the 
Declaration, were probably the result of his own observation.2 
To be certain, Locke does devote three paragraphs to the subject 
of slavery in his Second Treatise3 but the presentation is so 
unrealistic and normative that it could have had but little 
effect on the mind of Jefferson when confronted with the problem 
of slavery in his own plantation and colony. Locke makes the 
point that inasmuch as an individual does not own his life, 
he is breaking a law of nature when he becomes a slave to another. 
Reared in a nation which was at the time employed in a world-wide 
1. Jefferson, XV, vi; XVII, 469-470. 
2. Jefferson, XIX, 41. "He who is permitted by law to have no 
property of his own can with difficulty conceive that 
property is founded in anything but force." 
3. Locke, ECG, IV, 21-23. 
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slave market and exiling himself to another which was not 
without its commerce in human life, Locke chose an example from 
the Old Testament to illustrate his argument. This might have 
been a concession to Filmer or a habit of his own thought. 
At any rate it proved to be a blind spot. Medieval history, 
even English medieval history, offers ample opportunity for 
studying the worst forms of human slavery. 
The Hebrews, Locke maintains, did not sell themselves into 
slavery but into drudgery because there were legal conditions 
under which they could be freed. At other times he speaks of 
slavery only in the political sense. That is, a subject is 
in some sense a slave to a despot. But he did not have in mind 
an institution such as the one that existed in the American 
colonies and elsewhere. 
It was Jefferson's plan, as it was the plan of others, 
to deport the slaves to Africa and hire free white labor to 
take their place in the economy of the nation. He believed that 
habit, nature, etc., had drawn indelible lines between the 
Negro and the Anglo-Saxon. In the Notes on Virginia he gives a 
detailed and graphic account of the differences between the 
Negro and the Anglo-Saxon concluding ~hat when freed the Negroes 
should never be allowed to mix with them.1 He is not so certain 
of the Teutonic race for he seriously considers a plan of 
colonizing Negroes and Germans together. His sense of equality 
did not extend to a consideration of the fact that the Negroes 
might wish to wander over the face of the earth as freely as 
1. Jefferson, II, 19lf. 
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the Anglo-Saxons, that they might wish to have some say in 
whether or not they wanted to mix, etc. However, he did go 
much further than most in his day and he based his arguments 
for emancipation on his own observations. 
Jefferson's original copy of the Declaration is an 
all inclusive whole based on the broad principles of natural 
law. It makes particular application of universal principles 
and should be considered as a normative hypothesis flung into 
the current of history. It was not an attempt to describe the 
origins of man but it was an attempt to alter his historical 
destiny. Neither is it to be thought of as a mere dream for 
it implies a consistent metaphysics, a metaphysics which looked 
to human reason, and reason alone for the salvation of man. 
By way of summary a number of conclusions may be noted. 
The Declaration of Independence finds its origin in the varied 
needs and thought patterns of the American people. It was not, 
primarily, an attempt to formulate a consistent political 
philosophy, but it drew upon current theories of natural right 
widely published and discussed. At the same time a thorough-
going philosophy was implied complete with a metaphysics to meet 
the demand for intellectual justification of the action to be 
taken. The Second ~reatise came in handily at this point even 
to the phrasing. 
This does not mean that Jefferson was in complete agreement 
with Locke or that he was even in agreement with Bolingbroke. 
It does mean, and this is quite important, that when he wished 
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to summarize his own political philosophy, the wording of 
Locke came easily to mind, On the other hand there is never 
any indication that he accepted the psychology, 
The argument from design in the Declaration is one ot its 
most outstanding points. Tne catalogue of blunders were 
endurable as isolated instances of bad judgment, but coming as 
they did to establish a continuous trend, they were unacceptable, 
indeed, intolerable. For the announced purpose of allowing 
each reader to discover the trend tor himself, the bill ot 
particulars was included, Actually the colonies had ruled 
themselves with considerable independence and there is a real 
sense in which the Declaration was a conservative document drawn 
up to meet a growing threat. In thia sense the Declaration 
was no more revolutionary tor America than the Magna Carta 
was tor feudal Britain. Both were repelling threats and 
reaffirming previous political values, The Revolution may be 
described as an attempt on the part of Britain, not to bold, 
but to retake the colonies after loosing them by default. 
Needless to say this is not the whole truth of the matter 
but it is a welcome antidote to the more popular view, both 
being half truths, validity lies somewhere in between. It is 
quite clear that the implied appeals in the Declaration were 
based on rights which the people believed they already possessed. 
Fortunately tor America, British colonial policy had not taken 
a leaf from Machiavelli regarding the treatment of a tree people 
to the effect that the only approved means of ruling them was 
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that of obliteration.l 
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Although Jefferson was opposed to slavery it should 
always be noted that he did little or nothing to change the 
system on his own plantation as he owned between two and three 
hundred slaves, Throughout his life his social philosophy 
entertained abolition only as a theoretical possibility. 
This concludes the consideration of the Declaration of 
Independence and the sources from which Jefferson drew for his 
political theories included therein. So far, they are implied 
rather than explicit, 
1. Machiavelli, PRI, v. 
CHAPTER V 
THE·COMMONPLACE BOOK OF PHILOSOPHERS AND POETS 
Previous to Jefferson's departure for Paris in 1784, at 
forty-one years of age, he had a fully developed moral 
philosophy that formed the basis for his political thought up 
to that time. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the 
authors who had most influenced Jefferson previous to the trip. 
Unquestionably, he had been familiar with many of them before 
the writing of the Declaration, but as was shown in the preceding 
chapter, the whole framework of that prominent document can 
be found solely within Locke's Second Treatise. The Enlighten-
ment, with its emphasis on Deism and Materialism, consisted 
to a large degree in a revival of the Greco-Roman moralists. 
Jefferson, who was in every sense of the word a child of the 
Enlightenment, drew heavily upon those works of the ancients 
that were available to him. 
Jefferson's early letters reveal a young student who is 
preoccupied with the afflictions of this world and the 
contemplation of death. One of the beat examples is to be 
found in his letter to John Page (1763) 1 which was quoted at 
length in the second chapter. Interspersed with the pages 
of humor and light hearted wit which he uses to describe in 
detail some otherwise colorless experiences, are thoughts that 
reflect dejection and sometimes even despair. An individual's 
hopes and despairs, especially a youth's, are not innate to his 
1. Jefferson, IV, 8-11. 
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character, but in large measure rest on what he has been taught 
to expect from life, If this were not so, many cultures would 
have spent their time in perpetual anxiety because they could 
not live during another era; countless peasants would have 
been distraught throughout their lives because they were not 
kings. Only those Who have approached some advancement in 
human life at one time, only to have it denied later on, only 
those who have entertained a hope as being in the realm of the 
possible, are subject to such thorough despair and disappoint-
ment. Thus a child who had been told that he would live to wit-
ness some gigantic celestial collision might conceivably became 
a life-long pessimist on being told that it would not occur; 
but one Who had never been thus informed could hardly be expected 
to be disappointed with the same news. Therefore when the 
letters describe a dejected young man, possessed with a gifted 
mind, who had the advantage of attending school end owning one 
of the larger plantations, who was one of the privileged aristo-
crats of the colony, the reader has the right to ask just what 
he did expect. 
Since, for the most part, his disappointment was phrased 
in terms that belied a distrust in ultimate principles, it is 
safe to assume that he had once relied on the traditional 
orthodoxy of his day. Throughout his life he was religious 
in the sense that ultimate beliefs mattered to him, and mattered 
very much. His first two tutors had been ministers and it is 
probable that previous to the time when he chose law as his 
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vocation he had been deeply impressed with the fully developed 
theistic interprete.tions of the universe then current. 
Furthermore, his acceptance of them had not been merely formal 
or superficial; they had furnished him with a basis for his 
personal morality, a guide for all of life. They were so 
important to him1 that when he finally gave them up, he 
considered the effort to find a new basis for morality the 
most significant work to which he could devote himself.2 
If the tendency had been confined to some early part 
of his life and then been forgotten, it would be of little 
consequence to this study, but such is not the case. Throughout 
his life he is as much concerned to state what he does not 
believe as what he does, and to state it in reference to what 
he believed formerly. He seems always to have in mind either 
his own previous beliefs or those of individuals who still 
believed them. 
It is just at this point that the Commonplace Book fits 
into the framework of his thought.3 Excerpts from Bolingbroke 
1. Jefferson, VI, 258. 
2. Jefferson, IV, 10. 
3. Jefferson, CBP. This book was not published until 1928 by 
Gilbert Chinard and is titled by him, The Literary Bible 
of Thomas Jefferson. With some insignificant exceptions 
he places the writing of the book in the esr1y part of 
Jefferson's life. It consists of a series of extracts 
which Jefferson had culled from his reading and they are 
without footnote or marginal comment. Jefferson wrote two 
Commonplace Books and the other was edited by Chinard in 
1926. While this one is limited to philosophers and poets, 
the other takes up his theories of government. Chinard 
referred to this one as a Literary Bible because he believes 
that it is a supplement to Jefferson's Bible edited much 
later in life. References in this study to the Commonplace 
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dominate the first section, excerpts which are critical of 
orthodox theolog~ And which seek to establish a Deistic 
foundation for morality. The latter part consists of hetero-
geneous selections from numerous philosophers and poets, 
for the most part, ancient moralists. Primarily JeffE•!'30n was 
a moral philosopher and the Commonplace Book is an excellent 
example of his devotion to it as a field of study. Since the 
first large group of entries consists of selections from 
Bolingbroke, some space will be devoted to an evaluation of 
his influence on Jefferson. 
In political philosophy Bolingbroke is to be understood as 
a link between Locke and Jefferson, but in the realm of 
metaphysics, Bolingbroke stands as the most important single 
influence on the life of Jefferson. Jefferson accepted 
Bolingbroke's skeptical attitude toward metaphysics in general, 
but along with it Bolingbroke's metaphysical system in particular.1 
Jefferson's background in metaphysical systems was not sufficient 
to let him see the evident contradiction involved in a general 
attack on metaphysics as such from the vantage point of a 
particular metaphysics. But his apologists need incur little 
embarrassment at this point for he was not the first to make 
the mistake. 
Beginning with Lord Herbert of Cherbury's De Veritate (1624) 
Book of Philosophers and Poets will be to Jefferson, CBP; 
references to Chinard 1 s introduction in his edition of it, 
will be, Chinard, LBJ. 
1. Jefferson, VIII, 384; CBP, 41. 
V. Commonplace Book 117 
and continuing with Spinoza 1s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 
Thomas Hooker, Charles Blount, John Locke, Toland Collins, 
Tindal and others, reason understood as natural law, became the 
basis for a new philosophy of religion, Deism. Bolingbroke 
stood in this tradition, a tradition which was best systematized 
in the writings of John Locke until the time of Hume. 1 
Therefore Jefferson, in copying the doctrines of Bolingbroke 
in the Commonplace Book was accepting the position of the more 
systematic Deists along with something of the extreme Deism 
peculiar to the French school. For Bolingbroke had been exlled 
to France and had absorbed enough of the French viewpoint to 
express it in a "capricious and dilettante manner."2 A 
biographical sketch of Bolingbroke is pertinent to this study 
because of his pronounced influence on Jefferson's formative 
years. While not a great philosopher, Bolingbroke was never-
theless accorded a high place in the esteem of Jefferson. 
Henry St. John Bolingbroke {1678-1751) had an extensive 
and influential political career in the stormy days of Queen 
Anne and George I. He ascended to the leadership of the Tories 
early in his career and maintained it even while in exile until 
his retirement. ~one of his creations were published and therefore 
they died with him, but it is generally conceded that he was 
one of the greatest orators of his day. In spite of the fact 
that his political fortunes and personal character evidenced 
a shallowness and superficiality for which even his admirers 
1. Troeltsch, Art., III, 391-396. 
2. Troeltsch, Art., III, 394. 
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apologizedl he was nevertheless an excellent writer. His works 
evidenced deep thought in the fields of politics, philosophy, 
and natural theology. He was a student of Locke and thoroughly 
understood the Lockian principles of investigation.2 His 
criticism of the church end the clergy was reasonably and 
capably argued; it was that part of his writing which most 
influenced Jefferson. In an attempt to give, an estimate of 
Bolingbroke's style Jefferson compared him to Cicero.3 
Bolingbroke came into leadership of the Tories under 
Queen Anne and was made secretary of state in 1712. He was 
deposed with the ascendancy of George I and went to France in 
exile in 1715. While there, he devoted most of his time to the 
study of philosophy and political theory. Returning to England 
in 1723 under a new parliament, he was recognized as an eminent 
and outstanding philosopher, but this recognition quickly abated 
soon after his death in 1751. Today few people know of him and 
a complete edition of his works has not been published since 
1841. Jefferson, Who was introduced to his works by Fauquier, 
probably owned most of them by 1764, which was only thirteen 
years after Bolingbroke's death when he was still receiving 
the approbation of students on the continent and in the colonies. 
Adams said that he read through the Works of Bolingbroke five 
times.4 Since Bolingbroke represents a rather large school of 
thought which included such outstanding names as Locke, Voltaire, 
1. Jefferson, XV, 304. 3. Jefferson, XV, 304. 
2. Bolingbroke, WOB, IV, 333, 335, 4. Jefferson, XIV, 34. 
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and Hume, it is not difficult to understand why his works have 
not been widely read. He offered little that was novel and 
original then; now, he offers nothing that has not been said 
much better, in spite of his Ciceronian style. 
Bolingbroke, serving an an interpreter of Locke for 
Jefferson, introduced the Lockian principles in such a way that 
they made a more lasting impression than those of any other 
writer. The Deistic, dual emphasis on reason and experiencel 
which are included in all of Bolingbroke's writings, are 
likewise reflected throughout the subsequent writings of 
Jefferson, both public and private.2 There is no question but 
what Bolingbroke had been strongly influenced by Locke's 
arguments against innate ideas in the Essay. In the realm of 
political philosophy Bolingbroke was not afraid to introduce 
novel principles into the government at a time when it was 
extremely dangerous to make any innovation whatsoever. He was 
exiled, but what is remarkable is that he maintained a following, 
his life, and English citizenship. Jefferson's defense in 
behalf of one who otherwise was a superficial thinker is justified 
at precisely this point.3 
Jefferson was acquainted with the pre-Christian ethicists 
and when Bolingbroke recommended the classics to him in 1764, 
he did not have to look them up. The readiness with which he 
swung to Bolingbroke's position would indicate that the ground 
had already been prepared. The Essay Concerning Authority in 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 45. 
2. Jefferson, II, 221; VI, 10; XIV, 197, 424; XV, 123. 
3. Jefferson, XV, 304. 
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Matters of Religion1 furnished him, early in life, with the 
critical habits of thought which were to cut sway the irrelevant 
and preserve the valuable. This proved to be a lifetime task 
and finally ended with the Jefferson Bible, outlined but never 
completed before death overtook him. 
But I am a rational creature, and am therefore 
obliged to judge for myself in all cases where 
reason alone is the judge of the thing itself; 
for even in ~~e others l5econdari7 reason is 
the judge of the authority.2 
As Bolingbroke had used the Deistic theology to undermine 
the influence of the church on the English nation, Jefferson 
was to use it to disestablish the church of England in the 
colonies. He copied Bolingbroke's statement to the effect that 
"it is not true that Christ revealed an entire body of ethics, 
proved to be the law of nature.n3 In all probability he would 
have also agreed with the following~ 
Traditional Christianity, or that artificial 
theology which passes for genuine, and which 
we all profess, is derived from the writings 
of fathers and doctors of the church, and 
from the decrees of councils. It is there-
fore the word of men... It requires 
therefire, no regard, nor any inward conformity 
to it. 
Not only had men fashioned the doctrine of the church 
but they had fashioned them according to design, a design 
particularly adopted to the needs of the clergy and the 
institutional church.5 Just as the acceptance of the 
principles of reason and experience had moved Locke and 
1. BOlingbroke, WOB, IV. 
2. Bolingbroke, WOB, IV, 257. 
3. Jefferson, CBP, 50. 
4. Bolingbroke, WOB, IV, 647. 
5. Bolingbroke, WOB, IV, 324. 
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Bolingbroke to broad principles of tolerance, it moved 
Jefferson to a universal regard for all religions and 
especially the many sects cropping out in the colonies. His 
sensitivity to the interests of these sects, combined with a 
study of the Old Testament influence on English common lawl and 
other considerations to be discussed later were to evolve into 
his doctrine of the separation of church end state. 
The problem of the relation between morality and 
metaphysics formed the core of his thinking throughout his 
public career.2 One of the problems of this chapter, as well 
as the whole study, is to point out that Jefferson's off-hand 
dismissal of speculative thought did not mean that he actually 
had no metaphysics.3 However, it does mean that he was 
unsettled in his thought regarding the relationship of morality 
to ultimate principles. Few letters reflect this any better 
than a letter to Peter Carr in 1787.4 Moral philosophy, 
Jefferson advises the young man, is a waste of time for the 
conscience is sufficient as a moral guide, then, a few pages 
later in the same letter he wrote: 
Your own reason is the only oracle given you by 
heaven, and you are answerable, not for thg 
rightness but uprightness of the decision. 
The works of Bolingbroke copied by Jefferson in the 
Commonplace Book fill thirty printed pages.6 The first eleven 
selections deal exclusively with the presentation of a materialistic 
1. Chapter II. 4. Jefferson, VI, 256f. 
2. Koch, POJ, 10. 5. Jefferson, VI, 261. 
3. Jefferson, VI, 257f. 6. Jefferson, CBP, 40-71. 
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metaphysics revolving about the mind and body problem. 
Bolingbroke's desire to refute the claim to divine inspiration 
forces the problem into a strategic position.1 Drawing upon 
the Lockian analysis of simple ideas, he declares that the 
primary qualities are solidity and extension, that we cannot 
have simple ideas of spirit or immaterial substance. Thus 
Locke's abstract ideas and intuitive knowledge are denied. 
Bolingbroke and Berkeley lived and wrote at approximately the 
same time though there is little to indicate that they were aware 
of each other. Bolingbroke's criticism of Locke is strikingly 
similar to that of Berkeley and Hume but he did not join them 
in their respective experiments in mental architecture. Unlike 
them, he does not distinguish between the general and the 
abstract idea; consciousness, spirit, immateriality became for 
him, as they had previously for Hobbes, subjective secondary 
qualities, derivatives of material forces, names for a special 
type of physical phenomena. Instead of positing a substance 
of which we know nothing, Bolingbroke making questionable use of 
Occam's razor asserts that it is much more reasonable to posit 
consciousness as an attribute of extension. Extension then 
1. Inasmuch as the selections copied by Jefferson in the 
Commonplace Book were of obvious influence and since they 
form a consistent metaphysical position, this discussion 
will be limited to them. While there is no basis for the 
assumption that Jefferson agreed with each selection that 
he copied, there is ample evidence in his letters to 
indicate that the Commonplace Book was always close at 
hand and that he frequently referred to it as a source 
when Bolingbroke was discussed. 
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becomes the basic substance which supposedly is knowable through 
physical phenomena. Possibly at a later date natural science 
will be able to define the relationship. 
As long as matter is senseless and inert, it is 
not a thinking substance, nor ou~ht to be called 
so. But when, in any system of it, the essential 
properties, extension, solidity, etc., are 
maintained, that system is material still tho' 
it become a sensitive plant, 1a reasoning elephant, or a refining metaphysician. 
Bolingbroke does not claim that thought arises from the 
primary qualities of solidity and extension but he does claim 
that there is nothing in the ideas of solidity and extension 
which contradict the idea of thought just as they do not 
contradict the idea of motion.2 Thus there is a basic substance 
about Which we know only two things, solidity and extension; 
we also know something that is unlike either of these two but 
not contradictory to either, that is, thought or consciousness. 
The persistence with which Bolingbroke employs the two terms, 
solidity and extension, at first suggests to the reader that 
he may be developing a basic dualism within the material 
substance and that in some way one or the other could be 
related to consciousness. But such is not the case. In another 
context he uses them interchangeably with body and matter; 
solidity, extension, and matter are but three terms for the 
same substa>ce and substance is used in the same sense in Which 
Spinoza employed the term. It is that on which everything 
depends and which itself depends on nothing. 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 42. 2. Jefferson, CBP, 42. 
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In far cruder terms and without the naturalist's 
background of scientific observation, Bolingbroke anticipates 
the Spencerian adaptation of Darwin's findings. 
As these animal systems come to be more and more 
sensible to us, and as our means and opportunities 
of observing them increase, we discover in them, 
and according to their different species, or even 
among individuals of the same species, in some 
more in others fewer, of the same appearances 
that denote a power of thinking in us, from the 
lowest conceivable degrees of it, up to such as 
are not far, if at all rrmote from those in 
which some men enjoy it. 
He concludes that there is in all animals one intellectual 
spring which is variously distributed for reasons unknown to 
us but which is nevertheless present. It has its origin in 
the lowest forms of animal life and is distributed throughout 
all species; it is first discovered as mere motion. There is 
no ultimate distinction within this faculty, there is only a 
difference in the degree to which it is exerted.2 Thus in 
those sections of Bolingbroke which Jefferson copied into the 
Commonplace Book, Bolingbroke is implying that motion is the 
source of consciousness although he does not make it explicit. 
~hile copying these selections from Bolingbroke, Jefferson 
spent more time in the contemplation of metaphysical problems 
than he was to spend until he became interested in the Ideologists. 
Characteristically enough, he then turned to the field which 
most interested him and began copying selections which would 
give him a new basis for morality. His primary interest was 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 43. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 43; Cf. Jefferson's statement on Locke's 
material soul, XV, 225-6. 
v. Commonplace Book 125 
ethical, or cast in a slightly larger mold, human values. 
The twelveth paragraph of which there are some fifty-six, takes 
up this problem.l If God is good, "almighty and alwise," 
argues Bolingbroke, then it is absurd to think of a being who 
would allow an inferior creature to deface his work and make 
life miserable for other creatures. Consequently, God must be 
either amoral, limited, or non-existent. Believing that God 
did exist and refusing to take from Him his omniscence or 
omnipotence, Bolingbroke concluded that God was amoral, at 
least to the degree that the world and certainly the universe 
was not fashioned with man in mind as an end. "I combat the 
pride and presumption of metaphysicians in a most flagrant 
instance, in the assumption by Which man is made the final cause 
of the whole creation."2 
Thus early in life Jefferson separated his ethical system 
from traditional religion and began the life-long search for 
a new foundation. In a letter to Carr in 1787, he completely 
separated the two by listing moral philosophy in a distinct 
category of its own; furthermore no reference is made to s 
religious tradition within the category of moral philosophy. 
However, in his recommendations concerning the rational approach 
to religion, he tells Carr that if after having studied religion 
from the point of view of a Deist he still believes in God, he 
may find there an "incitement" to virtue that he would not fine 
otherwise. 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 43. 2. Jefferson, CBP, 44. 
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If you find reason to believe ••• that there Lfi7 
a future state, the hope or a happy existence 
in that increases the appetite to deserve it; 
if that Jesus was also a God, you will be 
comforted by a belief of his aid and love.1 
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In the same letter he informs Carr that it is a loss of 
time to attend lectures in moral philosophy. "He who made us 
would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules 
or our moral conduct a matter of science."2 For one person 
who is a scientist, and here he means science in the broad 
sense of the term, there are thousands who are not. Some 
provision must be made for them. The letter is replete with 
contradictions for immediately after saying this, he formulates 
a proposition which is peculiar to one type of moral philosophy, 
that of ethics. ~an is destined for society, he argues and his 
morality must be formed to his object. But God endowed him 
with a sense of right and wrong which is relative to the social 
situation and this sense of right and wrong constitutes a 
conscience which is as much a part or his nature as the sense 
or hearing, feeling, etc. To say that he was inconsistent, 
unreasonable, is an understatement; he denies the value of all 
ethical philosophy at the same time he presents one particular 
type; he states that the conscience is structured by society 
but in the same paragraph adds that it is a part or the nature 
or man to the same extent that hearing is a part of man's nature. 
Thus his particular brand is lifted from the field of 
1. Jefferson, VI, 260-1. 
2. Jefferson, VI, 257. 
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controversy and placed on an unquestionable pedestal.1 With Locke, 
he claims that the moral sense, the conscience, arises from the 
social situation but unlike Locke he also states that it is 
innate to man. 
Obviously the letter was written at a time When he was 
very much undecided as to where he stood; if Jefferson had left 
no other record of his thought this would leave the reader in 
a mass of contradictions. In all probability it reflects some 
personal disappointments in his own life, the nature cf Which 
it would be difficult to investigate. It is sufficient to note 
that he was continually striving with the problems which are 
being treated here more or less as abstractions and that it 
is impossible to say that this or that was the philosophy of 
Jefferson at a given time. 
The balance of the selections copied by Jefferson from 
Bolingbroke have to do with a detailed analysis of the Christian 
religion as it is revealed by the scriptures and tradition.2 
There is little here that varies from the general tradition 
of Deism wherein it is maintained that: reason is the judge of 
revelation, religion is universal, the Jews are not the chosen 
people, Christ is not divine, the early teachings were captured 
by the Academic school, the historical sections of the Bible are 
not authenic, the ethics of Jesus are insufficient, God is 
1. Cf. Jefferson, XV, 225-6. Jefferson attempted to see to it 
that his grandson did not attend lectures in metaphysics 
and logic While in college. He was to read only Locke, 
Tracy, and Stewart on the subject. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 45-71. 
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revealed in the law of nature, and immortality is 
questioned because it rests on a moral argument of retribution. 
To all of this, natural religion offers a positive answer in 
which the precept, "'thou shalt love the lord thy god with all 
thy heart' will be effectual."l 
As has been seen, the first part of the Commonplace Book 
consists of an attempt to separate religion and ethics; the 
latter part is an attempt to find a new basis among the 
ancients. But the content of this chapter will not be limited 
to those whom Jefferson drew upon to fill the pages of the 
Commonplace Book although it does follow the design and intent 
of his extracts. The Deists who influenced him were 
instrumental in inducing Jefferson to find a new basis for 
human values, a search which was to lead him to the Stoics and 
Epicureans. Particular contributions demand investigation at 
this point. Among the Deists, Bolingbroke was outstanding but 
others were not without their influence also. They will there-
fore be treated in connection with Bolingbroke. In none of 
Jefferson's published correspondence does he mention Locke's 
Reasonableness of Christianity and it is to be supposed that he 
did not read it until late in life. Locke, unlike Bolingbroke, 
affirmed a belief in the messianic doctrine as it applies to 
Jesus; furthermore, he accepted the Kingdom of God concept. 
Both theories are much more consistent with Jefferson's later 
interest in the morals of Jesus. 
1. Jefferson, CBP,64. 
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Either Jefferson was ignorant of Hume 1 s works in 
epistemology or he was blinded by Hume's justification of 
the Stuarts. The Tory tendencies inHume's History were 
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charged against him in the same denunciatory terminology 
originally reserved for Plato.1 There is much inHume's 
epistemology with which Jefferson would have agreed but Hume was 
judged in that area which held Jefferson's interest, political 
philosophy. He was not so harsh in the Tory tendencies of 
Bolingbroke. 
Jefferson does not discuss the works of Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626) in detail but two references indicate that he 
had some knowledge of Bacon's contribution.2 Although there 
are frequent references to reason3 and on at least one occasion 
he pauses to spell it with a capital •Rn4 there is no indication 
that he distinguished inductive from deductive reasoning. 
Even in his later years this distinction is not drawn;: after 
thanking the president of the Jefferson Debating Society of 
Hingham, Massachusetts, for the honor bestowed in the title, 
he outlines for them "the art of reasoning.•5 Livy, Sallust, 
and Tacitus, he claims, are "pre-eminent specimens of logic, 
taste, and that sententious brevity W2ich, using not a word to 
1. Jefferson, VIII, 32; XI, 223; XII, 405. 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 173; XVI, 17. 
3. Jefferson, II, 221; VI, 10; XIV, 197, 424; XV, 123. 
4. Jefferson, XV, 123. 
5. Jefferson, XVI, 30. 
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spare, leaves not a moment for inattention to the hearer." 
The terms used here hark back to Socrates' use of the term 
reason, that is, as sustained criticism but not induction or 
analysis. 
Even though the distinction is absent from his 
correspondence it is not necessary to conclude that he missed 
the most important part of Bacon's Novum Organum and the 
result it had on later thought. Deduction was the means by 
Which the scholastics had proved those doctrines which were so 
inimical to Jefferson's Deistic theology based on the law of 
nature. Thus it could not have been that when Jefferson referred 
to reason, he had in mind the subtle deductions of the scholastics. 
The laws of nature are reasonable but that reason is discovered 
through the observation of natural phenomena. Sufficient 
reference has been made to Bolingbroke's emphasis on induction 
to indicate that Jefferson agreed with Bacon's methodology. 
Among the aphorisms of Bacon's first book of the Novum 
Organum, Jefferson could have read statements which anticipated 
some of the first great strides in scientific industry, 
technology. Today it is quite easy to criticize Bacon's 
methodology and point to the Aristotelian Forms and scholastic 
1 essences. 1 It is true tha.t it was a science based on 
observation and classification rather than manipulation and 
operation, on deduction rather than induction.1 Yet, even 
though the emphasis was on deduction still, his contribution 
1. Windelband, HOP, :384. 
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was on the side of induction; underdeveloped and halting as 
it was, it held high promise for the future, His criticlsm 
of the tendency to become completely dependent on deductton 
was not based on the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus; it was 
much less theoretical. He stressed observation because he 
believed that the secrets of nature could not be known until 
man subjected himself to nature itself.1 For Bacon, active 
science is the employment of an hypothesis which is a means to 
2 an end, 
It cannot be that axioms established by 
argumentation should avail for the 
discovery of new works; since the subtlety 
of nature is greater many times over than 
the subtlety of argument, But axioms duly 
and orderly formed from particulars 
easily discover the way to new pSrticulars, 
and thus render sciences active, 
Although Jefferson's reference to experience in a letter 
to Mr. Drayton, "the precept ... is wise which directs us to 
try all things, and hold fast that which is good," does not 
reflect a technical knowledge of experimental process, there 
is no doubt but what he had such knowledge, 4 In another 
instance he writes, "reason and experiment have been indulged 
and error has fled before them,n5 Jefferson's oft-stated 
interest in science, both natural and speculative, revealed an 
understanding of scientific method which combined the hypothetical 
1, Bacon, Nov, Org,, I, viii, xix, xxiv, lxiv, 
2, Bacon, Nov. Org,, I, xxiv, 
3, Bacon, Nov. Org., I, xxiv. 
4, Jefferson, VI, 414. 
5. Jefferson, II; Also Cf, 221, 
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and the empirical.1 His interest in meterology, geology, 
chemistry, etc., presented ample opportunity for the practical 
application of his theories and it is there as well as in his 
writings, that Jefferson's understanding of Bacon's doctrine 
of induction is evident. There is no evidence that Jefferson 
adopted Bacon's doctrine of Aristotelian forms in the second 
book of the Novum Organum.2 With the help of Newton,3 
Shaftsbury, and Bolingbroke, Jefferson was able to free himself 
of the scholastic principles which reached up to enshroud the 
mind of Bacon. 'l'echnological advance which was always of 
interest to him, was likewise conducive to this development. 
The whole spirit of Jefferson's life would have been in 
complete agreement with Bacon's polemic on what science could do 
for the advance of society. With all of its faults the 
methodology of Bacon had much to teach the eighteenth century 
and is hardly to be attacked today as being medieval by 
physicists who still introduce their students to the mysteries 
of "force" and "mass." 
The contention of this study, that Jefferson's skeptical 
attitude toward metaphysics in general was actually a reaction 
to scholasticism and Platonism in particular, further supports 
the view that Jefferson was cognizant of the importance of 
induction. Deduction, the scholastic methodology would also 
1. Cf. Dewey, !lrt., 6f. 
2. Bacon, Nov. Org., II, iii, viii. 
3. Jefferson, III, 31; VIII, 41; XIV, 128. 
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come under his condemnation; thus when he says that Lord ~ames 
is too metaphysicall even though all of Jefferson's writings 
on social theories presuppose a metaphysics, it is probable 
that he actually revolted against the methodology of classical 
metaphysics. In a man to whom science and philosophy are 
almost synonymous, it is not strange that such a distinction 
would be overlooked, 
The social theories which had their foundation in the 
works of Bacon, Locke, Bolingbroke, and Newton were not in 
agreement with the central theme of the Purit&n tradition which 
had achieved the same ends, Locke was identified with the 
Puritan revolt but he did not argue from the same grounds that 
Milton and Sidney employed for their parallel development of 
social theory, Each was equally effective in the overthrow 
of a tyrant but one was essentially philosophical while the other 
was theological. Few men illuminate the arguments peculiar to 
the Puritan tradition better than Milton, Hooker and Sidney 
would stand next to him in that order but even between the works 
ot' Hooker and Sidney there is a distinction which places Sidney 
at the opposite pole from Protestant scriptural theology, 
Jefferson chose the philosophical as opposed to the theological 
and where he could, he chose the empirical as opposed to the 
speculative but it is instructive to note that a parallel 
development was taking place within the tenets of the Christian 
religion, a development which Jefferson by in large ignored. 
1. Jefferson, VIII, 384. 
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John Milton, poet and statesman, was in the eighteenth 
century known for his prose writings as well as Paradise Lost. 
Unreflected as they were, in the first political documents 
of the United States, they had a marked influence on the 
Puritan settlements in New England and it is one reason why the 
political descendants of the early Puritans could join hands 
with the southern colonies in declaring their independence 
from England. Milton is therefore of interest to this study 
for two reasons; the first is historical and the second is 
theoretical. He was instrumental in developing a theory of 
social contract which produced the same result as Locke's natural 
law in the Aroerican colonies. Theoretically, he is of interest 
because Milton achieved the same end but used a methodology 
which was at the opposite pole from that of Jefferson. 
The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Milton's summary 
of the ideal theological-political contract between subject 
and ruler came from the press during the stormy days of the wars 
for the Commonwealth. It was written in justification of an 
action being taken. In the very first sentence it announces 
to the reader that it is not only a work on politics but a 
sermon as well, by placing the blame for political tyranny on 
the "blind affections within. 111 "None can love freedom 
heartily but good men," he states, in2 anticipation of the 
doctrine of another great pietist, Kant. He goes on however 
1. Milton, PWM, II, 2. 
2, Milton, PWM, II, 2. 
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to present a theory of contract not unlike that of Locke. 
It being thus manifest that the power of kings 
and magistrates is nothing else but what is 
only derivative, transferred, and committed 
to them in trust from the people to the common 
good of them all, in whom the power yet remains 
fundamentally, and cannot be taken from them, 
without a violation of their natural birthright.l 
Appeals are made to the "dignity of mankind, 112 to Aristotle's 
3 doctrine that the laws are above the ruler, and Seneca's 
works. 4 References are also made to secular history, but for 
the most part The Tenure of ~inss and Magistrates is based on 
footnotes drawn from the Hebrew scriptures. 
Two main points at Which Milton varied from the scholastic 
political thought were, tradition on the one hand, and the 
church understood as being above the king, thus the supreme 
arbiter of all law, on the other. But otherwise, he, like 
Bacon, was unable to free himself from the morass of scholasti-
cism at the same time he was serving as a stepping atone for 
others. All law was divine law and the ultimate criterion 
was the revealed word of God. 5 Given the divine premise, he 
proceeded to a rationalistic conclusion which was marked by 
extreme intellectualism and reflected the problema of the times 
only in its far-retched application, not at its point of 
origin. Thus, although Milton used reason6 for the same purpose 
as Hooker, and structured the Puritan thought which was later 
reflected in America, it was the doctrine of the independent 
1. Milton, PWM, II, 11. 4. Milton, PWM, II, 18. 
2. Milton, PWM, II, 12. 5. Milton, PWM, II, 520f. 
3. Milton, PWM, II, 13. 6. Milton, PWM, II, 2. 
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conscience characteristic of Protestantism itself which did 
the most to prepare the soil for the revolt in America.1 
Milton agreed with Locke in his assertion that the king 
must be worthy in order to rule and that when he rules 
unwisely, the people have the right of deposition, even of 
tyrannicide. But Locke's appeal to natural law and the 
natural state of man was altogether distinct from the basis 
of Milton's thought. Jefferson, following Locke, not only 
refused to accept revelation unquestioned by reason as final, 
but went even further and refused to accept revealed scripture 
as being anything more than another poorly written history. 
It is significant that in the "Summary View of the rights of 
British America," When Jefferson is making explicit appeal to 
the early history of England he did not mention the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth under Cromwell as an outstanding 
achievement in political freedom but on the contrary, grouped 
it with the monarchies preceding and following in his blanket 
denouncement of restrictive trade treaties.2 This in turn 
reflects the degree of immunity which he had achieved, immunity 
from all arguments purporting to be based on divine law as 
opposed to natural law. Searching desperately for a prototype 
that would serve as a historical example, he did not favor the 
establishment of the Commonwealth with so much as a nod, but 
considered it a fight within the church. In part, this may be 
1. Becker, DOI, 34-5; Friedenwald, DOI, 186. 
2. Jefferson, I, 186, 189. 
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attributed to the fact that the Commonwealth practically 
ignored the colonial system while it was in power. 
Jefferson possessed a sensitivity to morals and an 
interest in ethics not unlike that of Milton, but his basic 
motivation bore little resemblance to that of the Puritan 
poet, Wollaston, like Bolingbroke, disassociated ethics 
from religion. Truth was the highest virtue for Wollaston as 
it was for Shaftesbury, who was introduced to Jefferson by 
Fauquier and Ferguson.1 Although they are important as 
individual authors, there is little that they said which had 
not been said much better by men who have already been 
discussed, In this connection it is pertinent to point out that 
Jefferson's library was one of the largest in the colonies; 
not only was it large and comprehensive but it was used by its 
owner. Only John Adams may be said to have competed with 
Jefferson in this regard. Although it is evident that he never 
could have read all of the books that are listed in his catalogue2 
he did have a cursory knowledge of most of them and his letters 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 139. 
2. Fire destroyed much of the Jefferson Library but the 
Library of Congress has on hand now 3 1 000 of the original 
volumes. A catalogue of these volumes is being prepared 
which will itself run into several volumes. Mr. Frederick 
R. Goff, Chief of the Rare Books Division writes in a 
letter dated August 4, 1949 that three of the volumes 
are ready for the press. The library intends to show how 
Jefferson used the books and this will be as important 
to a student of Jefferson as the knowledge of which 
books he owned. In addition to the books on which he 
spent a considerable fortune, many others were given to 
him later in life for his appraisal and recommendation. 
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are crammed with references to contemporary writers, both 
American and European, whose books are now oddities. 
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Of all the American pamphleteers whom Jefferson read, 
there was none more outstanding that Thomas Paine. It cannot 
be said that these men, coming as they did at the time of the 
revolution, influenced Jeffersons fundamental principles of 
government. However Paine's influence is noteworthy, not only 
because he was the most famous but because he was a personal 
friend and the recipient of several letters from Jefferson. 
There is no evidence that Jefferson took exception to any of 
Paine's writings but that does not necessarily mean that he 
agreed with all of them. Written as they were for popular 
reading and the influence they would have on laymen who had 
scarcely considered the fundamental principles of good govern-
ment but were variously motivated to join hands in proclaiming 
separate existence from the British Empire, they do not touch 
on the philosophical presuppositions but by indirection. 
In the most famous of all Paine's pamphlets, Common Sense, 
phrases were projected into the colonial vocabulary and arguments 
presented which were the direct cause of the popular appeal for 
the Declaration. Arguments are introduced in Common Sense which 
presuppose a doctrine of individual rights and it is written 
from that viewpoint but it does not treat the doctrine in detail. 
Paine is not unlike Rousseau when he states that government 
is "a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue 
to govern the world. 111 He joins with Jefferson in making it 
1. Paine, CS, 8. 
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the lesser of two evils. "Freedom and Security" constitute 
the true end of government. Drawing factual data neither from 
actual studies in anthropology or conditions as they existed 
at that time, he contrives in Lockian fashion to set up a 
hypothetical society as it would exist in its ne.tural state. 
From this supposedly primitive colony, certain general conclusions 
are drawn and the basis for his own particular brand of natural 
right is laid.1 From this vantage point attacks are leveled 
at the British Constitution2 and the king of England.3 
Hereditary succession is brought to the bar of utility and the 
citizens are invited to sit in the jury. The history of monarchy 
is traced throughout the Old Testament and needless to say it 
does not reach a favorable conclusion.4 "Monarchy in every 
instance is the popery of government;" William the Conqueror 
is termed, "a French bastard landing with an armed Banditti."5 
The second part of the pamphlet discusses practical 
measures which can be taken in the American economy to support 
the war and ends with a ringing appeal for a declaration of 
independence. Arguments which were later to be reflected in 
the deb£tes preceding the writing of the Declaration are for 
the first time summarized in the closing pages of Common Sense. 
Doubtless the success of Paine's pamphlets and Jefferson's 
own "Summary View" helped Jefferson in evaluating the American 
mind which he attempted to reflect in the Declaration. They 
1. Paine, CS, 6-8. 
2, Paine, CS, 9. 
3, Paine, CS, lOf, 
4. Paine, CS, 12f. 
5. Paine, CS, 14, 15, 
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would have helped him to know what phrases and What wording 
attracted the popular attention of the people; the immediate 
success of the Declaration attests to the accuracy of his 
appraisal. Paine's interest in Old Testament chronology and 
his frequent appeal to a transcendent and just God in the 
Crisis Papers was not shared by Jefferson.l Certainly Jefferson 
did not go so far as to say that it was his belief that 
God almighty will not give up a people to military 
destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, 
Who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to 
avoid the calamities of wa~, by every decent method 
which wisdom could invent. 
Whether or not it was Paine's belief or whether he was 
attempting to reflect popular opinion is an open question. 
It can only be said that Jefferson trembled before a just God 
only once and that in connection with the issue of slavery. 
Paine, whom tradition has acclaimed no less a Deist than 
Jefferson, was evidently tempted beyond the bounds of his own 
beliefs on this and other occasions. But tradition is not 
always true history; we do have a record of what he wrote and if 
it is to be believed the reader can only conclude that Paine 
as the author of Common Sense must be placed somewhere in 
between the arguments advanced by Milton and those advanced by 
Locke. Later, ~aine was to become more of a Deist. 
Jefferson always addressed Paine in the most complimentary 
terms. 
1. Paine, CP, 48. 
2. Paine, CP, 48. 
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I am in hopes you will find us returned generally 
to sentiments worthy of former times. In these 
it will be your glory to have steadily labored, 
and with as much effect as any man living,l 
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Again he says in comparing Paine with Bolingbroke, "they were 
alike in making bitter enemies of the priests and pharisees of 
their day."2 The Rights of Man, Paine's book length refutation 
of Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, an 
attack on the politically restless masses of England and France, 
received high praise from Jefferson. 3 The response to Paine's 
pamphlets confirmed Jefferson's belief in the destiny of an 
informed populace for it was on the backs of the people that 
Jefferson placed the sole responsibility for good government. 
Writing for a different people and at a different time 
(1792), Paine based his Rights of Man on a thesis distinct from 
that in Common Sense. He used reason as Jefferson had used it, 
distinguishing it to that degree from the earlier, Common Sense. 
Reason is the basis of government by election and representation;4 
ignorance is the basis of monarchy. Reason, was for him, 
systematic knowledge. 
Government, in a well-constituted Republic, 
requires no belief from man beyond what his 
reason can give. He sees the rationale of the 
whole system, its origin and its operation; 
and as it is best supported when best under-
stood, the human faculties act with boldness, and 
acquire under this form of government a 
gigantic manliness,5 
1. Jefferson, X, 224. 
2, Jefferson, XV, 305. 
3. Jefferson, VIII, 193, 
4, Paine, ROM, 177, 
5, Paine, ROM, 178, 
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Men are born with equal rights and utility is the only 
sound reason for making distinctions. All political 
organizations have only one justification, the preservation 
of the rights of man; the rights are imprescriptive and 
therefore cannot be abrogated by custom; also, they are natural, 
Varying only slightly from the Declaration, the rights consist 
of liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression 
in comparison to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.1 
Property and security are new additions which place the 
government in a more responsible position. If it were not for 
property, security could be taken to mean only physical 
security but it is explained further in the next category. 
For Paine, then, security meant economic security. The use of 
public taxes to feed and clothe the poor was recommended in the 
second part of the Rights of Man.2 "The Nation," he declared, 
"is essentially the source of all sovereignty."3 \Vhile Jefferson 
did approve of the Rights of Man in general, there is no 
indication that he agreed with Paine's plans for economic security 
and his other writings omit reference to such a plan. But 
neither is there indication of rejection. In this respect, at 
least, Paine went much further than Jefferson who held that the 
government was only to place minimum regulations on the economy, 
not direct it, 
In virtual retirement after repeated failures in trying 
to co-operate with the English and French revolutionists, Paine 
1, Paine, ROM, 181. 
2, Paine, ROM, 254f. 
3, Paine, ROM, 181. 
V, Commonplace Book 143 
penned the little read and much maligned work on practical 
theology, The Age of Reason, It offers little that is novel 
in the tradition of French Deism although it is much more 
plain spoken than some of the French writings. Claiming that 
his mind is his church Paine turns to an investigation of 
Biblical tradition not unlike the investigation previously 
discussed in reference to Bolingbroke,1 Reason, now used in a 
more technical sense, is not equated with mere knowledge as 
opposed to ignorance, but becomes a criterion by which to 
judge all knowledge, religious or otherwise. Unlike Locke in 
The Reasonableness of Christianity he does not accept tradition 
as a guide for anyone but he who receives it,2 However it is 
much more naive than the related works of Locke and Bolingbroke. 
By the time it was published in 1793, Jefferson had had 
ample opportunity to become acquainted with other works in the 
same field which no doubt had much more influence on him. If 
there had been any influence at all, it was probably in the 
other direction for the author of Common Sense was much more 
orthodox in his religious concepts than the same man nineteen 
years later after he had made the acquaintance of many Deists 
in America and abroad, including Jefferson. 
After Jefferson had completed copying the selections from 
Bolingbroke found in the Commonplace Book, he began to 
transcribe miscellaneous selections primarily from the classics, 
1. Paine, AOR, 285. 
2. Paine, AOR, 287. 
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but from others also, in order to find a basis for human 
values. His primary interest in eth:l.cal codes is evidenced 
in the fact that only those selections which had some direct 
bearing on morals were copied into the Commonplace Book.1 
The selections thus copied amounted to little more than page 
after page of heterogeneous epigrams; to base a consistent 
philosophy on them would be a task comparable to finding a 
plot within the book of Proverbs. Therefore only the more 
important selections will be discussed and the ~hole will be 
understood as an attempt on the part of Jefferson to find a 
new basis for morals. 
If it was Bolingbroke who freed the mind of Jefferson from 
the early orthodoxy of the este.blished church, then it was 
Cicero to whom he turned first in order to find a Stoic basis 
for moral philosophy in his eclectic writings. The selections 
from Cicero in the Commonplace Book are second in length only to 
those of Bolingbroke.2 Here in outline form are some of the 
more important doctrines which were copied from Cicero by 
Jefferson: 1. submission to the implacable, 2. the law of nature 
as universal consent, 3. a basic interest in morality, 4. reason 
as universal, 5. virtue as innate, 6. a deterministic theology 
and 7. a slight tinge cf pessimism. In addition to Cicero, 
Jefferson also read Epictetus and Seneca, each of whom will be 
discussed in connection with the above concepts. 
1. Chinard, LBJ, 4. 
2. Jef~erson, CBP, 73-81. 
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Later in life, (1803) Jefferson was to criticize the 
morals of the Stoics1 but there is every indication that at 
least for a time, they dominated his thought almost exclusively 
and later works were judged by them. He had a thorough knowledge 
of not less than eleven of Cicero's works 2 plus some ten works 
by Seneca.3 Jefferson was interested for the most part in the 
Stoic teachings on immortality contained in the eclectic 
writings of Cicero4 as most of the selections in the Commonplace 
~ are from the Disputationes Tuscalanae. 
A strain of mere pessimism runs throughout the sections 
which Jefferson copied and most have to do with the 
contemplation of death. "What is there agreeable in life, 
When we must night and day reflect that, at some time or other, 
we must die?"5 There is no answer but to learn how to die 
while one is alive and this may be done by separating the body 
from the soul through self-denial.6 "~ow to separate the soul 
from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else whatever.n7 
By so doing it is possible to enjoy a life in heaven while one 
is still alive and when the body is gone it will not be missed. 
In the meantime the wise man makes such provisions for his family 
as are necessary for their well being after his death. If 
death means only a change of abode, then there is nothing that 
could be better, if on the other hand, it means total extinction 
there are few things that could improve on a long sleep; 
1. Jefferson, X, 379f; XII, 343. 
2. Jefferson, x, 382. 5. Jefferson, 3. Jefferson, X, 382. CBP, 73. 
4. Jefferson, CBP, 73f. 6. Jefferson, CBP, 74. 7. Jefferson, CBP, 74. 
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either way, the wise man will be prepared and will not be 
disappointed,l The pessimistic strain is transformed and made 
triumphant in the observation that there is nothing in death 
which is frightening or to be avoided. 
He who is under no fear of death, not only because 
it is a thing absolutely inevitable, but also 
because he is persuaded that death itself hath 
nothing terrible in it provides himself w2th a 
very great resource towards a happy life. 
The wise man for the Stoic is the man to whom nothing 
in this life is absolutely unbearable nor is anything of such 
a nature that he can be swept from his feet in ecstasy; some-
where in between he finds his happiness, Thus for Jefferson, 
another area in life is taken from the realm of orthodox 
theology and p+aced in the realm of secular philosophy. It also 
reflects Jefferson's deep interest in morality and natural 
religion which is one of the dominating characteristics of his 
thought. In throwing over the traditional concepts of historical 
Christianity, Jefferson did not go so far as to accept any form 
of atheism, even momentarily. 
One section copied from Cicero reads, "There never was 
any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so 
savage, as to be without some notion of gods,n3 All believe 
that there is a "certain divine nature and energy." The divine 
nature and energy is not further defined and- it probably did 
not bother Jefferson at the time; at this stage in his life it 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 76. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 76. 
3. Jefferson, CBP, 72. 
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was enough to know that there was some other basis for a belief 
in God, a basis other than Christian scripture. The belief 
in the divinity does not proceed from opinions, customs, or 
laws; it is based on universal consent which is identical 
with natural law. "In every case the consent of all nations is 
to be looked upon as a law of nature."l Natural law as universal 
consent is also divine law for God resides within each person 
and is known through those characteristics which are common 
to all of the people. 
Natural law understood as universal law is reflected 
throughout the writings of the Stoics.2 Universal consent, 
for Jefferson, became in practice the law of the majority. 
Although it was not universal, he claimed that the law of the 
majority was natural for it came nearest approaching 
universality.3 "The lex majoris partis is a fundamental law 
of nature, by v hich alone self-government can be exercised by 
a society."4 Again, "The_ lex majoris partie LfiJ founded in 
common law as well as common right."5 Jefferson even goes so 
far as to accept an extremely pragmatic position in this 
regard when he writes to Madison "I readily suppose my opinion 
wrong, when opposed by the majority.n6 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 72. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 72; Marcus Aurelius, ~., IV, 9; Cicero, 
De Nat. Deo., II, v. 13; II, xiii, 35; Acad., I, 36; Cf. 
Windelband, HOP, 182f. 
3. Jefferson, III, 321. 
4. Jefferson, WOJ, VII, 417. 
5. Jefferson, WOJ, III, 229. 
6. Jefferson, WOJ, v, 48. 
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The concept of natural law according to the Stoic 
doctrine found ready acceptance in the mind of young Jefferson 
and was influential in all of his later thought on the subject. 
Thus when he read Locke's Second Treatise and found there a 
similar concept, it rang a familiar note, Natural development 
was for the Stoics, rational development. However, reason 
was for them innate; while for Locke it was learned, 
Jefferson did not accept the Lockian proscription of 
innate ideas, but was true to the Stoic concept. "The seeds 
of virtue are natural to our constitutions and were they 
suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a 
happy life,n1 In 1814 he wrote to Thomas Law, "The moral 
principle Lf!7 so much a part of our constitution as that no 
errors of reasoning or of speculation might lead us astray 
from its observance in practice." The familiar ambiguity 
discussed above is not lacking in this letter; after stating 
that it is part of our constitution, and meaning by that, that 
it is innate, he then argues, as if in memory of Locke's 
criticism, to the effect that exceptions do not invalidate the 
instinct. But, as Locke had pointed out, they do. When it is 
wanting, Jefferson continues, then education is used in an 
attempt to remedy the need and the unfortunate individual is 
given an artificial conscience. So much for individuals, when 
whole cultures differ, the difficulty is resolved by an appeal 
to "utility." In addition to a moral sense of right and wrong, 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 76. 
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nature has imputed utility to every man and by this he 
may judge whether or not he is justified in a particular action.1 
Despite the injection of this relativism he repeats in the 
same letter, "I sincerely believe in the general existence of 
a moral instinct." Thus in theory at least the Stoics triumph 
over Locke in the mind of Jefferson in spite of Jefferson's 
ill-fated attempt to resolve obvious contradictions by the use 
of a novel terminology and false distinction, In actual practice 
the Stoic triumph is not so clear, he still writes to Madison 
that he considers his opinion wrong when it is opposed by the 
majority, 
At such times his moral sense of right and wrong evidently 
fails him along with the rest of the minority, with which he 
sides, if but momentarily. The question at issue here is that 
of universal and innate truths on the one hand or pragmatic 
truths on the other, Atfuose points in his correspondence where 
he gave it most attention2 Jefferson resolved himself into a 
logical contradiction although twenty-seven years separated the 
two letters. In other instances, some of which have already 
been mentioned, he alternated in his views. Pragmatic truth 
can never be known ultimately for each stage can only be judged 
by what follows, while innate truths can be known and are eternal, 
irrevocable, The term utility is a key concept in the thought 
of Jefferson at this point. 
1, Jefferson, XIV, 143, 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 138f; VI, 256, 
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Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), one of England's great reformers, 
after some delay, finally had his Principles of Morels and 
Legislation published in 1789. Previous to that time it had 
been read and discussed by friends, The first paragraph of the 
first chapter introduces the word utility in its technical 
sense as pleasure end the remainder of the chapter is devoted 
to its development, French editions of Bentham's works were 
published in 1802 and he received immediate and fer-reaching 
acclaim, Jefferson did not mention Benthem in his writings 
and there is no attempt here to indicate that Benthem influenced 
Jefferson. However the dates of their essays end correspondence 
do not preclude that possibility. In the "Syllabus of the 
doctrines of Epicurus" Jefferson uses the term utility in 
its technical sense and in the same syllabus defined the summum 
bonum as "not pained in body, nor troubled in mind,nl Thus, 
although Jefferson did not draw upon Bentham's usage there is 
a striking similarity. Jefferson defined utility as the 
"standard and test of virtue,n2 Men, he explained, who live 
in various cultures and circumstances may have distinctive 
views of utility. The same activity may be useful in one 
culture end vicious in another. Jefferson did not make a point 
of basing utility on pain and pleasure as did Benthem in the 
Introduction to the Principles of Morality and Legisletion,3 
But otherwise, the way in which he used the term was similar 
1. Jefferson, XV, 224. 
2, Jefferson, XIV, 143, 
3. Bentham, PML, I, i-xiv. 
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to the way in which it was used by Bentham.l The principle 
of utility robs the moral instinct of Hll meaning for the moral 
instinct would be nothing more than the ability to be consistent 
once a given premise had been affirmed. ·rhe subject matter 
would be irrelevant. Two people might under these conditions 
have identical instincts and be diametrically opposed as to 
their moral interpretations of various human activities. 
Thus utility committed Jefferson to the same moral 
relativism as it did Bentham. A. Koch, in her treatment of 
the philosophy of Jefferson, discusses this pr•oblem but 
somehow avoids the obvious contradiction in the writings of 
Jefferson.2 She resolves it by saying that Jefferson "moved 
away" from the ear·lier absolutistic moral sense theory. But 
in the letter to Law,3 Jefferson did not move away from a 
former position; both theories are entertained as complementary 
coordinates. Koch states that at least he realized it to be 
a technical and complex problem, that his contradiction was 
only a technical contradiction. Possibly, but it is a 
contradiction nevertheless. 
Only a predilection to establish Jefferson as a philosopher 
of the first rank can account for labelling it a technical 
mistake. It is a philosophical error of the first order. It 
indicates Jefferson's impatience with rational systems; he 
possessed a pragmatic temperament but not a pragmatic philosophy. 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 143. 
2. Koch, POJ, 42. 
3. Jefferson, XIV, 140f. 
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Jefferson was pragmatic but he was not a Pragmatist; utility 
played a prominent part in his thought but he was not a 
Utilitarian in his moral philosophy. Neither was he an 
intuitionalist. This problem leads the reader to the margin of 
Jefferson's thought in moral philosophy; there is no justification 
for concluding that an answer to the dilemma is even implied. 
It ends in a contradiction and as such it is a judgment of 
Jefferson's philosophical grasp. As an Absolutist Jefferson 
could have isolated and categorized a few universal propositions 
which he believed would always hold true. As a Pragmatist he 
could have established e few principles which would serve as 
tested criteria, relative truths, but truths based on the 
additive experience of the race, He did neither. 
Doubtless the Stoic doctrines were some of the first 
positive concepts to influence Jefferson and in all probability 
throughout a large part of his life he considered himself a 
Neo-Stoie. The Stoic doctrines are reflected throughout the 
Commonplace Book, in the works chosen from Homer, Euripides, 
the English poets and dramatists. Other than the misogyny 
which is interspersed with the philosophical selections from 
Euripides, there are also statements which could be taken 
literally from the Stoic teachers.l "A man faithful amid 
adversities is fairer to behold than calm to mariners."2 
"No man among mortals is happy.n3 "To suffer is man's fate.n4 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 88, 3. Jefferson, CBP, 102. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 92. 4. Jefferson, CBP, 102. 
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"For men to sin is reasonable when gods offer the occasion. rtl 
From Pope's Homer he copied, "To labour is the lot of man below; 
and when Jove, gave us life, he gave us woe, 112 These selections, 
written in a changing script which indicates that the author , 
penned them over a number of years, were the excerpts which 
most impressed him from the works of the ancients. There is no 
evidence that his personal morality underwent the same change; 
it remained permanent and fixed as one foundation was removed 
and another slipped in place. 
In the previous chapter Locke's doctrine of natural law 
was discussed as a law based on Locke's hypothetical state of 
nature concept, In this chapter it has been pointed out that 
the Stoic concept of natural law was one of rational self-
development. In both, reason is the criterion, but Locke did 
not place the same emphasis on development; his theory was 
static and stationary. However, there is no evidence that 
Jefferson investigated this distinction. Natural law, for him, 
meant the Stoic concept of rational development supplemented by 
Locke's more scientific analysis. Although Locke did not 
emphasize development, his state of nature theory was an 
idealized end product rather than the point of origin. It was a 
hypothetical people who had been relieved of all social modes 
and reshaped by purely rational forms. The two emphases 
could have been complementary in the mind of Jefferson. 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 108. 
2. Jefferson, CBP, 128. 
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Jefferson, like the Stoics, was interested in metaphysics 
only in so far as it was related directly to morality. Thus 
he copies the following as a foundation for a materialistic 
metaphysics of the body and soul question. 
For if either the heart, of LSi£7 the blood, or 
the brain, is the soul, then certainly the soul, 
being corporeal, must perish with the rest of 
the body; if it is air, it will perhaps be 
dissolved; if it is fire, it will be extinguished.1 
Writing to Thomas Cooper in 1820 he speaks of spiritualism 
as a heresy which was not consistent with the Christian 
tradition, a tradition which he seldom bothered to defend. 
However on this occasion he quotes freely from the Church 
Fathers up to the time of St. Augustine in defense of his 
position.2 Locke, again, is his mainstay and he is quoted 
to the effect that the soul is material. Furthermore, he 
defies anyone to so limit the powers of God that He will be 
prevented from infusing the power of thought into any physical 
body.3 
In summary several conclusions present themselves at toia 
point. Jefferson's knowledge of Locke's metaphysics was for the 
most part dependent upon the writings of Bolingbroke. It is 
quite possible that he had little acquaintance with any other 
metaphysical system. For instance, he admitted repeatedly 
that he simply could not complete a Platonic dialogue. The 
proof that Bolingbroke influenced Jefferson is not to be found 
1. Jefferson, CBP, 72. 
2. Jefferson, XV, 266-7. 
3. Jefferson, XV, 266. 
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primarily in the Commonplace Book as Chinard indicates in his 
introduction. Influence is indicated only when it is 
corroborated by additional references in Jefferson's writings, 
In the temper of his approach to problems Jefferson has 
much in common with the methodology of Bacon. He was a firm 
believer in scientific method to the degree that it had been 
developed at the time he wrote, 
Puritan efforts to overthrow the king and replace him with 
a theocracy impressed Jefferson but little. He did not 
consider it as a popular revolution but as a battle between 
contending monarchies neither of which were primarily concerned 
with the rights of the people, He was not interested in over-
throwing a king as such but in the establishment of a free 
government. 
Paine, a friend of Jefferson's had little traceable 
influence, but undoubtedly did much to acquaint Jefferson with 
the American mind, 
Jefferson's moral philosophy, his personal passion, reaches 
a high water mark in his discussions of utility; it is an impasse 
that he never transcends and the attempts to do so on the 
part of others are misleading. However, although his affinity 
for Bentham is not triumphant in his moral philosophy it will 
be shown later that the school founded by Bentham receives the 
palm in Jefferson's political thought. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FRENCH INFLUENCE 
Bereaved by the death of his wife on September 6, 178a 
and overcome with the responsibility involved in rearing the 
children alone, Jefferson refused the appointment of Peace 
Commissioner to France. But later, when he was made minister 
to the court of Louis XVI, he accepted, and arrived in Paris 
in 1784. In the persons of Messrs. Franklin and Jefferson, 
the struggling colonies were paying high tribute to the nation 
which had done the most to succor them in their hours of 
extreme necessity and in so doing had impoverished itself. 1 
France became the United States port of entry into the other 
courts of the continent. England, which would have normally 
made the introductions, was still sulking from the wounds 
received during the revolution and was doing all in its power 
to break the economic back of the United States by refusing 
credit. Thus among other things, it was Jefferson's desire to 
find independent channels which would give the United States 
access to the international banking system with its axis 
suspended between Amsterdam and London. Needless to say, the 
American entrance had to be made via Paris and Amsterdam. 
It was Jefferson's first trip abroad and the culture of 
France struck him as being in sharp contrast to that of the 
colonies. Notes hurriedly copied as he rambled throughout 
1. Langer, BWH, 448. 
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rural France filled reams of paper; one French invention 
after another was channeled into the stream of American 
ingenuity through the correspondence of Jefferson, He 
overlooked nothing, The French wines interested him in 
particular and he noted carefully the various processes 
involved in their production, Everything was copied with an 
eye for its immediate use in the United States and some items 
were deleted because it would take over a generation for them 
to be perfected and manufactured, Thinking of himself as a 
farmer and having a farmer's dist~1st of urban life, When the 
choice presented itself, he interested himself in novel 
agricultural processes at the expense of manufacturing. French 
educational institutions, the schools and colleges with Which 
Jefferson became acquainted made a negative impression, 
American students and parents of aspiring students were 
encouraged by Jefferson to study at home, To the mind of 
Jefferson, there existed a superficial haze, a gaudy brashness 
that pervaded French educational institutions and hid from his 
somewhat puritanical personality the more erudite character of 
French scholarship, It would, he claimed, have a detrimental 
effect on the unsophisticated, naive student reared on the 
American frontier. Ample opportunity for study was provided 
in the American universities and although Jefferson was to 
claim France as a second home, he did not wish to transplant it 
to American soil.1 French art he did admire and for it had 
1. Jefferson, V, 152, 
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nothing but praise. The architecture, sculpture, painting 
and music he coveted for the nation arising from the 
wilderness. 
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Later in life, within the pages of his !utobiography, 
Jefferson was to make a more objective appraisal of France and 
French culture.l He had nothing but approbation for their 
science and was charmed by their manners. Doubtless, as is the 
case with even the most appreciative visitors, some of these 
characteristics were not fully appreciated until he retumned 
home just as some American attributes were not noted until his 
trip to Paris. The mission to France and the influence which 
it had on his subsequent development falls easily into three 
categories: (1) the knowledge he gained in the practical affairs 
of international trade, (2) the impact of the French national 
culture, end (3) his acquaintance with French philosophy. This 
study is concerned in particular with the third category and 
the other two only in so fer as they effect it. In many 
respects Jefferson played the part of en American De Tocqueville. 
The leaders of the Enlightenment in France and England 
constitute a group of men who defy most attempts to be 
categorized in philosophical schools. But the majority had 
some characteristics in common such as the devotion to reason 
and to e crude methodology popularly described as scientific. 
Some were unorthodox and others were anti-orthodox in their 
1. Jefferson, I, 159. 
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religious and political views. They were spread over two 
nations, drew their influence from still other cultures and 
covered about two centuries from 1600 to 1800. The 
Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, and as one student has 
christened it, the Age of Voltaire, 1 was marked by a tendency 
toward deism in religion and materialism in metaphysics. 
Although Lange's ~tory of Materialism discusses moat of 
the men on both continents, the term materialism does not quite 
fit. It was designed to cover a much longer period of time 
and does not do justice to the individual contributions made by 
some of the outstanding French philosophers. Materialism 
denotes a school of thought within metaphysics and many of the 
French thinkers were not, primarily, metaphysicians. Skeptics 
they were, but behind their skepticism they hid a positive 
belief in English materialism. Of course this represents only 
a trend in French thought and certainly did not include all. 
Descartes was the first in the French school to make the break 
with orthodoxy and he was followed by Gassendi though not in 
detail. Locke was the most important exponent of materialism 
in England although he was preceded by Hobbes. When Montesquieu 
and Voltaire began to write, their works showed the imprint 
of the English as well as the French thinkers. Thus although 
no one term can be used to designate the whole school, the 
term deism comes very near doing so and it will be the term used 
here. Granted, it will be little more than arbitrary in some 
1. Torrey, VAE, 1. 
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instances. 
As was pointed out in Chapter V, Bolingbroke was exiled 
to France in 1735 and it was during this time that he came to 
know and appreciate the small struggling French deists. 
Voltaire had not begun to write his scathing criticisms of the 
church and Montesquieu's Esprit de Lois was not published 
until 1748. Whether or not Bolingbroke was instrumental in 
the early development of Voltaire's thought, is an open 
question but it is certain that they were well acquainted and 
that Voltaire attributed many of his doctrines to Bolingbroke.1 
Although Bolingbroke did not mention Voltaire in his writings, 
as in most such cases, in all probability the influence was 
reciprocal. Bolingbroke, along with the French deists, went 
far beyond the limits set by Locke but with the use of Locke's 
methodology. Their writings reflect an impatience with Locke's 
Reasonableness of Christianity and a determination to be openly 
critical of all religious doctrines, a determination not 
reflected in the early English deists. 
Jefferson, while laboriously copying selections from 
Bolingbroke, had absorbed some French deism, if only secondhand. 
With this one exception, he had had little preparation for the 
French school of thought with which he was thrown during the 
French mission.2 Although there is a cleavage along national 
1. Torrey, VED, 130f; Voltaire, ING, 146. 
2. Torrey, in his Voltaire and the English Deists, argues that 
Bolingbroke had very little influence on Voltaire, that 
Bolingbroke was used because Voltaire needed the prestige 
accruing to the title. Sir Leslie Stephen, along with other 
commentators on their relationship, holds that the influence 
was for the most part genuine. The immediate problem of this 
paper is satisfied with noting the .doctrines which they 
held in common. 
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lines between the English and French deists, they were 
nevertheless interdependent and neither can be understood 
without the other. In the history of philosophy, the com-
plexity of this reletionship celled for a subtle distinction 
bearing the marks of brevity and accuracy. 
With discerning insight Sir Leslie Stephen provided just 
such a distinction, one that has proved fruitful in subsequent 
thought.! Every system of thought, no .matter how positive 
in its original construction, carries with it an implied 
criticism; likewise every criticism implies a point of 
vantage. Although they may be separated almost to the breaking 
point, they cannot be long parted and it is this logical 
implication which bound the two systems. English deism, 
Stephen holds, was more constructive than the French. The 
English were devoted to raising the structure and the French 
to deciding Who could dwell there and Who could not. 
Constructive deism was characterized by an independent 
methodology based on a novel premise, a methodology designed 
to reach conclusions in both philosophy and theology which may 
or may not have resembled orthodoxy. Thus if rational empiricism 
came to orthodox conclusions it would further confirm the new 
method; but if not, orthodoxy had to stand condemned. 
Critical deism, on the other hand was almost parasitical in 
its tendency to thrive only where orthodoxy was strong.2 
1. Torrey, VED, 1. 
2. Russell, Art., xi. 
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Indifferent to an independent metaphysics, it chose a 
methodology similar to the constructive deists but has as its 
goal the demolition of orthodoxy. 
L~nge, in his History of Materialism makes a similar 
distinction but applies it specifically to the national 
character or national mind of each country, The national mind 
of Engls.nd developed toward materialism while the French 
developed toward skepticism.1 Thus, according to Lange, Hume 
would be more in the French tradition than the English, at least 
as far as his methodology is concerned, Although supposedly 
Pyrrhonism excludes all metaphysics, pragmatically it has 
always been forced to ally itself with some system in order to 
be intelligible, Thus the French school adopted an instrumental 
approach to English materialism, using it where it proved to be 
expedient and advantageous for the work at hand, For the most 
part they were satisfied to destroy orthodoxy and put nothing 
in its place; occasionally they were forced to be more con-
structive a.nd when necessary they chose materialism as that 
metaphysics Which most easily supported their methodology,2 
As Hume was an outstanding exception in England, so 
Gassendi and Lamettre in L'Homme Machine were exceptions in 
France. Montaigne, LaMothe, Le Vayer, Pierre Bayle, Diderot, 
and Voltaire were true to the French tradition and were more 
interested in abolishing orthodoxy than in establishing a 
1. Lange, HOM, II, 9, 
2. Lange, HOM, II, 9f. 
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1 thoroughgoing and systematic alternative. Roughly therefore, 
the two schools may be distinguished by the constructive 
tendency in England end the critical tendency in France, The 
outstanding leaders in English deism were discussed in Chapters 
IV and V; Chapter VI will be devoted to a study of the French 
schools of thought and their direct influence on Jefferson. 
Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holbach, and Helv~tius are the French 
thinkers ~ho most influenced Jefferson as critical deists. 
Rousseau and Tracy, who cannot be placed in that category, will 
be treated individually and subsequent to the first group. 
Voltaire (1694-1778), a sophisticate whose wit and rascality 
can be hardly distinguished from the seriousness of his nature, 
was at the same time a genius and alternated between fee.rless 
attacks on the church and frequent resort to duplicity, a 
duplicity prompted by fear. He attracted the mind of Jefferson 
as he has attracted countless other minds during his lifetime 
and since. Although he was not the student that many of his friends 
and associates were, librartes that maintain on their shelves 
scarcely a single volume on his more scholarly contemporaries 
abound in studies and commentaries on his voluminous works. 
Voltaire is first mentioned by Jefferson in the Notes on Virginia 
which was written previous to the French mission.2 The occasion 
is a discussion of the article on Coquilles in the Questions 
Encyclop{dioues wherein Voltaire offered a novel hypothesis 
1. Lange, HOM, 9. 
2. Jefferson, II, 42, :3. 
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for the deposits of shells in the continental interiors, It 
may be safely concluded therefore that Jefferson had acquainted 
hirrself with much of the Encyclop~die by 1782, Voltaire's 
works were published in a 35 volume English edition as early 
as 1761 and another followed in 1779,1 Frequent listings of 
Voltaire's works in French cen be found in American book 
catalogues previous to that time; Jefferson's acquaintance with 
the French language would have made him prefer these editions 
to the English. Thus it may be assumed that he was familiar 
with many of Voltaire's works, 2 
Voltaire's influence on Jefferson was more indirect than 
direct for he is mentioned only twice in the Memorial Edition,3 
However the French school of deism did have a marked influence 
as will be shown with the treatment of others in the group. 
Voltaire joined with the rest of the school in promoting the 
idea of progress based on reason and in the application of a 
crude and improvised scientific method, Voltaire placed an 
emphasis on novelty rather than accuracy in his methodology 
and it was in the correction of one of his erroneous observations 
that Jefferson became interested in him,4 Whether or not 
Bolingbroke directly influenced Voltaire, they availed 
themselves of a similar methodology, However, Voltaire in 
1. Barr, VIA, 12. 
2, An exhaustive study of Voltaire's influence in America has 
been made by Mary-Margaret H. Barr in volume XXXIX of the 
Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages. 
From this the conclusion can be drawn that Voltaire's works 
were highly prized in the American colonies. 
3. Jefferson, II, 42; XVII, 232. 
4. Jefferson, XVII, 232. 
VI. French Influence 165 
carrying it through to its logical conclusions, sometimes 
bordered on absurdity. The Philosophical Dictionary is replete 
with satire directed at the church and the laws of' the nation; 
only occasionally did he discuss such problems as common sense 
and final causes in a way that did justice to the depth of his 
learning.l Other topics which would ordinarily be treated at 
the same level such as faith, 2 he treated in a cavalier and 
supercilious manner. This treatment was nut of harmony with all 
of Jefferson's writings and in all probability he was not in the 
least interested in it. Jefferson could have been personally 
indifferent to the merciless extremes to be found in Voltaire's 
writing and at the same time appreciate its usefulness in 
breaking the tight hold of the clergy. It was Voltaire who 
popularized the Newtonian physics and with it displaced 
Descartes' metaphysics.3 He clothed it in a humorous and vivid 
style which sometimes sacrificed accuracy but nevertheless 
introduced it to readers who would never have read the Principia. 
And, he might have reasoned, the Principia was still available 
for those who wished to read it. Jefferson had as much to say 
against the church as Voltaire, but the particular abuses 
practiced in France were not those practiced in the colonies; 
therefore many of Voltaire's proscriptions were beside the point 
for Jefferson was concerned primarily with the excesses of the 
colonial church. Not only were: they irrelevant as far as 
1. Voltaire, PD, 78, 133. 
2. Voltaire, PD, 126. 
3. Torrey, VAE, 1. 
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Jefferson was concerned but they have been irrelevant to 
countless other anti-clericals who have lived in non.-
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Catholic countries. ~hereas Jefferson objected stringently to 
political control, Voltairal aimed his arrows at the two 
targets of immorality on the one hand and amassed wealth on 
the other. 
Voltaire disagreed with .L.ocke's opposition to innate 
ideas and sided with the position which was later to attract 
Jefferson. Good and evil, justice and injustice could be 
discerned by a law engraved on each human heart.2 Some ideas 
were innate; thus an appeal was made to the ::.toic doc trine of 
universals. Voltaire was not particularly interested in the 
necessary presuppositions to such a theory just as he was not 
interested in the presuppositions of Rousseau's theory of natural 
law which was caricatured rather than refuted. In L'Ing~nu 
he has the simple ingenuous primitive say: "Vous ~tea done 
le bien malhonnetes gens, puisqu 11 faut entre vous tant de 
precautions. 11 3 His superficial treatment of subject matter 
was not li~ited to the content of what he wrote but extended 
to the authorities which he quoted. He not only misrepresented 
others, but his quotations reveal little care in checking 
sources and an unscholarly dependence on mere hearsay. 4 
That every student in the United States did not read 
Destutt de Tracy's Commentaire Sur L 1Esprit Des Lois De Montesguieu, 
1. Voltaire, PD, 55. 
2. Torrey, VAE, 10. 
3. Voltaire, ING, 164; Cf. Torrey, VAE, 30; Voltaire, PD, 224. 
4. Torrey, VED, 12f. 
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that it was not singled out by reviewers as the most outstanding 
single work on government, is an oversight which cannot be 
blamed on Thomas Jefferson.1 He used every channel of influence 
at his command, the number and power of which was not inconsider-
able, to bring the Commentaire to the attention of the reading 
public. He supervised its translation into English, convinced e 
publisher friend that it should be printed, and promoted its sales~ 
Writing to Thomas Mann Randolph in 1790, Jefferson states 
that, "in the science of government, Montesquieu 1s Spirit of 
Laws is generally recommended.•3 But then he adds some reser-
vations by agreeing that although it does contain a large 
number of political truths, it nevertheless contains an equal 
number of heresies. He had recently read a letter written by 
Helv~tius Which had listed the specific reasons why he had 
advised Montesquieu not to publish the Esprit de Lois. ~ Helvetius 
had explained that Montesquieu was an avid reader, one who 
commonplaced all of his reading and who attempted in the 
Esprit de Lois to resolve all conflicts within the compiled notes. 
Jefferson's evaluation of Montesquieu (1689-1755) at this 
time ia important for the next time he is mentioned, it is in 
connection with the newly arrived (1810) commentary by Tracy 
1. Although the influence of Destutt de Tracy in the u.s. 
is slight, he did influence the thought of South America 
and Mexico. Cr. Ramos, HFM, 112; "La Ideologia de Destutt 
de Tracy tuvo una gran difusion en America." 
2. Jefferson, XII, 407. References to this endeavor sre 
frequent throughout his correspondence. 
3. Jefferson, VIII, 31. 
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and in Jefferson's zeal to prove it superior, Montesquieu 
comes in for some very hard criticism, It is incidentally, 
criticism which subsequent authorities have refused to second, 
Attempts to evaluate Montesquieu's influence on Jefferson1 
have frequently failed to note that a commentary on any work, 
even if h:!.ghly critical, is at the same time an implied compliment, 
Obviously, both Tracy and Jefferson held the work in high 
esteem or the former would have written an original work on 
government, and Jefferson would have encouraged him to do so, 
It is doubtful if Jefferson came to know any other basic book 
on government as well as he did the Esprit des Lois, if in no 
other way, at least through his close supervision of the 
translation of the Commentaire, He considered it a milestone in 
the development of political theory and his reaction to it in 
his correspondence and in his approval of Tracy's revision will 
not only be fruitful in determining Montesquieu's influence, 
but likewise in determining Jefferson's position as a political 
theorist, 
It can be conceded generally that Montesquieu played a 
prominent part in holding before the eyes of the framers of the 
constitution, the threefold division of government with its 
2 
consequent checks and balances, He was not alone in his 
influence at this point and there had been original 
experimentation along this line in the colonial governments, 
1, Spurlin, MIA, 23. 
2, Spurlin, MIA, 19f, 
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but he is frequently mentioned as having had significant 
influence, Jefferson repeatedly criticized Montesquieu for 
supporting the English monarchical government in his support of 
the English constitution,l He also frequently attacked 
Montesquieu's claim that only a small country could maintain a 
republio.2 This was a point also made by Rousseau. 
At the close of the Commentaire 1 Tracy writes 1 11malgr'e 
tous ses d~fauts, L 1Esprit des Lois, quand il a paru, a 
meri te d 11l'tre attaqu~ par tous lea ennemis des lumier~s et de 
l'humanite, et d'~tre d~fendu par leurs amis."3 Tracy's 
criticism of Montesquieu is basically metaphysical; it is much 
more than a commentary and amounts to a revision, Considerable 
space is devoted to attacking Montesquieu on such fundamental 
problems as the definition of the terms law and freedom. 
Montesquieu defines law as the "necessary relations arising 
from the nature of things, 114 and Tracy holds that it is not a 
relation. Positive law, he claims, is subject to natural law 
and natural law is the criterion whereby a positive law is 
proved just or unjust. 5 
Reate dono que les lois de la nature existent 
ant~rieurement et sup~rieurement aux nStres; 
que le juste fondamental est oe qui leur 
est conforms, et que 1 1 injuste radical 
1. Montesquieu, SOL, I, 162f. Cf. also 174 wherein he 
that the laws of the English Constitution are just 
whether or not they are effectively enforced. cr. 
TCG, XII. 
states 
Locke, 
2~ Jefferson, X, 232. 
3. Tracy, CLM, xv. 
4. Montesquieu, SOL, 1. 
5. Tracy, CLM, l-6. 
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est ce qui leur resiste; et que, par cons~quent 
nos lois post6rieures doivent, pour ~tre 
r~ellement bonnes, ~tre consequent~s a ces lois 
plus anciennes et plus puissantes, 
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Tracy defines natural law as that which is inevitable. "Ces 
lois ou regles de la nature ne sent autre chose que 1 1expression 
de la maniere dent lea choses arrivent inevitablement," 
Crediting most of Montesquieu's errors to his definition of 
law, Tracy writes later2 in a footnote that if Montesquieu 
had analysed the term law, many of his errors could have been 
prevented, A similar criticism is leveled at Montesquieu 1s 
discussion of liberty,3 Here he follows Locke's psychological 
analysis of freedom as the ability to execute what one wills, 
But there is no freedom to will. "Concluons que la libert'e 
n'existe qu 1apres la volonte et relativement ~ elle, et qu 1elle 
n'est que le pouvoir d'ex6cuter la volontE;,"4 
Equating freedom with personal and social happiness Tracy 
states that the best society is the one wherein the most 
people are happy and contented,5 Not the least significant 
point at which he disagrees with Montesquieu, is in the analysis 
of the English constitution,6 Tracy censors Montesquieu for 
1. Tracy, CLM, 6, 
a, Tracy, CLM, 31. 
3. Montesquieu, SOL, XI. 
4. Tracy, CLM, 143, Tracy does not say that he derived the 
doctrine from Locke but he does note that it is "aussi le 
sentiment de Locke." 
5. Tracy, CLM, 149, 
6. Tracy, CLM, 152f. 
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unreservedly praising the English constitution1 particularly 
when the latter in pointing out that there is a legislative, 
a judiciary and an executive, in the case of the executive 
"il approuve sans discussion qu'elle soit confi~e a un seul 
~ ' ' n2 homme, m~me hereditairement sans sa famille, This passage 
may or may not be the basis for a similar judgment by Jefferson3 
but it is noteworthy that Jefferson asserted it in connection 
with a discussion of Tracy's work, Attention must be drawn at 
this point to an obvious contradiction in a footnote to the 
French edition printed in 1819, 
It will be remembered that the first edition of the 
Commentaire was printed in English at Philadelphia in 1811 
under the supervision of Jefferson because of the restrictions 
on the French press during the reign of Napoleon, But on May 1, 
1819 during the second restoration of Louis XVIII, freedom of 
the press was granted along with several other liberal measures 
which immediately preceded and followed it, The French edition 
of the Commenteire was published in July, 1819, following 
close on the heels of "la libert6 de la presse" clause, The 
generally unsettled conditions and the close margin under which 
he was operating may expll;in in part the two notes added to the 
French edition at the close of Book XI. 4 In the first the editor 
takes exception to what he calls the "absolues et,,,tranchantes" 
conclusions which he is careful not to give specific designation, 
1. Montesquieu, SOL, I, 162f, 
2, Tracy, C!JII, 153, 
3. Jefferson, XII, 414, 
4, Tracy, CLM, 210-11, 
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In the second Tracy makes the following statement which 
deserves careful scrutiny. 
Je suis tres persuad~ que la monarchie 
constitutionnelle, ou le gouvernement 
representatif avec un seul chef her~ditaire, 
eat et sera encore extrement long-temps, 
malgre sea imperfections, le meilleur de tous 
les gouvernemens possibles pour tous lea 
peuples de 1 1Europe, et sur-tout pour la 
France.l 
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He then continues the note by saying that all nations 
that have received constitutional rights from their monarchy 
are not the nations which he is discussing in the text. 
Specific reference is made to France and it is asserted that 
since they have accepted their charte constitutionnelle, 
"avec joie," they should endeavor to support it. "La franchise 
avec laquelle j 1ai expose mea opinions jusqu 1ici, dolt "El'tre un 
sur garant de la sincerite de celle que j'enonce en ce moment."2 
The note is closed with the statement that he sees no 
contradiction if the reader keeps in mind the "abstractions de 
la theorie et lea realit1is de la pratique." It is significant 
that if Tracy had actually changed his theory of democratic 
government which he had been staunchly defending up to this 
point, he had ample opportunity to do so before publication of 
the French edition. But the text itself was left untouched 
according to the editor. 3 It was the hereditary monarchy which 
he had attacked in the English government and it was that point 
1. Tracy, CLM, 211. 
2. Tracy, CLM, 211. 
3. Tracy, CLM, 211. 
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which Jefferson had singled out for approbation. This 
contradiction is understandable in the light of the times and 
inasmuch as restrictive legislation proscribing the press 
did begin the following year end became increasingly harsh until 
1830.1 In feet, it was en exceedingly brave act for e men who 
had spent most of his adult life under en absolute end arbitrary 
monarch and Who might well have foreseen the reaction to 
liberal thought which was quickly to follow. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the note was written for government 
censors, not for students of political theory such as Jefferson. 
Jefferson never did allude to the retrection end it is quite 
possible that he had no opportunity to see it. 
To turn now to a point by point discussion of the differences 
between Tracy end Montesquieu, the following are significant. 
Montesquieu divides ell governments into three categories, 
despotism, monarchism, and republicanism. They are governed 
by fear, honor and virtue respectively.2 Tracy counters that 
any government which is founded on the rights of men must be 
founded on reason. In Book IV Montesquieu presents the argument 
that the education provided in a given country should be 
patterned after the government of the country in question and 
Tracy argues that a nation which does not recognize reason as 
its ultimate guide will warp the educational processes to fit 
its own need.3 Thus every commonwealth should educate the 
1. Langer, EWE, 626f. 
2. Montesquieu, SOL, I, 20f; Tracy, CLM, 221. 
3. Tracy, CLM, 221-2. 
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people according to the laws of reason and not according to 
the particular form which the government has taken, Tracy's 
point here is that if this is not done there will be no 
opportunity for the internal criticism of the government which 
is vital to its success over a period of time. Tracy dismisses 
the discussion of Book VI, which treats the principles of 
various governments in respect to the simplicity of their 
civil s.nd criminal laws, and goes on to outline a dynamic and 
progressive development in the history of political theory. The 
first stage of civilization is defined either as the democratic 
or despotic, the second stage as an aristocracy under one or 
more leaders and the third as representative government under 
one or more leaders. The last he acclaims as the best and the 
one which brings the most happiness to the greatest number of 
people, The first stage is governed by ignorance and force, the 
second by opinions and religion, the third by reason. 
Une of Tracy's most marked contributions was his insistence 
on the twofold freedoms, that of the press end individual or 
private liberty,1 Because of the restrictions on the press 
discussed above it is not difficult to understand why it was 
uppermost in his mind as a necessary freedom. 
In this discussion of the influence of Montesquieu on 
Jefferson, which has necessarily detoured through the revision 
by Tracy, there is little direct influence which can be seen. 
1. Tracy, CLM, 210, 227. 
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There is no evidence that Jefferson ever did approve the 
Esprit de Lois without serious reservations. There is ample 
evidence to indicate that he gave his complete support to 
Tracy's revision, and that, without reservation. Tracy's work 
is more a thorough-going revision than a commentary, for at 
many points he departs almost entirely from Montesquieu and 
follows Locke. In a comparison of Tracy with Locke however it 
is important to note that Tracy tended toward the representative 
type of government and even in a relatively small geographical 
area would not permit a pure democracy.l This was not true of 
Locke who placed the primary power in the people themselves.2 
On first reading Tracy, it may be difficult to discern just 
why he cannot be given more credit as an outstanding democratic 
philosopher. At least one of the reasons is to be found here. 
Reason he ascribed to the people, but it was a power which 
he refused to place directly in the hands of the people. The 
public could elect and they had sufficient ability to choose 
their leaders, but not to lead themselves. Actually, it would 
have amounted to the same thing if the representatives were 
elected regularly. But it is evident that it was not the same 
for him; otherwise he would not have placed democracy on the 
level with despotism and said that they were both ruled by 
ignorance. Thus for him there was an irrevocable cleavage 
between democratic and representative government, a cleavage 
1. Tracy, CLM, 223. 
2. Locke, ECG, 461. 
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which has been reflected in the arbitrary and semantically 
unjustifiable distinction sometimes made between democracies 
and republics. That Jefferson wavered between the same 
alternatives cannot be denied. It was a last resort for ~hose 
who could not give up the policy of centralized control and 
could find no valid justification for an aristocracy. 'rracy 
had in mind an elected aristocracy, not an aristocracy that was 
such because of inherited wealth, but because of superior 
reasoning powers, intelligence. His analysis of Montesquieu 
was intellectualistic, placing more emphasis on abstract reasoning 
than on the people who were to use it. 
Montesquieu was a relativist who believed that the laws 
should be fashioned according to the soil, the climate, the 
particular disposi tiona of the people and their occupations. 
Thus for him, there was no possibility of external criticism 
or comparison; the only possible criticism was that of 
pointing out the inconsistency within a given country. A law 
which did not fit into the framework of a given country was by 
that token, evil, one that did, was good. 
There are many points at which Jefferson strongly differed 
with Montesquieu, in particular Montesquieu 1 s ambiguous 
attitude toward slavery,1 his justification of a hereditary 
monarchy, and his belief that the republican form of government 
is limited to a small territory. Although Jefferson approved 
of the threefold division of the government, there is no 
1. Montesquieu, SOL, I, 253-270. 
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indication that there was direct influence at this point, It 
may have come from any number of sources including his own 
firsthand experience with a similar type as an executive in 
the state of Virginia, 
Jefferson does not mention Halbach (1723-1789) in his 
correspondence although it was Halbach who in The System of 
Nature introduced one of the most complete expositions of 
the extreme deistic position in France, If there was influence, 
it was indirect and relatively unimportant, Jefferson refused 
to accept one of Halbach's most important concepts, the 
identification of morality with self-perpetuation and 
preservation,1 Likewise Jefferson could not bring himself to 
a full rejection of the belief in innate ideas,2 This 
ambivalent attitude on the part of Jefferson was discussed 
fully in the analysis of Locke's influence,0 
Helv~tius (1715-1778) is frequently referred to by 
Jefferson in connection with the former's criticism of 
Montesquieu, but only once does he discuss the ethics of the 
prominent encyclopedist.4 In this selection he claims that 
Helv,tius does not go far enough in his doctrine of the ego as 
the sole motivation for the worthy act. It is true, Jefferson 
agrees, that the good act does give us pleasure, but the 
analysis of our motivation should not stop there, Significance 
cannot be attached to such a common sense observation, 
1, Holbach, SON, I, 70f, 
2. Holbach, SON, I, 75f; Jefferson, XIV, 14lf. 
3, Chapter IV, 
4, Jefferson, XIV, 14lf. 
VI. French Influence 178 
Importance can only be attached to an investigation of why we 
are pleased when we alleviate another 1 s suffering. 'Ne are 
made happy because "nature hath implanted in our breasts a 
love of others ••• a moral instinct. 111 Jefferson obviously does 
not see that when he has said this, he has not gone one step 
further than Helv~tius, who has contradicted one of his 
central arguments against innate ideas. 
The ideas supposed to be innate, are those Which 
are familiar to, and as it were, incorporated with 
us: but it is always through the medium of the 
senses that we acquire them. They are the effect 
of education, example, and habit. Such are the 
ideas formed of God, which evidently proceed from 
the descriptions given of him. Our moral ideas 
are the fruit of experience alone. The sentiments 
of paternal and filial affection are the result 
of reflection and habit. Man acquires all his 
notions and ideas. The words beauty, intelllgence, 
order, virtue, grief, pain and pleasure, are, 
to me, void of meaning, unless I compare them 
with other objects. Judgment presupposes 
sensibility; and judgment itself is the fruit 
of comparison.2 
Chinard, writing in the introduction to The Literary Bible, 
holds up the possibility that Jefferson Might have been 
, 
influenced by the Helvetius group in France to change over from 
the Stoic to the Epicurean concepts. He bases his judgment 
primarily on Jefferson's statement in a letter to William 
Short, "I too am an Epicurian. 113 In the same letter Jefferson 
includes a syllabus of Epicurus's teachings compiled some 
twenty years previous. Then there follows a qualification that 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 141 • 
., 2. Helvetius, TMSN, 23. 
3. Jefferson, XV, 219. 
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Chinard might well have overlooked; Epicurus' doctrines contain 
everything rational "in moral philosophy which Greece and 
Rome have left us.nl In the same letter he describes his 
desire to compile a much more complete syllabus of Epicurus 
and add to it a syllabus of the teachings of Jesus. Remembering 
that only five years previously he had reaffirmed his belief 
in the moral instinct, a precept peculiar to the Stoic 
influence and being reminded also that one does not simply 
affix the doctrines of Jesus to those of Epicurus, it can 
readily be concluded that something of Jefferson's extreme 
eclecticism is seen coming to the fore. 2 
This letter to Short, although written many years after 
his trip to France, offers ample opportunity for speculation 
and is one of the key letters in any study of Jefferson's 
philosophy. From it, one may hastily gain several keys to the 
development of his thought. For example, he states that he is 
an Epicurean, and goes on to say that Epictetus has given the 
only true picture of the Stoics. But the great crime of the 
Stoics had nothing to do with their doctrines, no refutation 
is presented; their crime was that they misrepresented Epicurus. 
Obviously there is no basis for the statement here that 
Jefferson was a confirmed Epicurean, it is loose and friendly 
conversation designed not to set forth personal dogma but to 
establish rapport with a friend who called himself an Epicurean, 
1. Jefferson, XV, 219. 
2. Ct. a statement of this in Jefferson, XV, 77. 
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an Epicurean by example rather than precept. 
The Epicurean sage continues, "Epictetus and Epicurus 
give laws for governing ourselves, Jesus a supplement of the 
duties and cherities we owe to others."1 Jesus is further 
described as the "greatest of all the reformers of the 
depraved religion of his own country.n2 Hoping to find the time 
to do so, Jefferson writes that it is his wish to include the 
writings of Epictetus with extracts from the sayings of Jesus 
as if there were no contradiction between the Lord's Prayer3 
and the Epicurean concept of the gods as "enjoying in their 
own sphere, their own felicities." 4 There can be little doubt 
but what the significance of the letter lies in Jefferson's 
approbation of Galilean morals rather than in the transition 
from the Stoic to the Epicurean philosophy. 
As with many of his other letters, this one is crammed 
with contradictions that defy justification in terms of the 
material at hand. The summum bonum of the Christian ethic is 
not, and never has been, the absence of pain in the human body 
nor the lack of a troubled mind.5 They are, of course, 
Epicurean and rightly belong in the Epicurean syllabus where 
Jefferson has placed them, but they would not supplement the 
ethic of Jesus; they contradict it. The statement that 
Jefferson is an eclectic philosopher is far too generous; he 
was only eclectic in the negative sense. That is, he did 
1. Jefferson, XV, 220; X, 38lf. 4. Jefferson, XV, 223. 
2. Jefferson, XV, 220. 5. Jefferson, XV, 224. 
3. Jefferson, XX, appendix, 11. 
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choose from varied sources but eclecticism implies some 
criterion of its own and is nothing if it is not self consistent. 
A work cannot supplement that which it displaces and the 
term eclecticism does not justify internal contradiction, At 
least in so far as this letter is an index to the mind of 
Jefferson, it indicates a superficial grasp of the material; 
not only are there contradictions between Epicureanism and the 
morals of the Galilean but also between Epicureanism and 
Stoicism. 
The Epicurean doctrines of free will and utility which 
Jefferson did accept are opposed to the Stoic concepts of 
determinism and universal conformity to basic moral precepts, 
But Jefferson never did come to any final conclusions on the 
distinction between utility and the moral instinct, thus he 
had not left his stoicisms as far behind as he thought,1 
The time has come for writers on Jefferson to dispense 
with the idea that he was a man who was pushed from one school 
of thought to the other, accepting or rejecting all of each, 
He never did give himself completely to any system but stood 
outside (not above) each. Furthermore, he was not thorough 
in his consideration of them and was frequently incapable of 
placing his finger on the most obvious contradictions, It is 
quite possible that the French school reawakened his interest in 
the Epicurean school of thought and that the works of Gassendi, 
who had introduced Epicurus to French thought, also influenced 
Jefferson. There are passages to support this, some of which 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 143, 
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have already been discussed, but the influence is not above 
question and the student of Jefferson can find many instances 
in which Jefferson draws on several systems to build a more 
or less heterogeneous philosophy of his own. Few criticisms 
could be more applicable to him than the one which he quotes 
~ from Helvetius concerning Montesquieu 1 s Esprit des Lois. 
Helv~tius described it as an attempt to reconcile the 
heterogeneous thoughts which he had spent a lifetime in 
collll1lonplac ing. 
Turgot and Diderot are also mentioned within the French 
school but with little indication as to their influence. 
Rousseau (1712-78), one of the great revolutionary writers who 
helped to precipitate the French revolution, received but 
scant notice from Jefferson, and when he was mentioned it was 
1 
always in a derogatory manner. Only vague reference is made 
to Rousseau's idealization of man in the primitive state, 
an anthropological premise with which Jefferson had little 
patience. 
This leaves only Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) through 
whom the direct influence of the French school may be traced. 
Tracy was the first to refer to the new development in French 
rational psychology as Ideology and by that ambiguous name it 
came to be known.2 Ideology was a continuation of the 
scientific analysis of the human mind begun by Condillac and 
1. Jefferson, XIII, 307; XIV, 157, 469. 
2. Windelband, HOP, 457. 
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continued by his successors with only slight improvement. 
They held that the main problem in philosophy was the 
positivistic analysis of the mental conceptions aroused by 
sensations in the material world. Because political science 
was the interest of the day, the French materialists who followed 
the Ideological trend, built a political superstructure on an 
epistemological basis. There are few works of the period 
which better illustrate this than the 'l'rai tll d 1 ~conomie Poll-
tlgue of Destutt de Tracy, the third division of his four 
part work, Elemens d 1 Ideologle. Because the work received 
Jefferson 1 a f'ull approval, it will be treated in some detail. 
Jefferson attempted to have it published in the llnited 
States in 1813 by the same publisher who published the 
Commentaire.l He describes it as a review of the principles 
of the Economists, of Smith and of Say.2 He tried again to 
have it published in 1816 and as with the Commentaire, he 
supervised its translation and wrote a rather long prospectus 
to be published with the English version.3 The French edition 
was published by 1816 and the American edition came from the 
press in 1817. The copy which will be used in this discussion 
is a French edition which was pu~lished at Paris in 1823, a 
small volume of fine print. No reference is made to previous 
editions, English or French, throughout the work. 
Tracy is one of the few men whom Jefferson praises without 
1. Jefferson, XIII, 214. 3. Jefferson, XIV, 456. 
2. Jefferson, XIII, 214. 
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reservation;: it is also significant that he discusses his 
work in some detail,1 He singles out the latter part of the 
book for particular recognition,2 as it is devoted entirely 
to specific problems of political economy, Jefferson either 
approved or disapproved of a particular metaphysical position; 
he seldom discussed them in detail,3 This is likewise true 
of Tracy's works, except that in this case there are few instances 
of disapproval,4 Jefferson's refusal to discuss a metaphysical 
position in detail thwarts all efforts to give a detailed and 
direct analysis of his ovm position. Therefore throughout 
this dissertation the emphasis necessarily has been placed on 
the men whom he mentioned or of whom he specifically approved, 
Characteristically enough, the psychology of Tracy 
forms the introduction to the treatise on political economy, 
The needs and means, the rights and duties of man are derived, 
Tracy claims, from the will, The being which does not will is 
less than human; the individual who does not will is 
undistinguished,5 The will is thus the supreme mark of the 
personality for all means and needs, all rights and duties, 
all riches and poverty, all justice and inj1lstice must have 
reference to a personality, an individual with the power to 
w111. 6 
~ ~ La volonte,,,,est une partie de la sensibilite; 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 457f, 
2, Jefferson, XIV, 462, 
3, Jefferson, XV, 75, 
4, Jefferson, XV, 75. 
5, Tracy, TEP, 4, 
6, Tracy, TEP, 5f, 
VI. French Influence 
la faculte d 1~tre affect~ d 1une certaine 
' maniere ne peut pas ne pas faire partie de la 
faculte d'~re affecte en general; main elle 
en est un mode distinct, et que 1 1 on peut en 
separer par la pensee. 
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It is impossible to will without having feeling or sense.tion 
and since all of our thoughts are of things felt or sensed, 
the terms think and feel are equivalent; likewise the terms 
perception and idea are equivalent. To perceive a thing is 
to have an idea of it and if one has not perceived a thing, 
one can ha.ve no idea of it.2 Tracy, who is here following 
Locke rather closely does not make room for the active will, 
conceived as rearranging our perceptions, thus giving them 
distinctive novelty in the abstrs.ct idea. The faculty of 
the will is that which distinguishes between those things 
which effect us as being agreeable and those Which effect us as 
being disagreeable.3 It is from our ability to distinguish 
between different effects and thus between ourselves and 
other things that we arrive at the idea of personality or 
propriety. 4 Thus from the basis of this pure sensationalism 
Which up to this point can scarcely be distinguished from 
Hume 1 s theory of the self, Tracy derives also the idea of 
liberty and restraint, rights and duties. Once it has been 
sho~~ that these ideas ere derived directly from the sensations 
of which we ere in receipt he goes on to establish his theories 
of political economy. But before this is taken up, the 
1. Tracy, TEP, 7. 3. Tracy, TEP, 9. 
2. Tracy, TEP, 9. 4. Tracy, TEP, lOf. 
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psychology should be pursued further. 
In the faculty of the will, Tracy like Locke, introduces 
an intuitive factor which makes full provision for the idea of 
the self. "Le moi de chacun de nous est pour lui sa propre 
sensibilit6."1 The type of sensation known as the will is the 
source of our idea of the self or our idea of propriety and 
to have an idea of the self, there is no necessity for a faculty 
other than that of the will. This truth, he claims is the basis 
of all morality and all economy, which are in turn, two aspects 
of the same science,2 
All of our needs and our means arise likewise from the 
faculty of the will for all desire is a need "et tout besoin 
n 1est jamais que le besoin de satisfaire un desir, Le desir 
est toujours en lui-meme une souffrance.n3 When the sensations 
act on the muscular system the desires can direct our actions 
in such a way that the means of satisfying the desire will 
be produced. Thus it is through the will that "passion et 
action, souffrance et puissance"4 are rendered, 
Everything which assists in the attainment of needs is a 
means and is therefore a value. If one is wealthy then he has 
at hand, so Tracy claims, the means to attain his needs or his 
ends,5 Wealth and poverty here are not to be thought of in the 
narrow sense of those terms. To be wealthy is to have in one's 
1. Tracy, TEP, 332. 
:a:. Tracy, TEP, 332. 
3. Tracy, TEP, 333. 
4. Tracy, TEP, 333. 
5. Tracy, TEP, 334. 
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possession.the means of satisfying needs whether or not those 
needs are economic. The more limited economic terminology is 
used in the discussion of psychology to make it fit more easily 
into the second section. 
Since liberty is the power to execute our desires, our 
needs, it likewise is derived from our will. "Toute contrainte 
est souffrance, toute liberte est jouissance. nl Constre.int 
is the lack of power to satisfy our needs; our duty is to 
augment our liberty and appreciate its value.2 
Rights are derived from needs and duties from means. 
Human feebleness is the source of human rights and power is 
the source of duty. "Un ~re sentant et voulant, mais 
incapable d'action, aurait tous lea droits et point de devoirs."3 
A being which had the necessary powers of satisfying all of 
his needs would have all of the rights but only the duties 
which followed from the circumstances. This concludes the 
resume of the first six chapters of the psychology. 
In the chapter on society, the first chapter devoted 
exclusively to political theory, Tracy holds that the three-
fold advantage of society is the unified strength expressed 
by the combined and cooperative powers of the people, the 
increase and conservation of knowledge, and the division of 
labor.4 Society considered only in its economic relations is 
a "suite continuelle d'echanges." The transactions are such that 
1. Tracy, TEP, 335. 3. Tracy, TEP, 336. 
2. Tracy, TEP, 335. 4. Tracy, TEP, 80, 339. 
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the two parties to the exchange always gain and the natural 
strength of the primitive is increased. Production is defined 
as that which endows an object with utility; thus production 
may involve either change of form, a change of place, or both.1 
Farms as well as factories are productive units; the laboring 
classes are producers but the absentee owners who do not work, 
belong to the non-producing class.~ Utility is that which 
augments our enjoyment of a thing or decreases our suffering.3 
Y.!e can measure what a thing is worth to us by the number of 
sacrifices which we are willing to undertake in order to gain 
its possession. The price of a particular item is determined 
"par le balancement de la resistance des vendeurs et des 
acheteurs, une chose, sans etre moins desiree, devient moins 
chere quand elle est plus facilment produite." 4 Thus the 
advancement of the arts and sciences is encouraged and 
subsidized. 
In all industry, Tracy claims, there are three stages 
of development, theory, application, and execution.5 This 
three fold division is derived from the theory of economics 
introduced by M. Say, an author who was particularly 
influential in the subsequent economic treatises of Tracy. 
Capital is money which has been accumulated in previous 
production and can be used by the entrepreneur to pay for the 
1. Tracy, TEP, 339. 
2:,. Tracy, TEP, 339. 
3. Tracy, TEP, 340. 
4. Tracy, TEP, 340. 
5. Tracy, TEP, 97f., 341. 
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knowledge and labor necessary to produce the new product. In 
the case of agriculture, "lea propri~taires de terre qui ne 
,. 
cul ti vent pas sont etrangers a l 1 industrie agricole. 'Ce sent 
le simples pr~eurs de fonds."l Sharply distinguishing 
between the entrepreneur and the laborer, Tracy emphasizes the 
essential nonproductiveness of the mere money lender. Industry 
in its embryonic stage had not experienced the ventures which 
made risk capital highly prized and the entrepreneur who would 
risk wealth, a man sought after. Agriculture is the first and 
primary art in relation to necessities but not in relation to 
wealth; the means of existence and the means of subsistence 
are distinct. By contrasting these two terms, Tracy attempts 
to give an account of the growing distinction between agricultural 
and manufacturing centers. Today it is taken for granted but 
at thattlme there was considerable debate concerning which of 
the two were the most important. Tracy2 calls to the attention 
of the reader, the fact that, there were large manufacturing 
centers which did not raise anything but were nevertheless 
capable of supporting themselves comfortably on the proceeds 
of their manufactured products. He does not admit that farming 
is the primary industry from all points of view and strives to 
justify the industrial revolution which was taking place at the 
time. 
The life of an economic unit is to be found in its 
commerce and transportation, the very essence of exchange.3 
1. Tracy, TEP, 341. 
2A Tracy, TEP, 127f. 
3. Tracy, TEP, 342, 130f. 
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Commerce between nations is justified by the inducement which 
it provides for internal production; new values can be 
attained through transporting an item as well as changing its 
form. Although commerce can be carried on for a time without 
money, a complicated economy demands that there be a common 
unit of durable value. Precious metals have served this purpose, 
but Tracy, claims, it is the nation which must regulate the 
value; only then does it become real money. Silver is chosen 
as the best metal for this purpose; the use of paper money 
produces an unstable economy for it has no real value. Bankers 
are taken to task for issuing it in lieu of real money and are 
accused of pocketing the actual wealth of the country. 
Declaring that inequality is a constituent part of human 
nature, unlike Rousseau, Tracy assumes that a nation's wealth 
will be distributed necessarily on that basis. Lamenting the 
fact that the human species is naturally strong but nevertheless 
lives in misery, he attributes its misfortune to the fecundity 
of the race. 1 He concludes that "L'inte~t des hommes, sous 
taus les rapports, est done de diminuer lea effects de leur 
-
flcondit~.n2 Throughout the chapter he quotes at length from 
Malthus. 3 
Il LMalthui7 est, au moins a ma connaissance, de 
taus lea auteurs qui ont ~crit sur la population, 
celui qui a le plus appronfondi le sujet, et qui 
en a le mieux developp~ toutes lea consequences.4 
1. Tracy, TEP, 347. 3. Tracy, TEP, 194, 196. 
2. Tracy, TEP, 197. 4. Tracy, TEP, 194. 
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Since numbers are the source of human misery, and the alternative 
of increasing production through technics was scarcely 
entertained, the only possible answer was a decrease in the 
number of births. 
Although within a given society there is opposition 
between those of unequal means, everyone is at the same time 
both a consumer and a producer. This fact in itself despite 
the heterogeneous tendencies, constitutes a sufficient basis for 
welding the society together. Because the poor are as a rule 
the primary producers, that which benefits them benefits society 
as a whole. They should be provided for and their needs 
should be understood; the salaries should be sufficient to 
provide for their livlihood end the tendency for salary 
fluctuation should be decreased, because it breeds injustice 
but can offer few aids for its reduction.1 Although the well 
ordered society reduces the advantages accruing to pure 
physical strength in a primitive society, it augments the 
arbitrary power of the wealthy and this amounts to about the 
same thing. 
Landowners and those Who own the manufacturing plants 
but contribute nothing else are a loss to the commerce of the 
society for only a small percentage of their revenues find 
their way back into the common exchange. Un the other hand, a 
large part of the salaries of the producers do find their way 
1. Tracy, TEP, 348f. 
2.. Tracy, TEP, 351. 
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back thus increasing the wealth of a nation.l Likewise the 
government which is one of the heaviest consumers does not 
live from its profits but from its revenues. '.l.'axes are a 
sacrifice demanded of the people and because they deplete the 
public wealth it is necessary for them to be moderate, varied, 
and scaled to the national income. It is to the advantage 
of the people as well as the government that the latter never 
go into debt.2 Thus Tracy concludes his treatise on political 
economy, a work which could scarcely touch the wealth of 
material used in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations but one v.hich 
nevertheless had a profound effect on the later life of 
Jefferson. 
This chapter began the study of the French influence with 
Jefferson's arrival in Paris and by far the most substantial 
part of that influence is found to have been most effective 
long after Jefferson's retirement from active political life. 
Since there is little evidence that Jefferson altered his 
political views to an appreciable degree after his retirement, 
the real value of Tracy's work is to be found in what Jefferson 
was prepared to accept as valid rather than in the degree to 
which it altered Jefferson's views. Ample evidence is at hand 
for the student who desires to illustrate the impact ~ich 
French culture had on the life of Jefferson, an impact that can 
be measured by the statement that he thought of it as a second 
1. Tracy, TEP, 266f., 352f. 
2. Tracy, TEP, 354. 
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home. On th~ other hand, evidence to support the proposition, 
that Jefferson derived many of his political theories from 
French thinkers, is lacking. Search as one will throughout 
his correspondence, with a list of the great French thinkers 
at hand, there will be little to indicate that they made a 
substantial contribution to his thought, That is, until the 
works of Tracy, but Tracy began to publish in 1805, the year 
following Jefferson's reelection to the presidency, There is 
little doubt but what a series of unjustified motives, not the 
least of which have been political in nature, on the part 
of Jeffersonian students have contributed to the popularly held 
opinion that Jefferson was strongly influenced by French thinkers. 
It must be repeated here that Jefferson went to France, not as 
a student of political theory but as an instructor, 
In so far as the ready acceptance of Tracy's works by 
Jefferson constitute an index to his previous thought, that is, 
in retrospect, there is one point which is of vital importance, 
It has to do with the last part of Tracy's treatise, Although 
the work is a study of political economy, government as such is 
not mentioned except in the last chapter where he maintains 
that it has little, if any economic justification, Indeed 
society viewed solely as an economic unit finds the government 
to be an instrument of exploitation and since society is nothing 
more than a "suite continuelle d 1echanges," there is no otht'r 
point from which to view the government. Thus political economy 
for Tracy does not mean government economy but the economy of 
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the body politic. There is one exception, the government is 
useful as an agency to standardize the unit of exchange. But 
if this could be maintained through another agency most other 
government agencies would be expendable. Tracy, like Smith, 
based the government on the economy and gave it an incidental 
derivation. Both agreed that it was not the business of 
government to equalize the distribution of wealth but to 
crystallize and confirm the inequality already existent. The 
fact that Smith was unremorseful and Tracy ~rote with a tear 
in his eye is beside the point; both reached similar conclusions 
at this point. Jefferson sided with Tracy and unlike Rousseau 
did not see the institution of government as a tool to prevent 
inequality. 
The whole treatise is consistent with Jefferson's view 
of government as emanating from the people and being tolerated 
by them only for certain specific ends. Government is incidental 
to society and is useful only as the scarecrow is useful to 
the farmer, to drive away the forces which ordinarily plague 
an economic unit. The emphasis placed by Jefferson on the value 
of agriculture as opposed to manufacturing in the Notes on 
Virginia is not reflected in his full approval of Tracy's work 
which was in many ways a justification of the industrial 
revolution. But then the America of 1817 was far different from 
the America of 1780-4; it had changed from an agricultural to 
an industrial economy. By studiously observing the scientific 
development of France and forwarding it to American engineers, 
Jefferson inadvertently participated to no small degree in that 
transformation. 
CHAPTER VII 
REVOLT AGAINST THE CHURCH 
Jefferson the statesman, the architect and the philosopher; 
so reads the accepted triad of attributes as applied to his 
multi-faceted career. Statesman he was in every sense of 
the word, an architect of whom America can always be proud, 
but philosopher he was not, at least not in the academic sense 
of that term. Jefferson's correspondence abounds in violent 
contradiction at just those points where the student is 
compelled to press for cl6rification. Jefferson's claim to the 
title is the same claim that the more primitive philosophers 
maintain, more in the spirit of Thales than Aristotle, more 
Socratic than Platonic or Spinozistic. His approach was that 
of the thinker who confronts the world with a set of problems 
indigenous to his own experience, not that of the professional 
who is primarily interested in solving problems hallowed by 
tradition. A problem is solved when Jefferson is personally 
satisfied and from the viewpoint of technical philosophy there 
were many times when it took little to satisfy him. He was a 
philosopher in the sense that his mind would not permit him to 
act in an heterogeneous, unrelated or irrelevant fashion. The 
fact that he frequented the primary springs of human thought 
in search of answers has given rise to the supposition that 
he had attained a similar level of rigor. Doubtless he was 
far above most men of his time but there can be no question 
but what he was far below the prominent names in the history 
of philosophy. Either because of a lack of interest, a lack 
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of ability or both, he did not reach the same status in 
philosophy that he reached as a statesman and as an architect.1 
As has been pointed out in Chapter V, in so far as 
Jefferson was a philosopher, his primary interest lay in the 
field of moral philosophy. However the student will look in 
vain who attempts to explain Jefferson's objection to the church 
in terms of moral philosophy. Although there was a parallel 
intellectual development toward deism, the mainsprings of his 
action must be interpreted in the light of the established church 
in the colony of Virginia. It will be the contention of this 
chapter that the "Act for establishing Religious Freedom" (1779) 
was, among other things, a product of Virginia's colonial 
church history. 
The fact that the colonial church had not provided for a 
distinction between political and rel:l.gious freedom compelled 
the American oitizen to break the religious as well as tb.e 
political ties with Britain. In his mind they were inseparable. 
Because the Anglican church provided the machinery for the divine 
right of kings theory it was necessarily held suspect from the 
first. Bolingbroke's statements concerning the church and 
theistic Christianity in general are to be kept in mind, but the 
emphasis in this chapter will be historical. The established 
church presented specific problems to the mind inclined to be 
lo Cf. Koch, POJ, xi, xii. Chinard withholds the title entirely 
but Koch attacks Chinard in justification of her dissertation. 
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free, problems which cannot be over-emphasized. A survey of 
the status of the church in colonial Virginia promises to be 
a fruitful approach to Jefferson's statements concerning it, 
a background on which to base the reaction that followed. 
Included in the catalogue of instructions issued to Sir 
William Berkeley, governor of Virginia, in the year 1650, is 
the following: 
That in the first place you be careful, Almighty 
God may be duly and daily served, according to 
the form of Religion established in the Church 
of England, both by yourself and all the people, 
under your charge, which may draw1down a Blessing upon all your endeavors. 
In the same article of instructions the Governor is obligated 
to provide ministers for the colonial parishes, a parsonage, 
and two hundred acres of 11Gleable Land. 112 For the clearing 
of the land every minister was to be furnished day labor 
by his parishioners. All of this was to be provided by the 
governor Who worked with the local vestrymen. If the vestrymen 
did not fulfill their obligations, the governor was held 
responsible to the king for their fail,~res. Again in 1679 
Governor Culpepper was instructed to be especially careful that 
God will be duly served in all government actions. This was 
to be done through the reading of The Book of Common Prayer 
each Sunday and Holiday. No minister was to be preferred by 
the governor "without a Certificate from the Lord Bishop of 
London" stating that the minister was conformable to the doctrine 
1. Perry, HCV, 1. 
2. Perry, HCV, 1. 
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and discipline of the church.l Several interesting letters 
relating to the efforts of Commissary Blair on behalf of the 
governor and church of the colony are included in Perry's 
Papers Relating to the History of the Church in Virginia. 
Motivated by a desire to lay the groundwork for the 
establishment of a college, the letters by the Commissary give 
an incidental though detailed account of the relationship 
existing between the church and the state. It is not a detail 
which can be lifted from the larger picture of the same 
relationship in England, for it isn't a copy of the former. 
The colonial church government is complicated through the 
intervention of the governor who stands between the bishop of 
London and the Virginia clergy.2 
When the governor was delinquent in his prescribed duties, 
as in the case of Governor Andros, the church suffered and there 
was no agency which could circumvent his authority. Blair 
complained that it was a common maxim among the friends of 
Andros that they had "nothing to do with the Bishop of London 
nor no church power."3 The governorship of Andros furnishes 
ample opportunity to study the tight and arbitrary control 
maintained by the governor; even the commissary to the bishop 
was barred from the colonial council and rendered virtually 
ineffective. At all times the commissary was burdened with a 
quasi status and could in no sense supplant the office of a 
1. Perry, HCV, 1-2. 
2. Perry, HCV, 10. 
3. Perry, HCV, 16. 
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bishop. He was actually little more than an official reporter 
for he could not initiate action. The vestrymen of each community 
were, on the other hand, more autonomous than they were in 
England. SincP- they were frequently members of the House of 
Burgesses, the governor would favor them in their capacity as 
vestrymen in order that he in turn might be favored by their 
votes.l 
An example of this tacit working srrangement is to be 
found during the governorship of Andros. By overlooking his 
obligation to induct a minister if it were delayed by the 
vestry more than six months, he permitted the vestrymen to hire 
and release the ministers at will.2 The autonomy vested in the 
governor and by his permission, procrastination, or indulgence, 
in the vestrymen, permitted the locus of church authority to 
be moved about at will so that specific characterizations 
covering a long span of time are prohibited. It can be said 
however thet on several occasions the politicel machinations 
of the governor brought to a standstill what might have been 
constructive efforts on the part of the church. Statements 
1. Mcilwaine, RTV, llf. 
2. Perry, HCV, 36f. This section of the "Papers" is purported 
to be 11 a true Account of a Conference at Lambeth, Dec. 27th, 
1697. 11 Seven were present, including the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the Bishop of London. The Commissary, Mr. 
Blair successfully defended himself against the charges 
leveled by a representative of the governor, one Mr. Byrd. 
Mr. Blair then brought charges against the governor 
defending his offense as well as his defense. The remarks 
of the Archbishop are models of judicature. The conference 
is concerned with a thorough investigation into the 
obstructionist tactics employed by the governor to delay the 
building of the college. 
VII. The Church 200 
by the Bishop of London and even the Archbishop of Canterbury 
evidence the difficulty involved in obtaining ministers for 
the plantations;! thtls only ministers poorly equipped in 
morals and education frequented the shores of the colony. 
Even they were anxious to return as soon as opportunities for 
advancement presented themselves. The fact that there was no 
great resistance on the part of the people to the arbitrary 
action of the vestrymen and that when a cause was pleaded for 
the clergy, it had to be pleaded by the clergy, implies an 
undercurrent of popular dissatisfaction which had not reached 
the surface. 
Originally, it was the policy of the English government 
to allow the colonies to govern themselves in so far as they 
did not obstruct the loosely constructed colonial system. 
This extended to recommendations concerning the choice of the 
governors and is another reason why the governor respected the 
local church and political leaders. At times the popular 
pressure was sufficient to overrule the commissary, governor, 
and clergy combined.2 Instead of being held together by the 
authority of a bishop or other ecclesiastic such as the 
resident commissary, the vestries were virtually autonomous. 
The church of England in Virginia was fast becoming non-
conformist even to the liturgy and vestments.3 
At least part of this early spirit of non-conformity 
1. Perry, HCV, 39. 
2. Mcilwaine, RTV, 14. 
3. Mcilwaine, RTV, 14. 
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stemmed from the Puritan movement Which had been formally 
dispossessed in the Act of ~niformity, 1662, All of the 
Independents did not leave the church and some who had tasted 
of increased ecclesiastical emancipation longed for more. An 
exact evaluation of the Puritan movement in Virginia in 
numerical terms is impossible.1 But it can be said that in the 
councils of the colony and in the parish vestrys their combined 
strength was significant, The discretionary political freedom 
enjoyed by the early colonists likewise had its religious 
reverberations, 
By the year 1700, the church in Virginia had done so 
much to wrest the arbitrary powers away from the bishop and 
governor, and had been so deeply influenced by the Puritan 
movement that it was to all intents and purposes a free and 
autonomous church. But such a condition could not last 
indefinitely for although the hierarchy made few demands, the 
state which provided for its upkeep, and other communions, 
which were at first prohibited from entering the colony, began 
to make demends that were to effect seriously its future develop-
ment. Already other churches were making inroads on the 
established domain and some of the subsequent governors 
prohibited them only for a price. After the threats to the 
effectiveness of its establishment had been made manifest, the 
established church bece.me rigid and intransigent, Previously 
its internal history was similar to that of most other churches 
1, Mcilwaine, RTV, 15, 
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struggling for survival in a colonial culture, 
Baptists, Presbyterians, and Quakers compete today for the 
honor of having been the most aggressive nonconformists in 
colonial Virginia. ~uakers were resident in the colony before 
either of the other two, The Baptists and Presbyterians who 
came after the beginning of the eighteenth century, following 
the Quakers by almost he.lf a century were much better organized 
int'J.eir attempts to either ignore, on the one hend, or ectively 
obstruct the establishment, on the other. 'l'here are no 
indications that the Quakers had entered the colony before the 
year 1656,1 From the time of governor Berkeley's appointment in 
1660 laws were passed specifically naming the Quakers; in 1663 
they gained negative recognition as being at least a separate 
sect,2 Little correspondence can be found between the 
Protectorate of Cromwell and the toleration of Quakers in 
Virginia, Even in England the Quakers under Cromwell were highly 
suspect, It was four years (1648-1752) before Governor 
Berkeley, the royal governor of Virginia, recognized the 
Protectorate and only then after troops had been sent to enforce 
allegiance, Cromwell was too busy with internal affairs to 
concern himself with the colonial governments, The colonists, 
largely unacquainted with the excesses of the monarchy, were 
too loyal to the king to concern themselves with the Protectorate, 
Thus the colony continued in relative independence until the 
restoration in 1660,3 In 1663 the laws were revised in favor 
1. Mcilwaine, RTV, 19, 
2, Mcilwaine, RTV, 21. 
3, Flippin, RGV, 3lf. 
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of leniency, but not toleration, for the nonconformists} In 
1663 11 .An act prohibiting the unlawful assembly of Quakers" was 
placed in the great body of Virginia law.2 Comprised in the 
six articles of the act were provisions limiting the congregating 
of more than five adult Quakers, fines for ship masters importing 
Quakers, fines for persons who entertained Quakers, and fines for 
colonial officers who failed to carry out the provisions of 
the act.:3 
The absence of early court records makes it impossible 
to determine how thoroughly the above provisions were 
enforced, although it is probable that their effectiveness 
depended on the local temper. Later developments point to the 
conclusion that their effectiveness was checkered rather than 
uniform. 
As the Quakers themselves were accepted in each community 
on the basis of secular rather than religious merit, the 
extreme harshness of the code was ignored. By 1672 the law 
was almost inoperative and in 1680 when Lord Culpepper was made 
governor the tendency toward toler~mce was accelerated. In 
the southeastern section of the colony, the old Puritan strong-
hold, the Quakers found a climate favorable to their religious 
beliefs. By 1689 the Toleration Act had been incorporated 
into the laws of Virginia and nonconformists were given the 
right to hold religious services provided they were licensed by 
the government. Two Presbyterian churches were organized under 
1. Mcilwaine, RTV, 2lf. 3. Mcilwaine, 22. 
2. Mcilwaine, RTV, 2lf. 
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this act but they did not flourish. By 1727 there were at 
least nine public meeting houses in Nansemond, the stronghold 
of the Quakers.l In a letter from Mr. Forbes to the Bishop of 
London written in 1724 the Beptists are mentioned for the first 
time.2 
The subsequent competition between the established church 
and the nonconformists was aggravated by the loss of prestige 
on the part of the establishment,3 Deism is for the first time 
mentioned in the colony by Mr. Forbes in a letter to the Bishop. 
He also spends some time in describing an attack by a Quaker 
teacher on the Anglican Church, an attack which, although it 
was made in the County Court, went unpunished. 4 "Even miracles 
could not maintain the Credit of that Church where such lewd 
and Profane Ministers are Tolerated or Connived at • 115 Argu.ing 
that the Bishop of London should send another visitor commissary 
to the colonies Mr. Forbes wrote: 
In Nansimond a large Populous and wealthy County, 
the Quakers do sensibly encrease not only in 
offspring but also Proselytes; and so many are 
the offended Persons there high and low, at the 
Ministry of the Church, that I think, there wants 
but little more, than a learned, talkative, and 
Subtle Quaker Preacher to persuade a great 
number of them to Quakerism,6 
This was of course not the first mention of competition between 
the two groups for as early as 1697 one Mr. Nicholas Moreau had 
written to the Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry; 
1. Mcilwaine, RTV, 33; Perry, HCV, 333. 
2. Perry, HCV, 328; Mcilwaine, RTV, 33fn. 
3. Perry, HCV, 332f. 5, Perry, HCV, 332. 
4, Perry, HCV, 332. 6. Perry, HCV, 333. 
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God has blest my endeavors so far already that, 
with his assistance, I have brought to church 
again two families, who had gone to the Quakers' 
meeting for three years past, and have1baptiZed one of their Children three years old, 
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The Hugenot and German Protestant settlers were willing to 
accept the established church although no pressure was used to 
make them do so, The government in an attempt to encourage 
their coming had made no provisions which limited their freedom 
of worship.2 
During the administration of Governor Gooch frontier 
expansion was vigorously encouraged and by 1727 all applicants 
for admission were granted without restrictions concerning 
religious beliefs, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Quakers, 
Mennonists, and Tunkers settled the frontier counties until in 
1738 the nonconformists and dissenters far outnumbered the 
members of the established church,3 An attempt was made to 
place an established minister there and from all reports he 
was amenable to the sentiments of the Dissenters, to the point of 
allowing their ministers to occupy his pulpit, However after 
more Presbyterians had entered the frontier colonies and 
brought their own ministers the membership in the established 
church dwindled away. The Presbyterians were better organized 
than the Quakers had been and were able to bring ministers 
there under conditions similar to those of the Anglican Church. 
According to one authority the Baptists entered Virginia 
l. Perry, HCV, 30. 
2, Mcilwaine, RTV, 35f, 
3. Mcilwaine, RTV, 40f, 
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as early as 17141 and settled in Isle of V'lght. Since the 
letter quoted above by Mr. Forbes was written from there in 
1724 and the Anabaptists are mentioned, this is probably factual. 
Two other groups, one in 1743 and another in 1754 entered the 
colony and established churches. Although they were required 
by law to be licensed, when the licenses were not forthcoming, 
they established churches without them.2 This was particularly 
true of the Separate Baptists who were most extreme in their 
religious observances. The outrages perpetrated against religious 
liberty in colonial Virginia are for the most part directed 
against the extreme Baptist groups.3 They took place during the 
twenty-five year period between 1750 and 1775. Since other 
groups, namely the Quakers and Presbyterians, had long since 
received licenses to worship, the question arises as to why the 
Baptists were thus persecuted. 
As has been mentioned, the liberal policies instituted by 
the colonial government in an effort to establish settlers on 
the frontier permitted the admission of many nonconformist 
groups. The central government abided by these policies and it 
is significant that the outrages perpetrated against the Baptist 
ministers were limited to the county government. Also, they were 
counties which constituted the older sections of the colony. 
Thus it~s the petty officers of the colony, not the Governor 
and House of Burgesses, who arrested and imprisoned the ministers. 
1. James, RLV, 12. 
2. James, RLV, 26. 
3. Them, RFV, 15f. 
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The question immediately comes to mind as to whether the 
motivation for the arrests stemmed from the machinery of the 
established church acting through the government or the 
isolated actions of individual petty officers who did not 
know what to do with a mob thrown into spastic convulsions by 
an eloquent plea for the second birth. There were no provisions 
in the colonial law for the imprisonment of dissenting 
preachers; little or no evidence attests to the Baptist charge 
that their arraignment for disturbing the peace was a blind to 
hide the machinations of the local clergy, Were not the 
Presbyterians worshiping peacefully? Even ~ith the extremely 
tolerant position of the United States today, such occasions are 
still forthcoming from extreme groups which frustrate the very 
best efforts of petty officers to keep the peace, 
Significance may likewise be attached to the fact that 
when the ministers were arrested, they were not ordered to 
change their religious convictions, to stop preaching, or to 
leave the county, but they were threatened with jail if they did 
not agree to refrain from preaching in that country for one year, 
The magistrates might have based their decisions on the belief 
that a cooling off period was required to bring the colony 
back to its senses. From 1765 to 1775 the Baptist movement 
acquired the proportions of a colony wide revival, a phenomena 
unique to Virginia colonial history and the spasmodic, local 
persecutions did little to stem the tide,l Although there were 
1, Thom, RFV, 15, 
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many arrests beginning with the imprisonment of John i';aller, 
Lewis Craig, James Childs and others in 1768, in relation to 
the scattered activity of the Baptists, they were the exception 
rather than the rule.1 Frequent attacks were made on the 
Baptists by mobs and of course they received little protection 
from the local authorities. If the Anglican ministers provoked 
the mobs into action, evidence is lacking to prove it. 
Of the Anglican ministers who were concerned with the 
problem, most believed that the inroads of the dissenters were 
due to the paucity of competent, established clergymen and the 
absence of a resident bishop.2 There is little question but 
what the inability of the Anglican church to send competent 
men to America, the absence of a bishop, plus the lack of a 
school to train incumbents resulted in substantial membership 
losses. Jefferson gives this as a cause in his Autobiography.3 
The historical antecedents to Jefferson's revolt against 
the church are not exhausted with a survey of the church in 
colonial Virginia. On the other hand a study of his reaction 
would be insdequate without it. Chinard, one of the great 
students of Jefferson and a man whom no subsequent study can 
ignore with impunity, has nevertheless made several shortsighted 
1. Cf. James, RLV, 28; Them, RFV, 15f. 
2. Throughout Perry, HCV, letters can be found presenting 
this thesis. The letter from Mr. Forbes, 323f., is a 
case in point. 
3. Jefferson, I, 57. 
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judgments concerning Jefferson that cannot go unchallenged. 
The volume of his work may be responsible for this. In the 
introduction to his The Commonnlace Book of Jefferson Chinard 
makes the following statement in referring to Jefferson's 
studies of the ecclesiastical influence on early Anglo-Saxon 
laws. 
This is undoubtedly the historical background 
of the Bill for religious freedom. , , it was 
simply the protest of a legalistic mind 
convinced that the privileges enjoyed by 
the Ch~rch in the State of Virginia rested 
upon an unsound foundation.l 
As was pointed out in Chapter III, Chinard was particularly 
interested in establishing this influence end it led him on 
severGl occasions to minimize all other sources. Since Chinard 
edited the commonplace book of government and was the first 
to use it extensively, and because it contained numerous 
references to Jefferson's interest in early inglo-Saxon law, 
the hypothesis must at least be entertsined that Chinard was 
too enthusiastic. That he was, is one of the conclusions of 
this disserts.tion. His arguments fall too readily into the age 
old pattern of the conflict between philosophers and historians. 
Not only is he primarily interested in history, but it is a 
history which is inclined to exclude the influence of ideas 
as a determinant in the af:rairs of men, The history of 
philosophy was s field in 'l'hich Chi nard was ill at ease; he 
seemed to have missed the whole point of the commonplace book 
in his introduction, Jefferson could find no more biting 
condemnation of Montesquiell than that the latter attempted to 
1. Chinard, TJ, 5lf, 
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reconcile the heterogeneous entries in his commonplace book. 
Yet Chinard assumes that Jefferson's commonplace book was a 
homogeneous mass of material, every word of v.hich received 
Jefferson's approabation. In trying to prove the influence 
of Montesquieu on Jefferson, Chinard writes, 
He would not hs.ve read Montesquieu and would 
not have copied these passages, if he had not 
approved of them, if they had not corresponded 
to something which he already felt to be true, 
and if they had not awakened some consonant 
echo in his mind. That much at least is 
proved beyond any doubt by the Commonplace Book. 
It is not the intention of this dissertation to discount 
Chinard's contribution in editing the Commonplace Book of 
Jefferson's ideas on government. But it is important to point 
out that many streams flowed into the main current, that they 
were historical, legal, and philosophical. Chinard need not be 
surprised that Jefferson's reaction to the church "was not in 
any way comparable to the measures taken against the Church by 
the men of the French Revolution."l The observation, though 
true, does not justify the conclusion that therefore Jefferson 
must have received his sole stimulus from the history of the 
early church. One very simple explanation may be found in the 
fact that the church in France and the church in Virginia had 
little in common. At least two significant points of 
dissimilarity immediately come to mind. The church in France 
had a long and bloody history of arbitrary intolerance while 
1. Chinard, Art., 57. 
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the church in Virginia did not. The church in Virginia carried 
with it connotations of foreign rule not shared by the church 
in France. 
The legal reaction to the church was discussed at length 
in Chapter III. It was Jefferson's belief that the inroads 
made upon English common law by the church were monkish fabri-
cations and that they had not had legislative epprova1.1 Although 
the fact that they had had the tacit approval of the people up 
until his time was not discussed, Jefferson's criticism was an 
excellent point and well taken.2 Other than that, his only 
reference to the early history of the church, to be found in his 
commonplace writings, refers to the fact that the early church 
did not demand tithes until the fourth century. 3 As important 
as these references are, it can hardly be said that they 
constitute the sole basis of Jefferson's efforts toward the 
separation of church and state. 
Jefferson's theoretical basis for separation is to be 
found for the most pert in his statements affirming the deistic 
position. It is significant that he considered himself in 
external opposition to the church although it was the church 
in Which he had been reared. He regarded himself as an alien 
to the church in the same sense that the sects were aliens end 
in the Autobiography he based his argument on the rights of the 
1. Jefferson, XVI, 50. 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 72f. This letter contains an excellent 
summary of Jefferson's charges. 
3. Jefferson, CBG, 245f. Cf. 290f. 349-356, 359, 386-7. 
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sects. His criticism of the church was not intrinsic in the 
sense that he was particularly interested in the spread of 
institutional Christianity in the states. He probably believed 
that the church as an institution would be seriously injured 
because of the separation. It was schools, not churches, 
which were needed by the colony. 
Jefferson's primary interest in the cause did not stem 
from a desire to see orthodox Christianity furthered and the 
religious apologist who looks to Jefferson as the advocate of 
the unfettered church is placing the emphasis at the wrong 
place. Siding with the sects, he was not allied with them 
because he approved of their theology or methods; he devoted 
himself to the task in order that they might receive freedom 
and equal status. Far from being unique in the canons of 
Protestant history, thls phenomenon has been repeated at each 
stage of its development. Protestant historians would do well 
to reflect how often the movement has found allies among those 
who had no particular interest in the Christian faith as such, 
but requested only personal freedom of thought or the right 
to think at all. Jefferson compared his allies to Bedlam;1 
they were not above referring to him as an atheist, a term 
not considered complimentary at the time. 
Sharing neither their fundamental beliefs nor their goals, 
he crossed their path, nevertheless, in the Virginia state 
leglslature from 1776 to 1779.2 When Jefferson spoke of the 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 232. 2. Jefferson, r, 58. 
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"loathsome combinHtion of Church and State, " he was much more 
concerned about the state than the church.l He was referring 
to the church when he wrote, "fOr I have sworn upon the sl tar of 
God, eternal hosti.lity against every form of tyranny over the 
mind of man. 112 
When in his Autobiography Jefferson referred to the cruel 
intolerance practiced by the Anglicans, he seems to have been 
remembering the laws of Virginia rather than recorded cases. 
Furthermore his easy association of the church with the actions 
of mobs is unwarranted. The church was a potential rather than 
an actual threat to the other groups, a distinction which 
Jefferson failed to make. Although his position would have 
still remained the same if there had been no single overt act, 
he did nothing to :3tem the extravagant claims made against 
the church at the time, claims that were frequently manifestly 
invalid. The term "spiritual tyrant," was not applicable to 
the Anglican clergy of colonial Virginia and would have been 
more fltting for the continent during the Middle Ages. The 
clergy was marked more by an attitude of indifference than 
tyranny. 3 
The student who has followed Jefferson's proscriptions 
against the institutional church,4 the union of church and 
state, and the clerical tyrant is not prepared for the 
affirmation of faith whi.ch became a part of the Virginia state 
1. Jefferson, XIV, 234. 3. Jefferson, I, 57. 
2. Jefferson, X, 175. 4. Cf. Jefferson, XIII, 350. 
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law, an affirmation penned by Jefferson. The "Act for 
establishing Religious Freedom," passed the Virginia Assembly 
in 1786.1 Jefferson's pen vied with those of the Church 
Fathers in cramming the text with theological references; he 
was prepared to offer a theological common denominator in 
deistic terms. However much the establishment and the sects 
had to sacrifice in order to reach agreement, it is evident that 
Jefferson sacrificed nothing. If the preamble has any reference 
whatsoever to the act itself, then it amounts to a philosophical 
contradiction, for the act is founded upon a closely defined 
deistic position. 
Without any attempt to document the sources, the 
act declares that God is omnipotent, that he has "created the 
mind free," and that all attempts to influence the mind by 
"temporal punishments or burdens" beget hypocrisy and meanness. 
Such attempts at coercion are contrary to the plan of the 
"Holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and 
mind yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as 
was his Almighty power to do." Fallible and uninspired civil 
and ecclesiastical legislatures have been impious in their 
presumptions and have attempted to set up thelr own creeds. They 
have endeavored to propagate these false religions by taxing 
the people, a practice not only tyrannical but "sinful" as well. 
Furthermore by supporting the ministry through the state they 
have taken from the clergy those temporal rewards which should 
1. Jefferson, II, 300-303. 
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be forthcoming only if they have lived up to the precepts of 
their faith. 
Thus the preamble becomes a confirmation of the criticism 
of the attempts of fallible and uninspired legislatures, though 
this time not ecclesiastical. Although the clergy will be 
spiritually benefitted by depending for their "temporal rewards" 
on individuals who agree with them, their dependence on a state 
that demands conformity is nothing less than bribery with 
"worldly honors and emoluments." 
The preamble falls into two sections. The second 
section is introduced by a statement that seems to divorce it 
from the thought contained in the first. If taken literally it 
discounts the foregoing theological propositions. "Our civil 
rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, more than 
our opinions in physics or geometry." The remainder of the 
preamble is concerned with a doctrine characteristically deistic, 
that of natural law. This may have been an attempt on the part 
of Jefferson to raise it above the level of the more controversial 
religious and historical doctrines. Truth, abstract truth, 
is described as being able to vindicate itself if it is not 
hampered by human interposition which limits debate and argument. 
The core of the act is to be found in the following paragraph. 
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or 
support any religious worship, place or ministry 
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, 
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, 
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his 
religious opinions or belief; but that all 
men shall be free to profess, and by argument 
to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, 
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and that the same shall in nowise diminish 
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.! 
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The second paragraph which was enacted by the Assembly 
recognized the fact that they could not declare the act 
irrevocable but stated that if it were revoked, it would 
contradict natural law. Thus a philosophy of law is intro-
duced to preclude the possibility that the act will be revoked. 
The act which motivated several years of heated debates was 
opposed by the church and most of the large land holders. 
Jefferson believed that a popular majority in favor of the 
bill had long existed in the colony but the representatives 
did not represent the majority.2 The larger land holders were 
the only ones who were able to be away from their plantations 
and were the only ones which had an education suitable for the 
responsibilities of a legislator. 
In this survey of the "Act for establishing Religious 
Freedom," one of the first questions that comes to mind is 
whether or not such a bill can be, or should be, framed in 
religious terms, deistic or otherwise. Would it have been 
possible for Jefferson to have formule.ted the preamble in 
purely non-religious terms? For the person who believes that 
the religious motive pervades all existence, non-religious 
must necessarily mean that part of existence which is least 
pervaded by religious motivation. The paragraph quoted above, 
the core of the act itself, was defined in purely negative 
1. Jefferson, II, 302-3. 
2. Jefferson, I, 52f. 
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terms but the paragraph which followed was not; it carried 
overtones of the Stoic-Deistic tradition with which Jefferson 
was fully acquainted. The preamble did not make one single 
reference to legal tradition, the happiness of mankind, or 
universal consent. It did imply a doctrine of religious develop-
ment toward the divine plan and appealed to the abstractions of 
truth and natural law. The religious background in the state 
of Virginia permitted the acceptance of the preamble but an 
atheist could only accept the paragraph which has been quoted in 
full above. 
A thoroughgoing bill for religious freedom such as the first 
amendment which has no preamble cannot be defined in religious 
terms. Freedom in the legal sense of the term can only mean 
complete objectivity, an objectivity which amounts to indifference, 
and for any particular religious body that must always be in 
some sense a compromise. Apart from specific forces it is an 
abstraction; to be meaningful it must be indigenous to particular 
situations. But it cannot grow out of those forces for it must 
be the judgment of an agency essentially indifferent to their 
outcome. The step which this act took was not a step from 
complete subjection to liberty but from toleration to liberty 
where toleration implies one or more favored churches. Freedom 
implies technical equality. The authorship of this act was one 
of the contributions of which Jefferson was most proud; it was 
the product of his own religious development and was completely 
consistent with his point of view.1 It was not only consistent 
1. Cp. Jefferson, X, 374f. 
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with Jefferson's view, but it had religious motivation. For 
the organized religious groups this was not the case; for the 
established church and the competing communions it was a 
secular working arrangement. Not only the church, but the 
theology was disestablished; the state became the new church to 
the degree that it assumed full responsibility for the develop-
ment of a new creed. Fortunately for the nation, subsequent 
state and national documents did not echo the sentiments 
written into the preamble. 
A fact frequently overlooked is that the Anglican church 
was the only institution which transcended national boundaries 
after the revolution and furnished a direct tie with Britain. 
Only one bishop was resident in America previous to 1786 and he 
was ordained under questionable circumstances in America by 
Americans. Thus the issue of separation was aggravated to some 
extent by the fact that Virginia recognized the same church 
recognized by Britain and that the American clergy were 
dependent on English bishops for their ordination. This did not 
receive overt experession in Jefferson's published writings 
but there is little doubt but What it carried great weight 
among some of the dissentePs. Furthermore some of the clergy 
had remained ambivalent in their attitude toward the revolution; 
they had supported few of the early revolutionary movements 
and some continued to pay allegiance to the British crown 
throughout the ~~r. 
The established church was the same church which provided 
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the machinery for the divine right of kings theory and it was 
this theory to which Jefferson was particularly opposed. 
There can be little doubt but VJhat these considerations played 
a prominent part in Jefferson's reaction to the church as it 
was established in the colonies and later in some of the 
states. Disestablishment brought with it the cessation of 
state support; it is not difficult to conclude that several 
factors combined to bring about Jefferson's efforts on the 
side of disestablishment. It would be impossible to single 
out one and make it of primary importance; the history of 
Virginia, of Anglo-Saxon England, legal traditions, political 
considerations, and the religio-political concepts of his 
mentors combined to produce Jefferson's attitude toward the 
church. 
In addttion to the influence of Bolingbroke v.hich has 
already been treated, mention should be made of Priestley, a 
friend of Jefferson, and a friend on v.hom he relied heavily 
for his own religious development.1 He stated in a letter to 
Adams that he had read Priestley's Corruptions of Christianity 
repeatedly. His devotion to Priestley is another indication 
that he drew his deism from the English rather than the French 
sources. The curve of Jefferson's relationship to the 
institutionalized forms of religion cannot be plotted without 
a considerable amount of attention being given to the Jefferson 
Bible. 
In the winter of 1816-17 Jefferson completed the text of 
1. Jefferson, XIII, 352. 
!II • The Church 220 
the compilation which has come to be known as the Jefferson 
Bible, At present the original text is in the Library of 
Congress and has been photolithographically reproduced in the 
Memorial Edition. The text consists of a harmony arranged in 
parallel columns in four languages, Greek, Latin, French, and 
English, Each column is therefore reproduced four times so 
that it covers two pages; the whole covers 83 pages, Although 
at one time in its preparation he referred to the compilation 
as "The Philosophy of Jesus of Nazareth,"l the title page of 
his bound volume reads: The Life and Morals of Jesus of 
Nazareth Extracted Textually From the Gospels in Greek, Latin, 
French & English,2 
Jefferson frequently mentioned his desire to compile 
such a book because later in life he considered the teachings 
of Jesus as being second to none,3 
Yet such are the fragments remaining as to show 
a master workman, and that his system of morality 
was the most benevolent and sublime probably that 
has been ever taught, and consequently more 
perfect 4han those of any of the ancient philo-
sophers, 
In a letter to Doctor Joseph Priestley Jefferson included a 
short and pertinent summary of his religious views ~hich end 
in the above approbation of Galilean morals, But the 
approbation is prefaced with the assertion that in outlining 
his religious position he would first survey the moral 
doctrines of the most outstanding ancient philosophers including 
1, Jefferson, XIV, 385, 3. Jefferson, X, 374. 
2. Jefferson, XX, Appendix. 4. Jefferson, X, 375, 
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Pythagoras, Epicurus, Epictetus, Socrates, Cicero, Seneca, and 
Antoninus.1 He then planned to review the ethical deism 
of the Jews and point out the degraded stste of their 
development. 
I should proceed to a view of the life, character, 
and doctrines of Jesus, who sensible of incorrect-
ness of their ideas of the Deity, and of morality, 
endeavored ~o bring them to the principles of a 
pure deism. 
Jesus, Jefferson said, reformed the Jewish religion with 
the standards of reason, justice, and philanthropy. Jefferson 
erroneously concluded that it was Jesus Who instituted the 
belief in a future life. The outline was to purposely omit 
reference either to his divinity or inspiration and would take 
special account of the difficulties involved in the trans-
cription of his teachings. 
It was not so much the interpolations which preceded their 
transcription, as it was the Platonisms Which found their way 
into the biblical canon along with the teachings of Jesus, that 
worried Jefferson. The term Platonism served Jefferson as a 
general category into which almost everything he disliked, 
disbelieved, or found undesirable could be thrown. Since the 
teachings of Jesus had b~en misrepresented by the platonistic 
interpolations of self-appointed interpreters, many students 
had been~mpted to overthrow the whole Christian structure, a 
gesture which Jefferson could not condone.3 But if the 
1. Jefferson, X, 374. 
2. Jefferson, X, 374. 
3. Jefferson, X, 375. 
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teachings of Jesus could have been freed of the false 
interpretations, Jesus would be recognized as the greatest 
moral philosopher who ever taught, This, combined with a 
desire to purify the scriptures for the use of the Indians, 
were the motives from which the Jefferson Bible sprung. 
Jesus, who was an early victim of the jealousy between 
the altar and the throne, had not sufficient time to 
complete his system and reach the maximum contribution of 
which he was potentially capable.1 Thus his doctrines con-
sidered as a whole were defective. But in spite of this he 
was the greatest moral philosopher. Jefferson threw himself 
outside the orthodox Christian tradition and employed his own 
reason as the ultimate arbiter to determine the authenticity 
of the statements attributed to Jesus. 
In the New Testament there is internal evidence 
that parts of it have proceeded from an extra-
ordinary men; and that other parts are of the 
fabric of very inferior minds. It is as easy 
to separate those parts, 2as to pick out diamonds from dunghills. 
1. Jefferson, X, 383. 
2. Jefferson, XIV, 72. Few contemporary scholars would claim 
that it is as simple as that. It is a metaphor which 
Jefferson used on several occasions in connection with his 
New Testament studies and is another indication of his 
supeficial approach to many fields in which he had little 
actual knowledge. Most critical biblical scholarship 
comes after the time of Jefferson's compilation and of 
course it was not available for his perusal. As much 
importance must be attached to the fact that Jefferson 
considered himself capable of such a task as to the 
actual text itself. A detailed criticism of Jefferson's 
Bible fromfue point of view of modern biblical scholar-
ship might be pertinent to this study but space does not 
permit nor experience qualify. 
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Jefferson's efforts to overhaul the teachings of Jesus 
in favor of the deistic position may be compared to Locke's 
The Reasonableness of Christianity, although Jefferson went 
much further than did Locke. His method was arbitrary and 
extreme although no more so than similar efforts by theists 
throughout the orthodox Christian religion. So many of the 
teachings must be removed for no other reason than that they are 
in disagreement, in order to make Jesus reasonable, deistic, 
and without any claim to revelation, that Jefferson's 
methodology is highly questionable. With this in mind, the 
contents of the Jefferson Bible will be brought into closer 
view. 
This compilation of the life and morals of Jesus is drawn 
from the first four gospels but because all miracles and 
references to the divinity of Jesus and his divine inspiration 
are excluded, few passages are taken from John. For the most 
part it is arranged in chronological order but this is not 
always the case.1 The text is made up of t~ose selections 
which have to do with the narratives ancl the precepts of Jesus. 
The Sermon on the Mount with the Beatitudes are lifted from the 
fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of Matthew. All of the 
parables are included and in one instance2 a selection was chosen 
which refers to the flood analogously. With this exception, 
1. Jefferson, XX, App., 4. Compare references to Mark I and 
vr. 
2. Jefferson, XX, App., 64. 
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none of the miracles are even mentioned as they would be 
contrary to natural law.1 In at least two instances the 
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same selections are repeated; they are the references to the 
money-changers in the temple and the immediate destruction 
of the temple,2 It concludes with the death and burial of 
Jesus, 
'rhe Jefferson Bible is not a triumph of Jefferson's 
scholarship; it is one thing to say that you agree with only 
certain sections of the New Testament; it is quite another to 
say that the sections with which you agree are the only ones 
which are valid and which Jesus approved, The latter is a 
problem in the historicity of the man and the texts which 
Jefferson made no attempt to solve. He stood at the opposite 
pole from that of Augustine but was guilty of the same error, 
Augustine interpolated into the teachings of Jesus the precepts 
of Plato, Jefferson's archenemy in philosophy. Jefferson 
misrepresented by omission the sayings of Jesus, with the deism 
of the Stoics and Bolingbroke in mind. Both forced Jesus into 
preconceived patterns and neither made a serious effort to find 
out exactly what he meant. Jefferson was thus involved in a 
serious error for whtch he must assume full responsibility; 
he had no external evidence whatsoever to sustain his claim 
that his compilation represented the valid historical Jesus, 
With the conclusion of this estimate of the Jefferson 
1. Jefferson, VI, 259. 
~ Jefferson, XX, App., 4, 56, 63, 
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Bible, several threads of thought can be converged into a 
unified evaluation of his intellectual development. After 
surveying the previous evolvement of his thought, the 
realization that he has returned to the teachings of Jesus 
225 
as his ultimate guide strikes the student of Jefferson as being 
totally out of character. Manifold alternatives present 
themselves, no one of which becomes a constant that is capable 
of distinguishing between the variables without a sweeping 
revaluation. The heterogeneous selections may be considered as 
a contradiction and reversal of all previous writings, as a 
sentimental return to his early childhood, as an effort to 
satisfy an unconscious sense of guilt, as a political expedient 
to thwart those who would denounce him as an atheist, or as an 
effort to purify the scripture according to deistic canons. 
Although the list is by no means exhaustive, these partial 
alternatives must be given serious consideration by anyone who 
would attempt to trace the evolution of Jefferson's thought. 
The most obvious explanation is that Jefferson, after wandering 
far from the Christian fold, finally ret~rned to the haven of 
his early childhood. It is quite possible that he had not 
wandered so far as he thought. 
Mecgre as the sources relating to Jefferson's childhood 
are, there are at least three factors wnich indicate the nature 
of his early development. The first such indication is purely 
formal; Jefferson was tutored by ministers of the Anglican 
church, the church of which he was a member, and undoubtedly 
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imbibed some Christian teachings along with his studies in 
Latin and Greek. In the second place he went to a school 
which was owned and maintained by the church; his thorough 
knowlede;e of tl1e Bible attests to the su:~position that it \Was 
at about this time that he was introduced to it, either formally 
or informally. The third and most important indication is to 
be found in the fact that when he later rebelled at the 
orthodox doctrines, he thought them of sufficient importance 
to consider all time consumed in proving them invalid to be 
time well spent. He spared no effort to base his morals, a 
morality Which was by in large characteristic of his station 
and status in life, on a substantial foundation. When he 
could no longer accept the intellectual basis of the orthodox 
faith, he turned to other sources. It should be remembered 
that Jefferson had no quarrel with the morals which the church 
was willing to condone, morals which had more in common with the 
gentlemanly virtues of Aristotle than with the teachings of 
Jesus. He might have found the conduct of individual ministers 
in the colony despicable but if he did so, he blamed the men, 
not the church and where he found one that was not a gentleman, 
he found dozens who were, and who as such, were not in conflict 
with the church. It was the system rather than the morality 
with which Jefferson could not agree. In the sense that he 
was deeply concerned to ph)tect and support his moral system at 
any cost, Jefferson can be considered throughout his life as 
being profoundly devout, if not fully religious. 
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It was Bolingbroke who along with others came to his aid 
at this stage in the transition of his thought. Bolingbroke, 
>ho 'Nas in all probability recommended to him by Governor 
Fauquier, gave him an external point of vantage which combined 
with the systems of the ancients provided first a critical and 
then a positive basis for a morality that remained substantially 
unchanged. As a deist Jefferson began to draw upon the writings 
of the Stoics, and the Epicureans as interpreted by Gassendi, 
Locke, and Bolingbroke. As a materialist he turned against 
the doctrine of immortality and identified the mind with the body. 
Natural law was accepted as the hand of God at work in history 
and that phenomenon which evaded or refuted the reasonable mind 
was termed evil, If Jefferson realized that in the most 
extreme expressions of his materialistic system he was 
substantiating a morality with which few contemporary Christian 
ministers would have found themselves at odds, he did not 
mention it. If they had disagreed, it would have been on a 
theoretical rather than a pragmatic basis. Of the two, Jefferson 
was undoubtedly the most consistent but his theoretical re,Tolt 
produced few external changes in personal conduct and was thus 
much more tame than he realized. 
Coincident with his intellectual development was a 
growing realization of the favored place of the church in the 
community, a historical observation which undeniably interacted 
with the trend of his thought, This stream of influence grew 
from his personal experience with the church as a political 
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agency. The establishment had congealed into s cartilaginous 
structure of codified law, a potential rather than an actual 
threat to dissenters. Again, it was the lack of consistency 
to which he objected; the usurpations of legal tradition by 
Christian precepts had to be rooted out. His case against the 
supposed intolerance of the establishment disregarded the record. 
The argument based on the early status of the church and the 
frauds Which it had perpetrated in order to impose itself on 
the state fell on deaf ears. It was the church as the one 
remalning direct tie with Britain and all that it represented 
as the heavy arm of the British empire which attracted popular 
support to his cause. Many of his statements are bitingly 
anti-clerical and as such they are frequently linked to similar 
denunciations of monarchies. The clergy who tacitly or actively 
supported the Tories and the divine right of kings theory may 
have been in the back of his mind and may have been responsible 
for such extreme statements.l 
Jefferson's experience with an all-powerful monarchy and 
an all-powerful state led him to be distrustful of strong 
institutions as such. The state became a referee for 
opposing churches just as the national government became a 
referee for opposing states. Jefferson had no affinity for the 
Baptists, his strongest allies in the conflict. He certainly 
did not agree with their theology, but he believed that they 
1. Jefferson, XV, 305. 
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had as much right to worship as the Anglicans. In plotting 
the curve of Jefferson's religious development there is a 
temptation to say that at this point he had least in common 
with the religious tradition but that the subsequent compilation 
of the scripture known as the Jefferson Bible marked a complete 
return to the Christian teachings, 
This is true in only one sense, He did reaffirm his belief 
in immortality after having given it up altogether. Jefferson 
was interested in Christianity only because it furnished the most 
consistent morality; it was positive and more concerned for the 
welfare of others. Jefferson did not really return to 
Christianity but thoroughly revised it; he did not submit to 
it but conquered it. Reason was still the ultimate criterion 
and an unreasonable Christianity would have been no more 
relevant than an irrational Pyrrhonism, From the time of his 
departure from the orthodox position, he never did return and 
the Jefferson Bible is the best indication of his intransigence. 
His treatment of scripture is completely consistent with an 
outline which he inscribed to Peter Carr as early as 1787. 
"Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every 
fact, every opinion. 11 
It is true that his earlier deism was corrected and 
extended; he became more interested in the concept of Christian 
brotherhood and extended his concepts to include it. But 
this is perfectly consistent with his earlier thought on the 
subject;: it does not constitute a contradiction. 
CHAPTER VIII 
sm.:z RIS'['OEICtL .ANTSCED1'1,'TS OF 'i'EE N ATl:RAL LA1A .AFD SOCIAL 
CONTRACT T:1EORIES 
As the author of the Decl8ration and as a notev.orthy 
commentator and early interpreter of the Constitution, 
Jefferson pleyed a unique role in relation to the two primary 
documents of the American government. Chapter IV treated the 
influence of Locke on Jefferson in wri tin8; t:1e Declsration; 
Locke's use of natural law and its relation to positive or 
civil law was discussed. In the Declaration Jefferson had 
occasion to make specific reference to the laws of nature 
using them as a court of appeal against which to cite the 
unconscionable e.cts of King George III. V.'i th the exception of 
the general terms used in the preamble and the i~plied argument 
from design drawn from the catalogue of protests, the content 
of the Declaration is philosophically negative. That is, it 
still left open the question as to just what constitutes 
positive law based on natural law. The Declaration based on 
"self evident" principles does not deteil t~ce machinery of 
a people's government or the rights of that people. 
It is true of peoples as v1ell as nations that the 
formulation of a protest precedes, <nd assists in the 
delineation of, a [Oel, the need, &nd then the ambition. The 
Declaration was a defensive tactic in international relations 
and against & neg&tive bill of particulars turbulent passions 
could be united in the common cause. A common source of pain 
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is much easier to identify than a common source of pleasure; 
fear could unite the states temporarily bt:t s positive force 
was demanded to make of that temporary unity a permanent 
union. Hurried agreement may be reeched as to the n&ture of 
natural law in reference to urgent needs, but it is an alto-
gether different matter when che same agreement must be 
reached to support civil or positive lew based upon the natural 
law theory. -'•en that had stood shoulder to shoulder to sign 
the Declaration, quickly partitioned themselves into small vocal 
cliques v:hen faced v:i th the problem of structuring a federal 
constitution. 
The preamble to the DeclEration is a hifh moral challenge 
appealing to the people in resonant tones chs.rged with 
emotion e.nd resolve; the Constitution is a compromise. It will 
be the contention of this study ths.t the Constitution is the 
historical culmination of the social compEct theories, of the 
thinkers who were anticipating the practical application of the 
theretofore vagu.e statements concerning nE tural law. The 
social compact is one of the pragmatic and positive assertions 
of the nEtural law theory. :;ut such e statement cannot zo 
undocummented and before the discussion of Jefferson's 
commentary on l:'le Constitution to follow in the next Chapter, 
some attention will be given to the historical antecedents of 
the social compact. 
Locke's treatment of natural law was introduced in 
Chapter IV and it v1as concluded that Jefferson accepted Locke's 
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definition of natural law as reason, reason understood as 
analysis or deductive logic. However, it may well have been 
even at that time, that when he used the term loosely he 
meant it only as a synonym for intelligence. Because of the 
abstract and negative characteristics to be found in the 
Declaration, there still remains a breach between~eory and 
practice that can only be bridged by an understanding of 
Jefferson's commentary on the Constitution, that is, natural 
law in its positive and detailed unfoldment. The social compact 
theorists such as Hooker, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, were 
not the first to make some application of the principle of 
natural law however, for they were preceded by the Stoles and 
the Roman jurists. Therefore, this historical resume will 
begin with the Stole doctrine of natural law. 
After the fall of the Greek city states the Hellenistic 
philosophies were marked by a decisive alteration in their 
political theory, systems that were as a whole dependent on 
earlier Greek models.1 At first this alteration was a shift 
toward individualism, personal ethics, and the good life for 
the individual ego. Here, the Epicurean thinkers were inclined 
to remain, but the Stoic leadership such as Panaetius, who 
penetrated the Roman world, and particularly those who lived 
and taught in and around Rome itself, began to emphasize the 
universal characteriati.cs of man. The adult Universal Man did 
1. Ct. Sabine, HPT, l4lf; Tarn, HC, 73f; Carlyle, HMPT, 2; 
Windelband, HOP, 163. 
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not reach maturity in Stoic philosophy, Previous to the 
Stoic development in Rome the doctrine of nat~ral harmony 
had not been emphasized unduly, It is trt:.e that they had ready 
at hend the su-·7estive philosophical postulete of the V.orld 
Soul, bc:t if they had not been presented v.ith the opportunity 
to find explicit confirmation in specific examples of universal 
human characteristics, there is every liklihood that the idea 
of i_}ni versal ;.:an would not have developed, Thus the Stoics 
were disposed to stress that science which would confirm 
these doctrines, would give them operative validity, 
They had not far to look for such phenomena; it was no 
accident that the Stoics in and near Rome discovered it first 
for Rome was en experimental laboratory in political science, 
From the viewpoint of legcl history the series of problems 
which confronted the Roman jurists were fortunate indeed, 
Lt first, trying desperately to stretch the skein of 
traditional, theologico-political law, they v·ere forced to break 
\':i th the past and become the leaders of a self-conscious, 
experimental discipline. The Stoic thi~kers found support 
for their postulctes in the growing body of Homan law known 
as .jus gentium, Jus gentium, Or law of the tribes, is built 
upon the concept of equity (aeguitas) v:hich in turn was a 
product of the actual decisions handed dov,n by the praetor 
peregrinus (created in 247 B,C,}, The praetor urbsnus had 
charge of t!"e cases arising between Homan citizens and as 
such drew upon the traditional body of law, but the praetor 
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peregrinus wss appointed specifically to adjudicate the 
cases in val ving the lErge number of colonie.ls living in Pome. 
Because of the varied social customs reflected in the 
cases brought before him, the praetor peregrinus was civen 
smple freedom snd forced to rely on lndivicuel iniative. 
Considerable objectivity was achieved and sradually there 
developed a body of experimental pos tulc. tes "'D.ich could 
transcend the varied social hsbits reflected by the colonials. 
Using trial :end error, then "'i th experience, approved 
hypotheses, the praetor peregrinus becar~e the laboratory 
technician in political science. A disinterestedness wss 
achieved in the Romsn concept of equity that was not to appear 
again until the recrudescence of the natural sciences in the 
17th century.1 The praetors were self-consciously and 
intentionally searching for judicial principles that would 
meet the needs of any culture. They turned a sensitive ear to 
stories describing other societies and began to collect not an 
inconsiderable amount of informal anthropoloc;ical data. The 
contestants at the trial frequently were ziven the opportunity 
of rel£. tine the mores end customs cf their respective homehnds. 
Although subsequent Lnrlish end F'rench political 
theorists drev: heavily on a scanty knowledge of anthropology, 
it is not to be compared to the first-h&nd experience cf the 
praetors. The theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries did 
1. Note that technical objectivity need not necessarily 
precede social disinterestedness. 
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not have t':le opportunity to study human tribal customs in 
t':J.e manner of tbe praetors. T"lere was not the motivation for 
doing so, nor was there the professional dedication to objective 
principles of observation. 
Here then, is to be found one of t:1e first applications 
of natural law. Jus naturae in Stoic thoucht was universal 
law, that law v:hich is applicable to all pco 9les and Clcl tures. 
The v.orld Soul was revealed in the tiny spark of moral 
consciousness \':i thin each individual. loach men is reasonable 
and at least potentially capable of plscing justice above his 
immediate requirements. But the term jus naturae was at first 
reserved for the vague theories of universalism derived from 
the Stoic metaphysics while jus gentium was the term used to 
designate the actual body of law compiled by the praetor 
peregrinus. The praetors, because of their individual status, 
decided cases independently cf ee.ch other and were in frequent 
disagreement. Each jurist dug freely in the great storehouse 
of mores which had been deposited like driftwood on the Roman 
coast. Undoubtedly this is one source of the elasticity and 
applicability to be found in the jus gentium. The jus civile 
was barnacled over •,•:ith the ceremonies, now considerably 
telescoped, that had constituted the law court before the legal 
canons had been e.dopted in the form of the ·rwel ve 'L'ebles. 
Thus the jus civile as jus scripta contained much of the 
elementary and crystallized dramatics of the jus non scripta. 
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Jus neturae was too ve.gue and undefined to lend anything but 
questionable moral support to the best legal theory. But 
jus gentium pushed back the racial, geographical and ethnic 
barr·iers of t':le day >..i th unequaled efficiency. It was not 
international lav: or law between the states; it \'as e code v.hich 
united the individuals of ristinct cultures, the people 10s 
individuels. 
From this time on the srowth of f,omen lev can be treced 
by the e::r~·du::cl cotolescence cf these three concepts. Lt:ter 
Homan jurists with E philosophical bent bsr;£.n Lo use the ~erms 
,jus gent hun e.nd ,jus ::1eturae interchangeably. One after 
another the praetore urbe.nu began to incorporate it into their 
decisions, first informally end then £'ormt, lly. The injection 
of jus gentium into Roman law constituted the fermente.tion 
which ;Jrecipitated the lePp into the f1:ture, the leap that 
E-nticipated legf11 development from the 5th to the 17th century 
and spree.d the Rom12n code over the continent .1 
It is herein maintained that ~ithout the concept of equity 
which durin~ the ~'lellenistic era was wedded to ne tural law 
t';eory, the latter vmulC. never have commended itself to 
succeeding senerrtions o Khatever nE turEl law might hE ve meant 
1. Full treatments of the effect jus gentium hEd on natural 
lev may be f'o1.md in most comprehensive histories of legal 
theory o One of' the best is to be found in C&rlyle, fli.iPT, 
I, Chaptso i, iii, end vii. Shorter prsseges mey be found 
in Sabine, HPT, Chapts. viii and ix; Elliott, V·!P'J:, Che.pto v; 
end Brinton, IAJ,I, 13lf, The writings of Cicero in legal 
theory are the best originel sources to be found on the 
subject, particularly The republic and The Laws. Although 
me.ny histories treat the ft:sion of the two stres.ms, so far 
ss the e.t1thor knows none of them place quite the same 
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to the philosopher, it meant to the lawyer t class n&me for the 
highest legal tradition.1 It is the polden thread of legal 
theory, not because of its metc.physical justification, but 
because of its nearly uni versel application, its pra[l!latism. 
The term "natural" serves to suggest Dn Fbsoh:te sanction, not 
an approximE•te universal but a uni versel without exception, 
and it served quite well until a much l&ter date. Its classic 
denouement came v.l_th J. S, ;_:ill's little essay entitled Nature, 
which "'ill be discussed in the followin c: che.pter, Hov.ever 
the point to be msde here is that naturel law for many centuries 
denoted a superior quality in legal codes; it only connoted 
and that very vaguely, superior euthorization, where and when 
that authorization was needed. 
'l'his, of course, is a historical judgment end has no 
immediate reference to what natural lave might he.ve meant in eny 
pF.rticular metephysical system. It is an explanation that 
provides for the historical fact that natural law theory, 
although it is crammed v;i th overtones of authori tsrianism, has 
nevertheless usuPlly been on t~e side of free Dnd liberal 
thought. 2 A history of natural law theory is a history of 
emphasis on the in:;portance of jus rentium, at the expense of 
the metaphysical implications to be found in natural law doctrine. 
1. Cf, Carlyle, RKPT, I, Chapt. iii; N0 te p~rticularly page 
36f. C[rlyle is not Sc.yint; quite the same thing but he 
does emphasize the leg£•1 confusion as to the n:;etaphysical 
aspects of natural law. 
2. The outstanding exception here is Hobbes who will be taken 
up lc.ter in this chapter. Hobbes 1 thrcory of natural la>\ was 
consistent ;dth his metaphysics in a way that the Stoic 
natural law theory was not consistent with the Stoic 
metaphysics. Cf. Gurwitch, Art. 
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legal renovation, a chronoloecy of the '1.ighpoints in legal 
theory. Time and again it has been employed by the chanting 
mobs, the people, & s they be tot on t.he fcrtresses of legal 
trBdition. It hes been described as being universal when 
actually individualism is intended, as intuitive v~en 
empiricism for·med its content, as rational ·,hen it v:as marked 
b; experimentstion, as international y,J:'.en it relied on the code 
of the msrket place, and it has suggested traditionelism vhen 
novelty and change v.ere sought. ·Lnless it is interpreted in 
some such way it is fraucht with contradiction. ~rom the view-
point of the liberal tradition its value lies in its use as a 
touchstone for individualism, reformation, and elasticity. It 
provides the orifinel dogmatism necessary to initiate e new 
policy and stir the followers to fanatical allegiance at the 
same time it anticipates a gre.ceful exit once that policy is no 
longer operative. Its universslity lies not in positive codes 
that heve been tested and tried in all conceivable human 
situations, but in its ultimate unintelligibility. Historically 
it has been used as E name for matever has seemed rood at the 
time. y,hat has seemed good at the time has usually been stated 
normatively as in the cases of Cicero, Locke, and Jefferson. 
With this hypothesis in mind t::,e historical development of some 
of the outstanding exponents of natural law will be continued. 
For Cicero, justice was necessarily implicated in the 
definition of the state; where justice did not prevail, the 
state did not exist. Although Cicero was at many points a 
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follower of PlBto, unlike Flato he dtd r:ot define justice as 
vocational hannony v:i th an imposed r1"ling hierarchy. :Ie ws s 
slightly closer to l.ristotle 1 s theory of the state b~Jt even 
here there is a considerable break. Aristotle visualized the 
good state as deriving its justification fT.d support from the 
consensus of a select group in a mutual rot&tion of responsi-
bility. For Cicero, everyone ~as ~otentielly cepeble of 
pbrticipating in the c::overnment by reason of their moral 
nature.l This is one of the primary reBsons for dre.wing such 
a heavy line between the doctrines of the Greek political 
theorists and those cf the Roman lawyers. Justice for Cicero 
meant equsli ty and equal participation, .jus consensu. 2 
But at the ssme time it was Cicero who did more than any 
other Roman thinker to bind the natursl law doctrine to the 
best tradition of Roman lew. It WIJS he who in explicit 
contrlldiction to Csr·neades of the Middle 1\cademy and Epicurus, 
advanced the theory of lsw as universally binding on everyone, 
as being &bove the immediate needs of specific groups and 
cultures.3 Others such es Panaetius had advanced the theory 
of ne.tural law in e vague manner '>Jith a metaphysical basis but 
1. Cicero, De Leg., I, v, 17. "You must understand that in no 
other kind cf discussion can one bring out so clearly what 
:'ature 's gifts to me.n are, v:hat e. v.ealth of most excellent 
possessions the human mind enjoys, \'.'1.st the purpose is, to 
strive after and accomplish v,hich we h2ve been born a;nd 
pleced in this world, what it is that vnites men, and what 
nature.l fellowship there is a~ong them. For it is only 
after sll these things have been made clear that the origin 
of Law snd Justice can be discovered." Cf. De Nat. Deo., II, 
xxxf. 
2. Cicero, De Leg., III, i. 2-ii. 5. 
3. Cicero, De Leg., I, v., 17. 
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it was Cicero who gave it specific application. Cicero was the 
first to present explicit legal models and give content to the 
theory of natural law. It is thGse specimens that are of most 
consequence in the study of natural lav. theory. Therefore the 
immediate problem is to determine what natural law meant, vh.at 
it effected, for Cicero. 
Cicero's writings are manifestly and admittedly eclectic. 
If there is novelty at all it must be found in his style and 
the unique combinations of pE,st tradi tiorcs. They were not 
original except in their novel combina.tions of previous 
traditions. :01ct if this is so, the commente.tcr on ._;icero \'.ill 
be hard pressed to explain why there was such a break in 
political theory between .iiristotle snd Cicero if he does not 
place considerable emphasis on the F.omen leg&l tre.di tion 
previous to Cicero. In De Re Publica and De Legibus Cicero is 
quick to recognize the need for explicit examples of natural 
law, particularly in the latter. In De Legibus he pives such an 
example in his outline for a constitution. Even here he is 
admittedly unoriginal but draws heavily upon the Roman 
Constitution. 1 It is his belief thst his edition of the Roman 
Constitution is an example of natural lew, so again, natural 
law becomes E name for a sli,~htly idealized version of the best 
legal tradition. In formulating his criticism Cicero uses 
reason2 plus his experience as a practicing lawyer in Rome. 
1. Cicero, De Leg., III, iii. 
2. Cicero, De Leg., I, vi., 19. "Law is a natural force; it is 
the mind and res. son of the intelligent man." 
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The constitution in De .Legibus s.ppesls to ,iustice and invokes 
jus consensu. Cicero meets the threatened extre~e relativism 
of Carneades v:i th theon tic:?-1 absolutism but v:hen '1e begins to 
apply this ebsolutism he finds it m&nifested in a particular 
historical tradition. It is just this v.hich he enveighs against 
in Book I of De Legibus 1 but it is what i1e does in Book III. 
Although he inte!'ldS to cover "tie v.·'>ole ren:ce cf Lniversal 
Justice and Law in sv.ch a way tl:at our ov.n ffiomarJ civil lew, 
as it is called, v:ill be confined to a sm&ll and narrow corner, 11 
when he is called upon to do so, that small and narrow corner 
penetrates and occupies the total concept. Cicero's motivation 
in invoking natural law v:as little more than opportunism; it 
was a defense of tr£ditional vslues in the face of the imminent 
dovmfall of Roman constitutional government. J,t no point is 
this better expressed than in the following selection. 
But if Justice is conformity to written laws and 
national customs, and if, as the same persons claim, 
everything is to be tested by the standard of 
utility, then anyone who thinks it v:ill be profit-
able to him will, if he is able, disregerd end violate 
the laws. It follows that Justice does not exist at 
all, if it does not exist in Nat'J.re, end i.f that <'orm 
of it v·hich is based on ~;tilit:• can be overthrovcn 
by t2'1at very utility itself. ;.nd if Ne ture is not to 
be considered the foundation of Justice, that vcill 
m.ean the destruction {Of the virtues on r."lich human 
society dependy. F'or where then v:ill there be a 
place for generosity, or love of country, or 
loyalty, or the inclination to be of service to 
others or to show gratitude for favours received? 
F'or these virtues originate in our natural incli-
nation to love our fellow-men, end ti1is is t'1e 
foundation of Justice. Ctherv:ise not mere 
1. Cicero, De Leg., I, 17. 
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consideration for ~en but also rites and pious 
observel'lces in honor of t'>e gods are done away 
with; for I tc1.ink that t~1ese ought to be mBin-
tained, not through fear, but on Eccount of the 
close ret a tionship v;hich exists between man 
and God. 
242 
Cicero goes on to say that if the principles of justice 
nere based on the decisions of judges, the edicts of princes 
or the people, then justice would be called upon to <.dmit 
robbery end adultry, &nd t.oe forging of :cills. Pools may 
vote agEinst justice but in so doin&: they h£,ve not altered 
it, the~ h&ve not made the right into the v'.rong.2 Obviously 
Cicero is here employing nature as a sanction to reinforce 
his criticism of law as it existed, perticularly the civil 
law in the lov,er courts. The validity of natural law consists 
in its ability to guerd the traditional and approved virtues, 
not in its own right; ft:rthermore they ere the virtues, not 
of the plsbi&ns, bvt of the aristocracy, the patriciens. 
';"oisdom becomes e prodr.ct cf virtv.e for only those who exercise 
their innate virtue could discern the value of natural law; 
it is based on the morBl nature of m~;n. 'J'he ra.mifica tions of 
this theory were not carrled further by Cicero, it remained 
for Seneca to complete t~1.e metamorphosis. 
After Cicero, in the writings of Seneca and the subsequent 
Roman lawyers up to the sixth century attempts were made to 
connect the theory of natural law with imaginary primitive 
states. This is particularly true in the case of argu.ments 
1. Cicero, De Leg., I, xv. 
2. Cicero, De Leg., I, vi. 
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revolving around slavery. But in t:"e Vlritings of Cicero no 
such meaning is evident; likewise, there is not the emphasis 
on naturEl necessity t:1.at will be found lEter in t'1e ':.·ritings 
of Hobbes. 
One of th.e most noteworthy statements to be found in the 
above quotation is that "these virtues oricinate in our natural 
inclination to love our fellov·,·-men, and this is the foundation 
of Justice." It is to be rerrembered thHt Cicero preceded the 
Christian era and that here he is introducing a basis for 
justice not c:nlike the best attempts of the Church Fathers. 
At least in this one instance he is equating the love of 
fellow-men vii th natural law, the moral nature of man. Obviously 
he is not referring to a state of affairs in the past, or 
even to the advanced Poman legal codes; here he is underlining 
the normative aspect of natural lav·, v;hat man should be or 
what he is potentie.lly a.hle to become. Cicero did not continue 
the ririd distinction that had existed between the barbe.rian 
and the civilized man in Greek thought. "The homogeneity of 
the hum<n r·ace v:as in the Roman Empire no mere t':leory of the 
philosophers, but an actual fact of experience, e. reality in 
political and socie.l conditions."l 
.'my attempt to find lo;c:ical consistency in the v.ritings 
of Cicero will be fruitless and no such ende~:vor vill :be made 
here. He is important to this study not becaLse of his 
1. Carlyle, HMPT, I, 11. 
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philosophical critic ism of natural law but because of the 
his tori cal importance to be found in that v·i th which he 
equated it. Time and agsin he leaves the way open for basic 
criticisms against this ambiguous and contradictory use of the 
phrase. His basic opportunism and superficia.lity have already 
been indicated, but this was not to be discovered for some 
time to come. Throcshout the middle e.ges his identification 
of natural lev· c·ith the highest F:oman tradition v;as accepted, 
approved, 8nd ~anipulated to a subordinate position under 
divine law. The Church Fathers were much more interested in 
placing divine or revealed law over natt:ral la v. than they v.ere 
in making a critical analysis of what was meant by t!:te term 
natural. 1 Y.hatever the basic contradictions involved, Cicero's 
theories went virtuelly uncriticized until the time of the 
Enlightenment and beyond. This is not only true of his 
poll tical theories but of his other v:orks as well. They were 
undeservedly influenti&l in succeeding eras. 
By way of sum:nary; natural law for Cicero resulted from 
the interaction of the 2 toic V:orld Soul c nd the tradition in 
Roman law thst culminated in the Roman Constitution. The 
latter, of course, he.d drawn heavily upon the jus ;centium 
discussed above. It v:as a means of holding the best legal 
traditions of the pest up to the reader as norms. From its 
Stoic heritage it gained a doctrine of man, of man as rational 
1. Cf. Carlyle 1 s six volume Fistory of I,:edieval Political 
Theory in the Viest for a treatment of this. 
VIII. Historical Antecedents 245 
and having an innate desire to live in harmony with his fellow 
man. :?rom the same theoretical background it carrled 
metaphysical overtones of absolutism end urgency, although it 
did not reflect tl1e cosmic determinism to be found in Stoiclsm. 
From its Roman heritage it drew upon c:1e de: ctrine of equality 
and universality; although equslity mcy hcve been practiced for 
some time in Roman courts of lew, it had only recently been 
formuls.ted in the legal trsdi tion of jus r:entium. Cicero did 
not mean by natural 1£ w, primitivism, necessi tarisnism, or the 
Epicuresn utilitarianism. Essentially it was, for him, an 
agency of conservation. 
By subsequent thinkers some of these attributes v;ere not 
given the same weight that they were given by Cicero, but most 
of the above characteristics continued to constitute what was 
generally meant by the term. As has been indicated, natural 
law was relegated to a subordinate position during the middle 
ages and ••as c:enerally understood to have been the rcighest type 
of law between the F£11 end the comlng of Christ. It was still 
operative for heathens and secular nations that ruled vithout 
the benefit of divine or revealed law as it was interpreted by 
t':le Church. Therefore its treatment durin[ the middle ages will 
not be developed here. :::Ether, attention will be t:;rned 
immediately to Thomas ~obbes (1588-1679). 
In tracing the history of the natural law and social 
contract theories, Thomas Hobbes plays such a unique role that 
a consideration of his writings is imperative, if for no other 
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reason, then to indicate the extremes to vhich the theories 
have been pressed. It may have been for purely facetious reasons 
that Hobbes c':tose to tcse both terms, bc:.t he gave them a twist 
from vhich they hs ve never fully recovered. 'I'here is su'::Jstan tial 
historical evldence to indicate that he dJd not r,1ean by the 
terms ar.ything that had been meant before and t'tat therefore 
he had no right to use them. Herein it is maintained that 
clobbes did give the natural lav; theory the first metaphysically 
consistent and meaningful interpretation. 2ven if ~obbes' 
use of the t"o concepts was nothing more than pure rational-
ization for an otherv,ise unsavory doctrine, it attests to the 
strength of the doctrines in that they v.·ere intended to have 
a beneficent effect upon his readers. Just why the social 
contrB.ct theory, in particular, should have such an effect can 
readily be seen from the history that im~ediately preceded this 
era. 
'I'he idea of socicl compact in the 17th century was 
derived from two primary sources, the dissenting church bodies, 
and e1e feudal contrEct between ~he liee:e a.nd the lord. 
Ldded to these two streams of infl~ence were the new studies 
in anthropology that v.•ere being undertE lcen at that time. They 
were of an infor~t.al and unscientific n2tt•re; for the most part 
they \'ere the fabricated end glossed over stories of returning 
sailors but an a~cthenic literstc::re was gradually accumulating 
and the public interest, Et least, was e;enuine. 
The dissenting Protestant groups had frequently separated 
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t'nemselves for reasons of church sovernment. Having disposed 
of hierarchical authority they were throv.n upon their own 
initiative to form a new type of church government. In both 
England snd Colonh.l America, the ch~:.rches vere "gathered" 
and eac'! member v:as &;i ven a vote. The ministers v·ere then 
"called" and could be dismissed by vote of t':1e church. Thus 
large numbers gained first-hand experience through individual 
pErticipation. T~·,e new method commended itself to groups 
v.herever new governments v:ere established, for the most part in 
the colonies. This was the death blov. to the theory of trans-
cendental and divine lav,· that hsd domina ted the middle ages; 
the Protestants believed in revelation but beca1:.se it had to 
be indi viduslly interpreted, it nurtured political nominalism. 
Just ss the church v.as not identified with Le bishop, more 
and more thinkers during the 17th century concluded that the 
state wss not identified v.i th the king. The way was thrown 
open agsin for s natural law theory derived from common consent. 
The recognition that msny Protestant bodies chose this type of 
church pcverm11ent is not intended to imply t>at the vs.rious 
ecclesiasticel lesders v:ithin the sects prorrcoted ,)olitical 
individuelism. There is no necessary connection frorn one to 
the other and many t':loroughly der1ocratic churches were quite at 
peace with the r1on&rchies of the 17th and 18th centuries both 
in :>!.nglsnd end ·'er:cany. Nevertheless it •:, as e constant reminder 
that there were othei'types of t:;overnment. 
The feudsl contrs ct VJE.S an agree:nen t bet•,,•een t'J e leige 
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and the lord Whereby the lord would protect the liege in 
return for a certain percentage of his harvest. In time of 
war the liege was to assist the lord in the common defense. 
Originally these contracts were freely entered upon and the 
liege was often the one to voluntarily surrender his lands in 
return for protection. 'According to the Magna Carta1 the liege 
was not obliged to pay more than the contract called for except 
for the ransoming of his body, the making of h1.s oldest son a 
knight, and the marriage of his oldest daughter. In both Spain 
and England the coronation oath was taken by the king in the 
form of a feudal contract so that the idea of contractual 
responsibility was well grounded in the minds of the peasants 
during the 17th century. 
As has been mentioned, the anthropological data gathered 
during the 17th century were fictionalized, scanty, and generally 
inaccurate. The data were a product of the era ot geographical 
discovery that had suddenly erupted during the preceding 
century. Returning traders twisted their reports in order to 
attract more sailors on their hazardous journeys; foreign 
investments and colonial ventures were encouraged and gave rise 
to the idea of the noble savage, later to be exploited by 
1. The position is maintained here that the Magna Carta was not 
an advance in feudal political theory but was rather an 
attempt to continue it against the encroachments of King 
John. The above conditions of the feudal contract while 
inscribed in the Magna Carta June 15, 1215, had actually 
been in effect for centuries. A discussion of early feudal 
contracts is presented in Chapter III. 
2. cr. Elliott, WPH, 430f. 
VIII. Historical Antecedents 249 
Montesquieu and Rousseau. On the other hand there were stories, 
sometimes more authenic, of headhunters and cannibals that could 
also be misrepresented to increase their shoek value. The 
politica.l theorist could choose that report v;hich best suited 
his temperament and philosophical prejudgments. This, in fact, 
was what happened as cen be seen in the works of Hobbes and 
Locke. 
Becav.se of Hobbes' materialistic metaphysics, his political 
theory was nothing more than a problem in mechanics and 
technology. Once his premise is gran ted as to the nature of 
man, the rest follows in perfect logical order. For him, both 
psychology and axiology are based en a concept of man as the 
machine, the self-moving autom&ton. "For what l.s the heart 
but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints, 
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body. 111 All men 
are inclined toward a 11 perpet1:al and restless desire of power 
after power, that ceaseth only in death. 112 Every man is worth 
what another will pay for his power, not the value that he places 
upon himself. Life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short."3 The state of nature for mpn was not Cicero's harmony 
with the elements but the state of continual and unrelenting 
war. All social forms were ertificially imposed though they 
were desirable in order to enforce the peace. heason, according 
to Sobbes, is not an innate characteristic of each mind, but an 
1. Hobbes, LEV, ix. 
2 .• Hobbes, LEV, 85-6. 
3. Hobbes, LEV, 113. 
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achievement that few minds can attain; the passions will always 
rule the large majority of people, Since this is so, only 
force can be relied upon to produce a reasonable society, 
In Hobbes' analysis of natural man, he contradicts 
himself \vhen he posits a e,miversal desire for peace that would 
ultimately justify total s-~bmission to higher authority. If 
life is really what Hobbes claims that it is, poor, nasty, and 
brutish, then there is little room for the overwhelming desire 
for peace and security that would lead the brute into the trap, 
It is true that Hobbes equates the kingdom won by force v;i th the 
kingdom created by mutual consent but the whole intent of his 
work is to establish the latter as a feasible and workable 
theory, 
The only law of natc,re recognized by ':-!obbes was the law 
of self-preservation, the one law that could not be ahrogated. 
On this c"undamental drive he placed his total socia.l strvcture; 
in order to Echieve it man would be willing to give up all of 
his other so-called "rights." All individual liberty is 
surrendered in abject submission and the s.ttempt is made to 
base a moral consciousness on brute necessity. 
Justice, for Hobbes, consists in keeping valid covenants 
but there must be a power capable of enforcing them. Thus the 
contre.ct for Hobbes was a tour de force to insti tc.te the 
absolute sovereign. '''en 1/.'ere equal in the state of nature 
because each had the power to end the life c•f the other, what 
one lacked in physical power he mede up for in cunning and 
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reason,l As equals they could enter upon a contract where 
each would have one vote and with that vote tr£nsfer all of 
his rights to the sovereign. 
The sovereign guarantees internal peace to the state and 
that is ais sole reason for existing; the subject can make no 
other request, The majority institutes the contract because 
the majority is more powerful than the minority; once begun, 
the minority will perforce accept it, T'1e soverei.gn may invoke 
divine aid in proclaiming the laws and fabricate myths to 
reinforce his statutes, :.o:e is the higr;est avt:writy ;:nd no 
parallel organization such as the church can threaten his 
supremacy, Pleto, Mohammed, and l~achiavelli had made similar 
use of myths as e crutch to support the precarious status of 
the upper levels in the hierarchy, In the Leviathan '""obbes 
only devoted a few paragraphs to the concept of the soci:ol 
contract as such,2 but it was nevertheless t!--e cornerstone 
of his system; for once the contract was accepted, the sovereign 
became its overt manifestation, The sovereign could do no 
wrong because h:ts mistrkes were actually the mistakes of the 
subjects, the members of the contract. In this sense the 
contract was continuous but in every ot~er sense it was concluded 
with the creation of the sovereit;n. Kevertheless this thread 
of continuity is important for it m£,kes of every sovereign 
decree a direct outgrowth of natural law, the drive for self-
preservation. 
l. Hobbes, LEV, 110. 2. Hobbes, LEV, 120f. 
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Through the method of tho social contract what virtue can 
be found in the brutes is carefully collected and deposited in 
the sovereign. v:i th a benevolence somelww born of tyranny he 
will provide for the subjects in such a way that life will be 
more tolerable for them than it would be in t~1.e state of nature. 
The Leviathan is a closely v:oven treatise that can~~ot be 
attacked at intermediate points; as with the Ethics of Spinoza, 
if it is to be disproven, error must be found in the major 
premise, either in the metaphysics, or the c~octrine of man 
derived directly from the latter. 
Hobbes bears a considerable degree of likeness to 
l<achiavelli in The Prince. Both Ere sophistic in their e;eneral 
view of man but Hobbes ¥:as more interested in the philosophical 
;iustification for force, while lilachiavelli v.as primarily 
interested in the mechanics of government, grantee that Force. 
Both v;ere qPi te willing to use any means to achieve an end 
and toth v1ere prophets of absolutism. The concept of motion 
in Eobbes 1 metaphysics became the concept of political force 
in his theory of the state. Since this force was derived 
from the elementary drive, the law of self-preservation, it is 
clear that nat"ral law in Eobbes 1 political theory \HlS 
immediately derivable from physical lav1 ln the natural sciences. 
As s~ch it contrib~ted s nev. elsment to the doctrine of 
natural law, that of historical necessity, determinism, or as 
it is sometimes termed, historicism. 
Historicism is the belief that t':le implacability to be 
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found in the relentless changing of the seasons is to be 
found in history, that man is not a determinant in history as 
a rational, creative being, but as a link somewhere between 
the original msch&nical impulse and the effect. The Stoics 
had held to such ~ t':leory of his tory but it was a macrocosmic 
process that gave little attention tc detail. ~hen Cicero 
borrowed from the Stoic conce ,t of natural lav, the details of 
his tori cal necessity V'ere left out. Historicism may be under-
stood as a product of the rationalists as opposed to the 
empiricists, 1 the realists d~ring the middle ages as opposed 
to the nominalists. 
If it had not been for the mechanistic metaphysics of 
Hobbes e,nd his willinr,ness to equate m~n with the machine, his 
nominalism would heve placed him on the side of' the democratic 
state bound together v:i th mutual ties of equality and purpose. 
A part of his historical importance is to be found in the 
suggestiveness of his treatise for the later, more liberal 
thinkers. This is found in !1is doctrine of equality ~ nd his 
characterization of reason as achievement. fnlike Cicero, he 
did not accept the analysis of man whic~~ pictures him as desiring 
to live in total harmony with his fellow man; he included the 
primitivism End necessit~rianism whicb Cicero had not n:aintained. 
To t:1e £,bsolutism implied in the nctural la¥> doctrine he gave 
the highest plEce and the greatest weight. It is the quality 
of absolutism that forever places Hobbes on the side of the most 
1. Hobbes was C'f course ~:;n er:piricist in his epistemology but 
like Locke, he was a r~tionalist in his metaphysics. 
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extreme political thinkers; he is representative of a pole of 
thought Which in the West has generally been considered the 
most suspect and has given rise to the ;rorst forms of 
totalitarianism. 
Thus in Hobbes, the natural law concept finds its most 
extreme and consistent exponent. There is nothing vague or 
undetermined about his analysis and there is no room for doubt 
as to what he means. The hypothesis is here maintained that 
if succeeding thinkers had followed Hobbe 1 s analysis of natural 
law as implacable historicism, it would not have succeeded in 
catching the eye of subsequent political reforms, It was 
natural law as understood by Cicero, not Hobbes, that was 
accepted by later thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau. Or, it 
may be stated in another way; the nominalism, equality, and 
reasonableness to be found in the Leviathan subsequently 
triumphed over the concept of absolute historical necessity. 
The implications of Hobbes' theory were more suggestive to 
succeeding thinkers than his conclusions, It was Hobbes' 
theory of the contract which survived and became increasingly 
important in the writings of Locke and Rousseau, important 
because of ita ready applicability and assumption of equality. 
Since there is no evidence that Jefferson was influenced by 
Rousseau, Locke will be discussed. 
The three cultural emphases that led to the social 
contract theory already discussed in relation to Hobbes, were 
even more pronounced for Locke. He was more receptive to them 
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and spent more time in their elucidation. Locke was intimately 
acquainted with the Protestant dissenters and their problems 
are discussed in his Letters on Toleration. He was also 
cognizant of historical contract patterns but had made few 
preleminary studies in anthropology. His was an imaginary 
anthropology, that is, his primitive society was contrived by 
stripping 17th century society of its civilized forms and 
then formulating an imaginative description of it. 
As was pointed out in Chapter IV, reason, for Locke, is 
learned, an end, an achievement as it was for Cicero; he 
maintains the ultimate rationality of the world but the concept 
of natural law does not derive from the mechanical laws of 
nature. Even the moral consciousness arises from education; 
man is free and can use his creative reason to structure history, 
he is not a mere product of his drives and passions. Life, 
liberty and property rights are derivable from this concept of 
natural law as reason. Unlike Hobbes, for Locke, most people 
are reasonable. 
Like Hobbes, Locke was an epistemological empiricist and 
all knowledge was dependent on individual perception; once having 
established this nominalism Locke does not destroy it as 
Hobbes did in the absolute state. Rather, it is carried to 
its ultimate conclusion in the constitutional, representative 
state. 
As has ~een mentioned, the "state of naturen as described 
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by both Locke and Hobbes was erroneous.l Hobbes leaned to the 
brutal, Locke to the noble, savage; both warped the report 
to fit the needs of their system. However Hobbes' natural 
law concept could have been derived solely from his mechanistic 
metaphysics and psychology while for Locke this was not the 
case. The state of nature for Locke constituted his concept 
of natural law; in this sense Locke was much more dependent on 
his anthropological data, erroneous or not, than was Hobbes.2 
From natural law realized in the state of nature Locke derives 
his concepts of liberty, equality, and property. The latter 
is implicated in his idea of labor and the needs of life, a 
man owns what he needs to sustain himself and what he can 
employ to that end. 
For Locke, the social contract is derived immediately 
from his doctrine of natural law, the reasonableness of man, 
of the satisfaction of a desire given to him by God to establish 
a society. The contract finds its first analogy in the 
family, "a voluntary compact between man and woman."3 
Although the family exists as a patriarchy, the woman has the 
right of separation when the union becomes unbearable.4 
Just as men enter the marriage contract they also enter the 
1. Locke, EGG, llBf; Hobbes, LEV, llOf. 
2. Locke, EGG, 119. "The state of Nature has a law of Nature 
to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which 
is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, 
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." 
3. Locke, EGG, 115. 
4. Locke, EGG, 156-7. 
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social contract to form a state and by the state formed in this 
way, with due respect to the rights and liberties of the 
individual, they e.re elevated from a state of nature to a 
society. However, if an attempt is made to form a government 
in which there would be only one ruler and one source of 
sovereignty, then it is not a society at all but the return to 
the state of nature. Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of An Essay 
Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
are committed to the description of just such a representative 
government with the threefold division into the executive, 
legislative, and federative powers. Unlike Hobbes, for Locke 
the contract is continuous in every sense of the term. The end 
of society is the protection of private property and that 
government which does not protect property may be dissolved at 
will by the society. The society may exist in an informal 
manner without the government, but the government can never 
exist without a society. 
What was said of Cicero holds true for the most part with 
Locke for in many ways they were similar. The emphasis for 
Locke is placed on the contract or the proposed constitution 
with the threefold division of government and the implied 
individual rights. This constitutes his primary contribution 
to succeeding thinkers and not his metaphysics (in the Second 
Essay) or his doctrine of natural law preceding from the 
idealized state of nature. The articles in the contract 
outlined in Chapter XII of the Essay are a summary of the 
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current governmental practices of which he approved and it 
places considerable strain upon his natural law theory to 
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show how they were necessarily derived from it. Thus it is 
here contended that since he could not have used natural law 
as what had already existed or what must necessarily exist, 
he must have understood it in the normative, idealized sense, 
as what could be if men allowed their reason to rule their 
passions. Like Cicero, he is holding up that tradition of 
which he approved for succeeding political theorists to read 
as a guide, not as an objective description. The term 
natural is a means of justification, if need be, absolute 
justification, a reassuring and semi-fictional point of vantage 
from which to strike at the mythically sanctioned monarchies 
of the past. 
Actually, by relying on nature he is substituting one 
absolute for another and if he had followed it through 
logically, or been explicit in his original meaning, he would 
have created another totalitarian state. But he did not choose 
to do this; instead, he used it as a means for legal reform. 
It is a way of introducing the problem and giving external 
validity to a system of government that might otherwise have 
seemed to approach anarchy. The objection Locke had to Hobbes 
is not to be found in his metaphysics but in his totalitarian 
system of government; indeed there is little in Hobbes' 
epistemology with which Locke did not agree and he was more 
of an epistemologist than a metaphysician. Their disagreement 
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on the state of nature concept is not to be based entirely on 
contradictory anthropological data but on the ideal government 
each had in mind, for neither made a serious study of the 
primitive. For that matter, Hobbes did not make a serious 
study of any history previous to the Stuarts and had nothing 
but scorn to heap upon the current revival in Greek and 
Roman literature.l Locke on the other hand looked more to the 
future and what could be accomplished with the growing tendency 
toward individualism. Hobbes attempted to halt the Enlighten-
ment in his political philosophy, Locke attempted to further it. 
As was pointed out in Chapter IV there is a contradiction 
between Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding and his 
Second Essay on Government if it is maintained that Locke 
believed there was an innate reason in everyone. The former 
is dedicated to the destruction of the belief in innate ideas. 
There is considerable evidence for this contradiction 
in theory but not in practice, not as it works itself out in 
the contract and proposed constitution. Thus while Locke may 
be attacked on the basis of logical contradiction, he cannot 
be accused of dual intent or purpose. The nominalism to be 
found in his doctrine of simple ideas is consistent with the 
individualism of his political theory. This further contributes 
to the thesis being presented here that the concept of natural 
law, was not, as such, a constitutive part of his system but 
was rather a means of justifying what seemed to him to be 
1. Hobbes, LEV, 668f. 
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useful at the time. Natural law theory rested lightly upon 
his shoulders. 
Of the three men, Hobbes, Locke, and Jefferson, none 
was so little concerned with the relation of studies in 
primitivism to political theory as was Jefferson. At the 
same time it should be added that only J"efferson had a ready 
acquaintance with primitive peoples and had devoted a 
considerable amount of his time to the science of anthropology. 
For Jefferson it was a science and as far as his studies carried 
him, they were accurate. This can be seen in his Notes on 
Virginia mentioned previously. But he evidently did not 
believe that the American Indian could instruct him in 
government or that a thorough-going natural law theory could 
be based on their tribal behavior. 
The introduction to this chapter pointed out that 
Jefferson's attitude toward the social contract could be 
determined from a study of the Declaration and his commentaries 
on the American Constitution. Chapter IV dealt with the 
Declaration and Chapter IX will deal with the Constitution. 
Na.tural law is invoked in the preamble to the Declaration 
but the bill of particulars which constitute the major content 
of the document make explicit just what he meant by natural 
law. Likewise the Constitution, which is a reflection of previous 
theories of the social contract, is understood as a product 
of natural law. Whether Jefferson viewed the Constitution as 
having authoritative validity in its own right or as a tool 
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for the promotion of good government, can be gained from a 
study of his commentaries upon it. That will constitute the 
subject matter of the chapter following. 
CHAPTER IX 
JEFFERSON'S COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION 
On November 15, 1777, the Articles of Confederation 
were finally agreed upon by the hastily gathered and war-
weary Congressmen. While the war was in progress and until 
the treaty with Great Britain was signed on September 3, 
1783, the problem of mutual defense served to cement the 
newly-founded states together. But once the war was concluded, 
the Articles of Confederation were found inadequate to meet 
many serious problems confronting the new Confederacy. Thus 
on September 17, 1787, the Constitution was signed by the 
Constitutional Congress which represented some of the most 
outstanding leaders of the country. It was placed in operation 
by New Hampshire's vote to ratify in June, 1788 and the Republic 
was formed. 
The Articles of Confederation were based on state 
representation and as such, guaranteed the states individual 
sovereignty in Article II of that document. Although attempts 
were made to enforce laws mutually beneficial to all of the 
states, when one state did not wish to concur, it proceded to 
ignore them. It had been useful as an instrument of war as 
long as the individual states volunteered men, but once the 
emergency was past, the war-born document found it difficult 
to control a peace economy.l This was particularly so with the 
suddenly overwhelming demand for manufactured articles, articles 
1. Jefferson, VIII, 35. 
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that for the first time were to be made in the states. 
In comparison with the Articles of Confederation the 
Constitution made provision for a highly centralized government 
with popular, not state representation. The people elected 
Congress in the same manner that they elected the powerful 
state legislatures; both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate were popularly elected. Furthermore, the elections of 
Representatives were based on population distribution which 
contributed to the trend toward popular rule. The Constitution, 
like most democratic documents, reflected months of legislative 
compromise between the large established groups of the country. 
With some modification, the Constitution was a direct 
descendant of the social contract theorists discussed in the 
previous chapter. This is not to say that the a.uthors of the 
Constitution depended solely on these theorists in the penning 
of the document; rather, it is to affirm that the Constitution 
realized the social contract ambition, both (1) in the manner 
of ratification and (2) its subject matter.l Furthermore, 
as was pointed out in Chapters IV and VIII of this study, it 
was in full accordance with Jefferson's meaning of natural law 
and was a product of the same. 
In turning to a careful scrutiny of Jefferson's Commentary 
on the Constitution a number of problems should come to light: 
(1) The manner in which Jefferson adapted natural law theory 
to specific problems in government; (2) the relation of a 
lo Locke, ECG, XII. 
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primary document derived directly from natural lew, to secondary, 
civil, or positive lew; (3) Jefferson's consistency as a 
commentator before, during, and after fulfilling positions of 
public responsibility end trust, where ample opportunity was 
given to execute it. Jefferson served as Secretary of State 
under Washington and as President for eight years. As Vice-
President under Adams, he did not have direct authority and 
was embarrassed by Adam's opposition to Republican policies. 
A documentary answer to the above points should in turn establish 
the degree to which Jefferson relied on natural law theory, 
whether for him it was only a term with psychologically 
suggestive overtones of approval or an absolute rule rising 
from the harmonious nature of the law-abiding universe. Stated 
differently, the primary problem of this chapter will be resolved 
when it is understood Whether or not Jefferson's natural law 
theory was an apriori concept. It is in the answer to this 
question that the primary justification for this whole study 
will be found. 
A hurried survey of Jefferson's comments on the Constitution 
reveals a startling lack of consistency if each statement 
found in his letters and elsewhere is to be equated with every 
other. At the risk of seeming arbitrary they will therefore 
be separated into three groups, those made before, during and 
after his terms in public office. The justification for the 
division is to be found in their relative consistency within 
each time period and in the distinctive character of the 
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problems facing him in office. It is believed that the 
subsequent parcelling will be useful if it is remembered that 
a single man is being studied and that the divisions must 
ultimately be dissolved before general statements can be made 
as to the nature of his thought. They are functional, not 
elemental distinctions. 
The Constitution, signed in mid-September, 1787, was 
received by Jefferson, in Paris, well before the end of the 
year and a number of first impressions are available from that 
time. In a letter to John Adams on November 13, 1787, Jefferson 
expressed forthright disapproval. Beginning with the question, 
"How do you like our new constitution?" he continues, "I 
confess there are things in it ~ich stagger all my 
dispositions to subscribe to what such an Assembly has proposed." 
Two outstanding and devastating criticisms are levelled against 
it in this letter. In the first place, he points out that the 
"house of federal representatives" will not be able to manage 
foreign affairs. In the second, he claims that the absence of 
a clause forbidding the re~lection of the executive will ensure 
the success of some future attempt to establish a monarchy.l 
The Presidency, he claims, is a bad edition of the Polish king. 
The paragraph is concluded with the following observation; 
Indeed, I think all the good of this new 
constitution might have been couched in three 
or four new articles, to be added to the good, 
old venerable fabric which should have been 
preserved even as a religious relique.2 
1. Jefferson, VI, 370. 
2. Jefferson, VI, 370. 
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The extensive quotations from this letter to Adams are 
important for they are the first criticisms that he leveled 
against the Constitution and he is never to speak of it in 
such derogatory tones again. While in Paris, Jefferson's 
knowledge of What was happening in America was dependent on 
letters sent from trusted friends, many of whom were outstanding 
leaders in the authorship of the Constitution and in the 
subsequent movement to have it ratified. Undoubtedly, it is 
this fact that later tempered his statements and reduced his 
criticisms to two well-defined points. The two, one of which 
is contained in the above letter are: (1) The need for a bill 
of rights, and (2) the desirability of making it impossible for 
the president to succeed himself. In subsequent letters to 
Madison these points are made clear. The first was picked up 
immediately by the various state legislatures and finally 
Massachusetts ratified the Constitution only on the condition 
that immediate steps would be taken to provide a bill of rights. 
Thus, even before Jefferson returned to Monticello from Paris, 
such a movement was well under way and was to gain momentum as 
ratification progressed. 
The letters Jefferson wrote to Madison and others while 
in Paris after he had received a copy of the Constitution first 
go through a period of disapproval, then neutrality and finally 
limited approval, once the bill of rights amendment gained 
support. From time to time there was also another criticism 
that he made in reference to the third paragraph of Article VI. 
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The officers, he claimed, should not be required to take an 
oath to uphold the Constitution. This opinion was mentioned 
in a letter to Madison in December, 1787 and taken up again 
at various periods throughout his life.1 By July of 1788 
Jefferson had written to Madison that it was a "good canvass 
on which some strokes only want retouching."2 The "retouching" 
of which he spoke was the much needed bill of rights. In May 
of the same year he had written to William Carmichael that, 
"It will be more difficult if we lose this instrument, to 
recover what is good in it, than to correct what is bad, after 
we shall have adopted it. It has, therefore, my hearty 
prayers."3 Writing to Rutledge the same year he says, "Our 
government needed bracing. Still, we must take care not to 
run from one extreme to another: not to brace too high."4 
During the nine odd months when the Constitution was in process 
of ratification, Jefferson wrote to several of his friends 
that the nine required states should ratify the document but 
the other four should wait until the bill of rights was added, 
thus making it incumbent upon the first nine to speed the 
process. But after Massachusetts had included a clause along 
with the vote for ratification, to the effect that immediate 
steps be taken to amend, he concluded that the remaining 
states should accept this as a model. 
It was with some reluctance that Jefferson relinquished 
the right of the states to conduct all of their elections and 
1. Jefferson, VI, 385. 
2. Jefferson, VII, 26. 
3. Jefferson, VII, 96. 
4. Jefferson, VI, 79. 
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have state delegates appoint the federal representatives; 
this was the method employed in the Articles of Confederation. 
Article V, However, between 1787 and 1789 his reluctance 
was displaced by full approval in a letter to F, Hopkinson;! 
the approval was based on the recognition that the federal 
government levied direct taxes on the individual.2 A section of 
the letter to Hopkinson bears quoting for it is an excellent 
summary of his views. It will be noted that he speaks approvingly 
here of the federalists, that is, those Who are supporting 
the Constitution, not the Federalists of the bank controversy 
which will be discussed later. 
I am not a federalist, because I never submitted 
the Whole system of my opinions to the creed of 
any party of men whatever, in religion, in 
philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where 
I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an 
addiction, is the last degradation of a free and 
moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with 
a party, I would not go there at all. Therefore, 
I am not of the party of federalists. But I am 
much farther from that of the anti-federalists. 
I approved, from the first moment, of the great 
mass of what is in the new Constitution; the 
consolidation of the government; the organization 
into executive, legislative, and judiciary; the 
subdivision of the legislative; the happy compro-
mise of interests between the great and little 
States, by the different manner of voting in the 
different Houses; the voting by persons instead 
of States; the qualified negative on laws given 
to the executive, which however, I should have 
liked better if associated with the judici~ry also, 
as in New York; and the power of taxation. 
Throughout this time period Jefferson reveals a 
1. Jefferson, VII, 300. 
2, Jefferson, VI, 387. 
3. Jefferson, VII, 300. 
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considerable elasticity of judgment, a willingness to alter 
his view when new facts are presented, but at the same time 
an attitude of self-reliance. His judgments of the Constitution 
are independent and based upon his own experience in similar 
controversies. Yet at the same time he reveals a high regard 
for the views of others and it is easy to trace the metamorphosis 
in his writings. Koch, in her Jefferson and Madison, places 
considerable emphasis on Jefferson's reading of The Federalist 
which he received while in Paris, as a key to the modification 
of his opinion.l In a letter to Madison in 1788, Jefferson 
deprecates two of the hands that had a part in its authorship, 
but on the third he places his almost unqualified approval. 
He erroneously believes that Madison wrote the greater part 
and it is not at all certain he guessed cor~ectly in distri-
buting the articles among the authors.2 "It does the highest 
honor to the third, as being, in my opinion, the best commentary 
on the principles of government, which ever was written." He 
goes on to say, "I confess, it has rectified me on several 
points." The one point that had not been rectified was the 
necessity for a bill of rights; he continues to plead for this 
basic code of individual freedom with relentless reiteration. 
Jefferson does make it quite clear here that his primary 
sympathies were with Madison; in fact, his ready reference to 
the articles written by Madison leads the reader to believe 
1. Koch, JAM, 46f. 
2. Koch, JAM, 54; Jefferson, VII, 183f. 
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that they were with Madison regardless of whet he wrote, and 
by the same token he was opposed to Hamilton and Jay. Although 
Jefferson was later to be at odds with the patrician from 
New York, it is to be remembered that he had not yet weathered 
the storm of the bank issue in Washington's cabinet. It is 
doubtful therefore if as much emphasis can be placed on 
Jefferson's reading of The Federalist as Koch maintains. Her 
title commits her to the task of proving a degree of intimacy, 
mutual accord, and inter-dependency that with all of its 
evidence fails to create another Jonathan and David. 
This is not to question the importance of The Federalist 
in promoting constitutional ratification and approval in 
state legislatures. It is to maintain that Jefferson had not 
read it too carefully at the time of the above writing, was not 
certain of the authorship, much of which is still in question, 
and was consequently too hasty in his ready recommendation. 
He had altered his opinions on the Constitution before receiving 
a copy of The Federalist and he did not make a substantial 
change again after reading it. 
One of the most controversial of Jefferson's letters to 
Madison has been purposely excluded from the foregoing discussion 
for consideration at this point. This is the well-known 
"the earth belongs ••• to the living" letter Which is not directly 
but indirectly related to the discussion of the Constitution.1 
It is cast in a much larger framework and includes all laws 
1. Jefferson, VII, 454. 
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passed by any one generation. No man can, by natural right, 
he claims, legislate for a generation yet to appear, for the 
sum of the rights of the individuals are equal to the rights 
of the Whole at any given time. Slicing directly across the 
theories of the state advanced by Hume and Burke, Jefferson is 
therefore denying a necessary continuity to the state as such, 
along with the denial of a sovereignty superior to the people. 
Furthermore, he does this in the name of natural right. In 
other letters on the same subject he alters the span of a gene-
ration from 34 to 19 years, but the length of time is unimportant 
here. It is important that he repeatedly advances the theory 
that each generation should be left tree to begin anew with an 
indigenous legal system of its own choosing. With death, all 
property rights are dissolved for where there is no substance 
there can be no accident. That others did not take up the 
theory, indeed that most for whom he outlined it were in active 
opposition, did not dissuade Jefferson from repeating it through-
out his life.1 
Clearly this is one of his most extreme statements, with 
the possible exception of his insistence that periodically the 
tree of liberty must be watered with the blood of the heroes. 
The problem of simple mechanics, of just how each generation 
was to consciously deny the past and begin again, a problem 
frequently pointed out to him by his friends, did not daunt 
his resolve. The argument is so extreme and denies so many 
1. Jefferson, XV, 318. 
I 
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historical implications, of which Jefferson was fully aware in 
other areas, that it would be almost beside the point if it 
did not represent a pole of thought the opposite of which was 
no less absurd. The combined effect of both Burke's and Hume's 
political writings on the subject was pointed toward the 
conclusion that the state which was best would necessarily be 
the state which was oldest. Thus Jefferson's position, while 
it lacked practical application, could well serve as an antidote 
to Hume and Burke. In this letter the political nominalism 
of Locke reaches its logical conclusion and is applied not only 
quantitatively to individuals but temporally to generations. 
If this is to be taken literally and in its extreme form as 
Jefferson gave every indication that it was to be taken, then 
it is a denial of the accumulative and additive forces in 
history. It leaves no doubt as to what he means by the state 
and if this letter is to be taken as indicative of his political 
philosophy it will leave no room for argument as to the 
central problem of this chapter. Natural law would be taken 
to mean nothing more than a cross section of public opinion at 
any given time.1 Needless to say this is certainly not What 
Hobbes had in mind, or for that matter, Locke. But first his 
official decisions regarding the Constitution must be discussed. 
Jefferson was Secretary of State from February 14, 1790 
1. Jefferson, XV, 33f. "A government is republican in 
prop~rtion as every member composing it has his equal 
voice in the direction of its concerns." 
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to December 31, 1793. During this time his most important 
single controversy was with Hamilton over the proposed bank 
bill.1 The Secretary of the Treasury issued his recommendation 
concerning the incorporation of a bank on December 13, 1790. 
The bank was to be incorporated by the government but privately 
owned; however the government was to receive a part of the 
proceeds, s part commensurate with its original investment. 
Jefferson wrote his compendious opinion of the proposal 
on Feb~uary 15, 1791. It was unalterably opposed to the bill 
for two reasons. The first was that it was unconstitutional 
and inconsistent with the development of legal tradition; a 
number of such treditions were cited specifically. The second 
reason was based on its supposed economic effect, once it was 
passed. However, the bulk of the objection was based on the 
unconstitutionality of the bill, not its economic effect on 
the commonwealth. The previous legal traditions are cited 
with an intended authoritative effect and as having a definite 
bearing on the efforts of the new nation to construct its 
economy on a sound basis. His criticism here is based on a 
limited and strict construction of the Constitution. 
If such a latitude of construction be allowed to 
this phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, 
it will go to every one, for there is not one 
which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience 
in some instance or other to some one of so 
long a list of enumerated powers.2 
l. Cf. Koch, JAM, 108f. Again Koch is concerned to indicate 
the cooperation of Jefferson and Madison on the bank bill 
question. 
2. Jefferson, III, 149. 
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Without entering the tortuous channels of precise legal 
interpretation and construction, one point seems quite clear 
in the opinion presented by Jefferson to the President. If 
Jefferson had been consistent in the structuring of his 
opinion, consistent that is with his previous commentary on the 
Constitution, he would have placed the emphasis on the situation, 
the economic aspects of the proposed bill. These he hardly 
touched and at no point did he go into them in detail. It 
would be to evade the point to argue that he did not feel 
qualified to discuss the bill from an economic standpoint. 
There were few fields in which Jefferson did not feel qualified 
to speak and even those areas which were foreign to him could 
be brought rapidly into the range of comprehension given a 
few days in his library. Furthermore, his letter to friends 
while in Paris had been crammed with the fiscal and commercial 
policies of the United States, not only the policies of his 
own nation, but the management of much larger and more experienced 
national treasuries. Thus, to have been consistent with his 
previous stated policies he should have explained that it was 
unacceptable because of its economic consequenees. Clearly, 
in this situation he shifted from the aposteriori to the 
apriori basis. While a distinction between theory and practice, 
objective conjecture from across the ocean and subjective 
responsibility in office, might be helpful in a biography, 
such • distinction does not absolve him of a philosophical 
contradiction. 
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In another opinion written in April, 1793 Jefferson 
takes up the problem of treaty status when a nation is torn by 
revolution. The country in this instance is France. The 
opinion is rather long and concludes with a harmony of selected 
quotations from Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolf, and Vattel, in that 
order. In the body of the text and in these quotations it is 
maintained that the treaties remain valid because the people 
are the same and the state is to be identified with the people. 
Whether or not "people" extends beyond one generation is not 
made clear. He further adds, "questions of natural rights are 
triable by their conformity with the moral sense and reason 
of man."l In the event that there is disagreement between 
philosophers of natural law then the individual reader is 
thrown back upon his own reasoning and "feelings" to guide him. 
This is more consistent with his previous pragmatic and 
contextual views. 
John Adams, the second president, during his first term 
of office was so infuriated with France and French citizens as 
a result of the X,Y,Z affair that the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were passed in 1798. The Alien Act provided for the expulsion 
of aliens at the will of the president, but no alien was 
returned to his homeland because of it. However the Sedition 
Act which placed sharp curbs on the freedom of speech and press, 
when either means was employed to attack governmental policy, 
was placed in effect and severs.l Republican publishers were 
1. Jefferson, III, 235. 
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jailed. Jefferson, Who had opposed the strong measures taken 
during the ~hiskey Rebellion in 1794, measures that had 
elicited some unwarranted and unguarded strong arm statements 
from Washington, was equally opposed to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of Adams. But opposition was difficult for he was the 
Vice-President under Adams and direct assault would have been 
inadvisable. 
Through close friends he precipitated a series of moves 
that were veiled in secrecy, a disguise that was maintained 
surprisingly well. Kentucky was chosen as the first state in 
Which to voice serious opposition to the laws and it was 
Jefferson who penned the Kentucky resolution and had it 
introduced to the state legislative body by a close friend. 
The Resolutionl made the point that the compact nature of the 
Constitution permitted each state to determine for itself 
what was, and what was not, constitutional. This, it will be 
remembered, preceded the well-known supreme court decision 
rendered by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803, "Marbury v. 
Madison," in which the right of judicial review was proclaimed. 
It was the opinion of the Kentucky House that the Alien and 
Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, therefore it proclaimed 
them null and void. Soon after the passage of the Kentucky 
Resolution a similar resolution was passed by the state of 
Virginia; the resolutions did not have an immediate effect 
1. Copies of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions may be 
round in Foley, TJC, App., 977. 
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upon other states but considerable sentiment was aroused 
throughout the country and a Republican administration was 
seated in government with the "revolution of 1800. 111 
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The urge to speculate upon the contrary-to-fact 
conditionals in history is almost overwhelming and one of the 
most interesting in this connection has a direct bearing on 
Jefferson's unique position in the government at the time he 
wished to formulate an opposition policy. The Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions forever place him at the extreme "states-
rights" pole of American political thought. If he had not 
been Vice-President and if he had been in a position to bring 
more direct pressure upon the federal government, it is 
doubtful if he would have penned this extreme "states-rights" 
document at all. No one spoke more approvingly of the 
Constitution than Jefferson at the time of his inaug11ral into 
the presidency and no one has used more effectively the peculiar 
powers of the executive under the Constitution to suppress 
unwelcome legislation. ·when Jefferson became president all 
persons held under the Sedition Act were released and no others 
were convicted until it expired. This is not to question that 
Jefferson was an advocate of individual state rights, but it 
is to suggest that he would not have been so strong an advocate 
if it had not been for the peculiar position he held at that 
1. Koch, JAM, 174. The emphasis here is again placed upon the 
dual role of Madison and Jefferson. Madison penned the 
Virginia Resolution in the same manner that Jefferson 
penned that of Kentucky. Madison's resolution was some-
what milder than Jefferson's. 
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time. As Vice-President to a president who was a member of an 
opposing party Jefferson was somewhat limited in his overt 
political alliances. 
From the time that he penned his Notes on Virginia, 
Jefferson revealed a predisposition toward agrarianism as 
opposed to the large centers of manufacture and finance.l 
In various letters mentioned previously and in his Notes 
in particular, it has been pointed out that Jefferson believed 
the farmer was the bulwark of freedom and democracy because of 
his first-hand acquaintance with the sweat shops of Europe 
and the. lack of individualism observed there. He had a 
basic distrust of large manufacturing centers and had never 
felt at home in New York or Philadelphia. On his plantation 
he instituted a number of experiments to prove that a farm 
could be completely self-supporting. In a letter to his 
daughter, Martha, Jefferson states that, nit is a part of the 
American character to consider nothing as desperate, to 
surmount every difficulty by resolution and contrivance. In 
Europe there are shops for every want ••• "2 In America 
few shops were to be needed. 
His predisposition toward agrarianism is also reflected 
in his desire to have the capital situated away from the large 
1. Cf. Beard, EOJD, 415f. Beard is here more interested in 
investigating the great economic background involved in 
the shift toward Jeffersonian democracy. While Beard's 
study goes a long way in explaining the economic basis 
for Jefferson's support and the conflict between the 
agrarian and manufacturing economy, it is not felt that 
it contributes materially to this study. 
2. Jefferson, WOJ, IV, 373; Foley, TJC, 762. 
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financial centers of the growing nation. He believed that 
it would be less prone to graft, fraud, and bribery.l 
Jefferson became president on March 4, 1801 after John 
Adams had made a number of last minute appointments from among 
the Federalist ranks, some of ~hich he forgot to deliver. 
Adam's unwillingness to remain for the inauguration was 
considered in bad taste and its effect was not lost on Jefferson. 
A long friendship was thus brought to an abrupt end, a friend-
ship that was to be renewed much later, however. 
Jefferson unlike Washington and Adams, did not deliver 
his messages to the legislative bodies personally. He in-
stituted the practice of delivering written messages which did 
not have to be answered by an inexperienced congress. However, 
the First Inaugural was delivered in person and amounts to a 
summary of his views on government at that time. Jefferson 
was the first president to have been elected by the numerical 
superiority of one party as opposed to another after bitter 
conflict. Therefore his inaugural was an attempt to heal the 
breach and is marked by a conciliatory tone, "we are all 
republicans--we are all federalists. 112 In a classic statement 
designed to strike at the heart of the intentions embodied 
in the Alien and Sedition Acts he related the following: 
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve 
this Union or to change its republican form, let 
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety 
with which error of opinion may be tolerated where 
reason is left free to combat it.3 
1. Jefferson, WOJ, III, 458; Foley TJC, 926. 
2. Jefferson, III, 319. 
3. Jefferson, III, 319. 
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It is in the First Inaugural Address that Jefferson reaffirms 
his belief in the Constitution and the primary principles 
of the American government. The Constitution is defined as 
a "sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad.nl 
The phrase is a happy one and a metaphor that may well typify 
his opinion of natural law and compacts derived from that 
law. A sheet anchor is used by the captain of the ship in 
time of emergency; it is usually larger than the other anchors. 
As was mentioned above, when Jefferson became president 
he found on his desk a number of undelivered appointments 
made by John Adams to fellow Federalists in and around 
Washington. Jefferson with held them, claiming that an 
appointment was not completed until it was received, until then 
it had only potential validity. His power to do so was 
contested in the famous case of "Marbury v. Madison" in 1803. 
Madison had in the mean time become Secretary of State and 
it would have been his responsibility to execute the appointments 
if he had been secretary at the time. Therefore it was the 
Secretary of State against whom the suit was brought. Since 
the court ruled it had no jurisdiction in the case, it was a 
technical victory for Jefferson, but Chief Justice John Marshall 
added a section to the decision which not only struck an effective 
blow against the hepublicans, but made subsequent legal 
history. It was the decision in which he established the 
precedent of judicial review.2 a precedent still honored but 
1. Jefferson, III. 321. 2,~ Marshall, Art., 185-9. 
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not explicitly defined in the Constitution. 
Jefferson had maintained that each department in the 
government had the right to decide for itself whether its own 
actions were, or were not, constitutional. In the Kentucky 
Resolution he had further maintained that the states as 
sovereign members of a mutual compact, had the right to 
pronounce any law null and void, a practice that found its 
precedent in the old Articles of Confederation. Thus Jefferson 
had in effect suggested two alternatives to the doctrine of 
judicial review, neither one of which was accepted. The 
~entucky and Virginia Resolutions had doubtless done much to 
provoke the decision rendered by Marshall. There was really 
nothing in the suit of "Marbury v. Madison" that called for 
the ruling even if the case had been declared within the 
jurisdiction of the court. As it was, it could have been 
interpreted as little more than a well-aimed blow at a "states-
rights" and "equal-powers" administration. 
From the time of this decision on, Jefferson was a con-
firmed enemy of the United States Supreme Court. Marshall had 
been an adovcate of the Federalist position and had aligned 
himself with Hamilton and Adams. Jefferson argued that the 
right of judicial review gave that wing or the government 
which was least dependent on popular approval, a negative over 
the other two.1 Thus the right of judicial review was out of 
harmony with the spirit of the Constitution, a biased 
1. Jefferson, XV, 213. 
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construction designed to grab power for one department at the 
exclusion of others. In 1802, before the above decision, 
Jefferson had written to Albert Gallatin, his Secretary of the 
Treasury, the following concerning the Constitution, 
If on one infraction of the Constitution, we 
build a second, on that second a third, any 
one of the powers may be mide to comprehend 
every power of government. 
In that letter he is quite concerned to bring the acts of 
the executive branch within the intent of the Constitution, 
His opposition to Marshall was therefore on these same 
Constitutional grounds and it was the Constitution alone which 
became the criterion of judgment. There can be little doubt 
that here, as in the case of the bank, Jefferson is employing 
a tight construction of the Constitution to further the goals 
of his own party and that he does not hesitate to rely upon 
the Constitution when those goals can be thus furthered. At 
such times, for him, it is placed on an extraordinarily high 
pedestal. 
In 1802 Jefferson had written to Joseph Priestley the 
following: 
Though written constitutions may be violated in 
moments of passion or delusion, yet they furnish 
a text to which those Who are watchful may again 
rally and recall the people; they fix too for 
the peQple the principles of their political 
creed,2 
Along the same lines he penned a similar letter to c. Nicholas 
1. Jefferson, X, 338. 
2. Jefferson, X, 325. 
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in 180:5. 
I had rather ask an inlargement of power from the 
nation, where it is found necessary, than to 
assume it by a construction Which would make our 
powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in 
the possession of a written Constitution. Lei 
us not make it a blank paper by construction. 
29:5 
On the basis of the preceding comments it is herein concluded 
that Jefferson's statements concerning the Constitution while 
he was in a position of power, as Secretary of State, as 
Vice-President and as President, were based on a rather strict 
construction when it suited his purposes. To be sure, there 
is nothing in the document that gave him the authority to buy 
the Louisana Territory or participate in the construction of 
roads and canals, a project undertaken by Albert Gallatin 
his Secretary of the Treasury. These somehow went unnoticed 
as far as the Constitution was concerned reflecting only the 
willingness of Congress to support all attempts at western 
expansion. But at just those points where the Constitution 
was immediately involved, Jefferson gave it a limited inter-
pretation. It was that basic legal code which bestowed upon 
him his official prerogatives. Also, a part of the motivation 
may be traced back to his primary interest in the Bill of 
Rights which he had worked so hard to obtain and the feeling 
that the whole structure of government rested ultimately upon 
these fundamental natural rights. 
With Jefferson's retirement from public life in 1809 
1. Jefferson, X, 418-9. 
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there came an entirely different attitude. Immediately after 
returning to Monticello he wrote to his previous Secretary 
of State and successor to the presidency, that "no constitution 
was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire 
and self government."l But after several years a different 
sentiment is expressed along with the continued bitterness 
against the Supreme Court.2 In a letter to l'iilliam Johnson in 
1823 he writes the following. 
On every question of construction, carry ourselves 
back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, 
recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and 
instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out 
of the text, or invented against it, consorm to 
the probable one in which it was passed. 
Here the emphasis is placed not on a literal reading but 
"the spirit" of the founding fathers, what they intended to 
do. It is contextual rather than transcendent for its emphasis 
is on the intent rather than upon the document itself. 
The distinction here bas numerous implications in the 
philosophy of history and politica to say nothing of the 
parallels in the history of philosophy. The so-called liberal 
interpreters of a legal document may well argue that they 
maintain more continuity with the author of the document than 
those who follow a literal or dogmatic construction. The 
contention is based on the fact that a ratio exists between 
problem and answer which may be valid for all problems, whereas 
1. Jefferson, XII, 277. 
2. Jefferson, XV, 422; XVI, 113. 
3:. Jefferson, XV, 442f. 
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no specific answer can anticipate future needs. Consequently, 
the literalist in the very act of atte~pting to maintain the 
tradition, thwarts, frustrates, and eventually destroys it. 
Mockery is nothing more than precise and faultless imitation 
out of context. Jefferson, in saying that he followed the 
spirit or intent of the Constitution, believed that he was 
nevertheless, following it, maintaining legal continuity. It 
was the method he used in culling from the New Testament what 
he believed was the historical Jesus. 
Later in life Jefferson described the Constitution as a 
"compact of independent nations" reverting back to the powers 
implied in the Kentucky resolution. A point must be added here. 
When Jefferson spoke of the Constitution as a compact of 
independent nations, as he did on several occasions, he had 
reference to the method of ratification. It will be remembered 
that the Constitution was ratified by states, or rather by 
nations, as nations. But once it was instituted the unique 
position of the states as independent entities ceased and the 
machinery of the Constitution called for direct, not indirect, 
representation. Jefferson was thus making of the Constitution 
nothing more than a revision of the Articles of Confederation. 
There is little doubt but what this was what he had in mind 
as the "sage of Monticello" after his retirement from public 
office. In a long and rambling letter to Samuel Kerchival in 
1816 he gives a succinct and precise wording to many thoughts 
only implied in other letters on the same subject. Turning 
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back to the days when the Constitution was written he says that 
at that time and under the stress of war, the leaders had 
imagined every government that was not expressly monarchical 
must have been, by that token, republican. But republican 
government is only achieved when every member has an equal 
voice in its affaira,l Republicanism then is not to be found 
in the Constitution but in the attitude of the people which 
make up that government, The success of the Constitution was 
not derived from the provisions of that document but from the 
spirit of the people, a spirit that has prevailed "in spite of" 
the Constitution.2 The functionaries of government have 
succeeded because they were generally honest and it is this 
presupposition of fundamental honesty which the Constitution 
must presuppose before it can be effective. 
Some men, Jefferson adds in the same letter, look at the 
Constitution as if it were the ark of the covenant and as if 
it could not be touched under any circumstsnces. Succeeding 
generations have ascribed to the founding fathers a wisdom 
that they did not possess, and that human beings could not be 
expected to possess. 
I knew that age well; I belonged to it, 
and labored with it. It deserved well of 
its country. It •as very like the present, 
but without the experience of the present,,, 
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent 
and untried changes in laws and constitutions,,. 
But I know also, that laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of 
1. Jefferson, XV, 33. 
2. Jefferson, XV, 35. 
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the human mind ••• We might as well require 
a man to wear still the coat which fitted him 
when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever 
under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.1. 
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Clearly, this is a return to the sentiment expressed before 
he accepted public responsibility as Secretary of State 
and as President. The oath to uphold the Constitution, an 
oath to which Jefferson objected, may nevertheless have been 
taken quite seriously by him, but it is questionable if this is 
the only reason for his altered attitude, The position outlined 
above plus other statements in the same letter is an echo 
of the thought he first conveyed to Madison, that the land 
belongs to the living. It is the spirit of reform, change, 
frequent alteration and experimentation. 
From the foregoing study of Jefferson's regard for the 
Constitution before, during, and after his appointment and 
election to public offices, it is quite clear that it meant 
most to him while he was serving in office, when he was in a 
position of public trust. It is also quite clear that at no 
time in his life was it ever considered above the will of the 
majority and his faith in the document lay in its capacity for 
amendment. The controversies that raged between the 
Federalists and the Republicans colored the waters considerably 
and make it almost impossible to arrive at clear and objective 
conclusions. There is little doubt but what his conflict 
with the Supreme Court resulted in a deep bitterness toward 
i. Jefferson, XV, 40-41. 
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that body, a bitterness that made every subsequent court 
decision suspect, Jefferson possessed an unbounded faith in 
the decisions of the majority, in the individuals ability to 
fully appreciate a situation and reach definitive conclusions 
concerning it during his own lifetime, He was fond of turning 
the question on his reader and asking who, if not the people, 
could decide their fate. It was a faith based on reason but 
reason understood as e derivative of public opinion. The 
majority was not right because it was reasonable but it was 
reasonable because it was always right; reason represented for 
him a cross section of public opinion. It is herein suggested 
that natural law for Jefferson was synonymous with majority 
opinion, that the social contract was not only continuous as 
opposed to Hobbes' theory, but eternally self-renewing. The 
Constitution was for him a social contract in the sense that 
it represented a cross section of public opinion at the time it 
was ratified. 
For Jefferson the distinction between statute and 
constitutional law was a functional, not an ultimate partition. 
Thus there was no ultimate distinction between natural law 
and civil law end nothing inconsistent in declaring that two 
laws could both be natural although contradictory, if 
legislated at different times to satisfy distinct needs. If it 
had any significance whatsoever for Jefferson, it was a 
historical or psychological significance. The historical 
significance was derived from ita use in the past. Because of 
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its previous use it had an emotive connotation. Tutored in 
an atmosphere of traditional legal philosophy, that had been 
influenced by whet Mill1 chooses to call "sentimental deism," 
Jefferson continued to use a term to the end of his life that 
had long since lost the qualities of normative prediction or 
determination. 
In his little essay, "Nature," John Stuart Iviill makes a 
number of helpful distinctions and subsequent criticisms of 
the concept. The first meaning to which he attributes the term, 
is that which is, and the second, is that which was before it 
was reconstructed by the voluntary activity of a rational being.2 
In the first instance it is understood that natural scientists 
do not break natural laws and have never done anything 
"unnatural" in their lives, for that matter, neither has anyone 
else. If an irregularity does appear in relation to what 
was previously known as a law, then the law is rewritten, but 
nature remains as it is. From this point of view it is absurd 
to label any operation unnatural; when you have applied the 
term to another term such as law, you have contributed nothing 
intelligible to the latter, it has not been limited in any way. 
The second meaning and one, that might well have been 
shared by the political philosophers who began with an analysis 
of primitive societies, holds that everything previous to the 
rational creature was natural. Thus all civilized forms and 
1. Mill, Art, 6. 
2. Mill, Art, 5. 
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all advances in technology are unnatural. But here again 
it was the primary point of these thinkers that natural laws 
could transcend a civilized culture; they were not, with the 
possible exception of Rousseau in his earlier essays, opposed 
to civilized rational forms as such. They instituted those 
forma and spent most of their time in implementing them to 
build the good society. To have been consistent they should 
have recommended a return to primitive societies. 
Mill points out that no natural law theorist has really 
intended either of the above meanings but rather has used the 
concept to convey a normative connotation, a description of 
what ought to be. Thus societies should comply with natural 
law, should set such laws up as an ideal for possible future 
achievement and realization. But if they meant this, then 
they could only mean that a person should act rationally, 
that he should use some lawa to counteract others, that he 
should make decisions which would place him in rewarding 
situations. But this is not complying with nature as such, it is 
using some natural phenomena to overcome others. Natural, 
when not opposed by some theory of the Supernatural, is an all-
inclusive term; it does not delineate one phenomenon and oppose 
it to another. One could conclude on the basis of reason and 
intelligence that in order to live one must eat and set in 
process a series of operations that would yield an edible 
object. It would be unreasonable to say that man does not need 
food in order to live, but neither the wording of the proposition 
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nor dietary abstinence would be unnatural. What is meant here 
is not the ability to comply with natural laws which cannot be 
violated anyway, but the ability to act rationally, or 
intelligently. 
Mill's essay was written over twenty-five years after 
Jefferson's death and it was not published until after the 
death of Mill in 1873. There is no evidence that Jefferson 
ever did make a serious study of the term nature but if he had 
there is little question but what he would have been in full 
agreement. This can be seen from a comparison with the three 
men discussed in the previous chapter. 
In the last chapter the social philosophies of three men 
were studied in some detail, those of Cicero, Hobbes, and Locke. 
Each had a definite meaning for the phrase natural law and 
each used it as a constitutive part of a general political 
philosophy. Cicero, drawing on the Stoic cosmic scheme of 
materialistic determinism used it as a general concept with 
little necessary connection to specific content. The content, 
for him, therefore consisted in surveying past legal systems and 
deriving from them an ideal legal system. As a Roman, it was 
the Roman code embodied in the Roman Constitution that most 
appealed to him and it became in effect, what he understood as 
naturally inspired positive law. 
Cicero attempted to maintain historical continuity with 
the past, to maintain it with modification to be sure, but still 
to maintain it. He did not have in mind a state that was to 
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be purified periodically by civil wars and revolutions, but a 
state developing from its own past, corrected, modified, and 
reorganized if need be, but not revolutionary. As was pointed 
out in the previous chapter, there was a compulsion to maintain 
the customs of the past, the rites, and the religiously inspired 
codes. Indeed natural law was brought in as a type of con-
serving agency which would guarantee the conservation of the 
past and project the better aspects of it into the future. 
This capacity for conservation was implied in holding up an 
idealized version of the Roman Constitution for the instruction 
of future lawyers; it~s further implied in the act of surround-
ing the code with a protective ontology at the very time it 
was being seriously threatened. The act of taking the code 
from its contextual courtroom setting and placing it on a 
philosophical basis may well have been motivated by this threat. 
Jefferson did not follow Cicero in employing the concept 
of natural law as an agency of conservation, although on 
occasion he did seem to imply this, Its use in the Declaration 
and some letters written at the time indicate that he might 
well have had this in mind, But the thesis that the land 
belongs to the living, first introduced while he was in Paris, 
but continued throughout his life in one form or another, 
places the opposite construction upon it. On several occasions 
Jefferson outlined a criterion that might well be relevant 
at just this point. "When an instrument admits two constructions, 
the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the other 
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indefinite, I prefer that Which is safe and precise."l 
Jefferson's ambiguous use of the term natural does admit of 
at least two constructions. In choosing between the rationalism 
and traditionalism implied in his use of the natural law 
concept, an implication for the most part gained by reading 
into it what previous thinkers had meant, and the political 
positivism clearly asserted time and again, it would seem that 
the latter is much more "sate and precise," Where there is 
doubt, the position outlined in positive, discrete terms is 
superior to implied meanings, Viewing his lifetime as a whole 
it must be concluded that as he grew older, he grew less and 
less conservative, or rather, more and more liberal. The 
instances where the implied traditionalism may be found in his 
meaning of natural law become fewer and farther between as 
time goes on. 
The hypothesis must at least be maintained that during 
his terms in public office Jefferson employed the concept for 
its mythical qualities, a political occultism in the Platonic 
and Machiavellian mode, That it was probably unconscious is 
beside the point. That he used it thus less than either Cicero 
or Locke is important. Later in life it was almost non•existent 
and he did more than most of the Founding Fathers to purge it 
from the American tradition. No judgment is being entered here, 
either for, or against the political myth, It has its corollaries 
1. Jefferson, X, 418, 
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in other realms of human endeavor, both religion and science. 
Some form of it is in every culture and Jefferson was striking 
at the root of an American variety when he reminded his reader 
that the Founders were much like other men. Ironically this 
political Saint George, who slew his share of dragons, has 
since become a candidate for a more recent democratic mythology. 
It should not be forgotten in this discussion of Jefferson's 
decisions concerning the Constitution while he was in office, 
that it was a document produced by his own generation. 
Technically, even when he revered it for its own sake, he was 
fulfilling the doctrine that he instituted in the letter to 
Madison. He had no objection to Constitutions as such; he 
objected to their being passed from one generation to another. 
Thus when Jefferson used the Constitution to support a part-
icular decision there is a sense in which he was acting within 
the framework of his political theory. 
On being elected to the presidency Jefferson made a number 
of changes in the protocol established by Washington and Adams; 
he attempted to establish the presidential office as a type 
of secretariat, a clearing house for the state governors. He 
referred to his own election as a triumph for the Republicans, 
an event that constituted nothing less than a popular 
revolution.1 Thus, "the revolution of 1800," it has come to be 
known by historians.2 Needless to say it was a very peaceful 
revolution and may have reflected nothing else than the tendency 
1. Jefferson, X, 217. 
2. Cf. Langer, ~R, 766. 
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for the people during their first well-organized party election 
to phrase the sharp lines of conflict in military terms. 
Nevertheless, the tendency for Jefferson to ignore tradition 
and to label his republican policies revolutionary, is further 
indication of his disregard for the past and his willingness to 
support frequent and radical changes. This was not the meaning 
attached to the concept of natural law by Cicero. 
Although earlier in life Jefferson may have used natural 
law to suggest overtones of absolutism, he used it in this 
sense even less than Cicero. However, as with Cicero, it always 
contained for him the presupposition of equality. The element 
of Epicurean utilitarianism, avoided by Cicero, was prevalent 
in Jefferson's writings. Jefferson did not justify the use of 
natural law to bolster religiously or politically inspired 
rites, ceremonies, and ethical codes. Cicero's refusal to use 
it in a necessitarian or deterministic sense was reflected 
in Jefferson's use of the term; both avoided the references 
to primitivism as an analytical basis for the concept. 
The precise rationalism of Hobbes, based on sensationalistic 
empiricism, gave to the concept of natural law, a rigid, 
necessitarian, and deterministic bent. He employed the analysis 
of primitive cultures and derived from them a doctrine of 
natural universalism in his first law of nature. Although he 
began with a doctrine of equality, natural law was pictured 
as demanding its revocation and instituting a permanent 
hierarchical state in its place. Of the three, Cicero, Hobbes, 
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and Locke, only Hobbes gave the concept of natural law a meaning 
which could meet the criticism of Mill. There is a real sense 
in Which Hobbes, writing an apology for the Stuarts, meant by 
natural law, that which is. Whatever else may be said of his 
thesis, it is not vague, obscure, or indefinite. Beginning aa 
he did with a nominalistic empiricism and'concluding with 
political realism by making the state synonymous with the 
sovereign, he does indeed, contradict himself at the point of 
transition. Although Cicero and Locke are opposed to Hobbes' 
meaning of the concept, it is Jefferson that stands at the 
opposite pole of thought. 9nly the tendency toward nominalism, 
with which Hobbes began, is shared by Jefferson. A hurried 
survey of Jefferson's writings may incline the reeder to 
interpret him from the viewpoint of Hobbes because of the logical 
appeal in the latter's meaning of natural law. To that tendency 
the findings of this study are unalterably opposed. 
Locke following more in the general tradition of Cicero, 
used the concept of natural law as a term of approbation. He 
began with an imaginative primitivism but his unwillingaess 
to base it on a systematic survey of some particular culture 
prevented it from being anything more than an ephemeral point 
of origin. The nominalism, equality, and sensationalism 
embodied in his Essay, was continued in fact, though not in 
theory, in his Second Essay on Government. Cicero's universalism 
derived from the tradition of jus gentium in Roman civil law, 
was not continued by Locke. Jus gentium represented an attempt 
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to arrive at a common denominator, a compromise, but Locke 
left the minority outside the organized state, remaining in 
the state of nature. Both Cicero and Jefferson were much 
more practical statesmen than Locke, or for that matter, Hobbes. 
When a society contrives to form a compact there can be no 
one left outside, so the compact is in fact a compromise unless 
it follows the model in the Leviathan. For both Cicero and 
Jefferson it was a compromise.l In this sense therefore 
Jefferson's social contract theory included a doctrine of 
universalism and it was with that in mind that he cautioned 
Madison against opposing the minority supporting the bill of 
rights when the Constitution was being ratified. The Consti-
tution reflects the same degree of universalism in denying the 
right of a simple majority to carry en amendment. As in 
Rousseau's Social Contract, the size of the majority must be 
proportionate to the importance of the question. Thus two 
opposing parties may operate under the same constitution. 
The absolutism and determinism to be found in Hobbes is 
lacking in Locke and Jefferson although Locke uses the natural 
law concept as an agency of conservation in a way that Jefferson 
did not. Locke provided for the right of revolution, a 
provision conscientiously copied into many early state consti-
tutions, but he did not suggest that there be a studied effort 
to replace the old, with a new, social contract each generation. 
1. Jefferson, XV, 72. "But everyone knows, that that 
constitution was a matter of compromise; a capitulation 
between conflicting interests and opinions." 
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In Locke's epistemology, he distinguishes between three 
levels of verification, first the intuitive, second the 
demonstrable, and last the sensational. The term reason as 
used in the Second Essa1 is the second level in the 
epistemological hierarchy, that is, analytic logic. It contains 
an authoritative validity not possessed by pure sensationalism 
which is merely probable, so that his theory of the state 
tended toward rationalism. As was pointed out in Chapter IV, 
there is little doubt but that when Jefferson penned the 
Declaration he meant something of the same thing. But as time 
passed reason came to mean nothing more than mere intellect, 
cognition without apriori principles of thought. Thus a 
temporal distinction must be included in any evaluation of 
Jefferson's thought; during his lifetime his political philosophy 
shifted from an early implied rationalism to a political 
positivism. 
The phrase, political positivism, calls for further 
investigation. Both Hume and Bentham were contemporaries of 
Jefferson but if he read from either, with the exception of 
Hume 1 s History, there is no mention of it in his published 
correspondence. Locke, on whom he did rely quite heavily 
instituted the empiricist movement that finally culminated in 
Hums's positivism. Likewise Bentham's utilitarianism 
eventuated in Mill's analysis of Nature. The positivism to be 
found in Hume 1s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, not 
his History, is likewise reflected in the nominalism of 
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Bentham and the Mills. This stream of thought was foreign 
to Jefferson and there is no indication in his other 
commentaries that he would have fully appreciated all of it, 
if it had been made known to him. A seeming dislike of, or 
possibly, impatience with, metaphysics runs through much of 
his writing even though he frequently reverted to a metaphysical 
terminology. Aside from Jefferson's references to Locke and 
his popularizer, Bolingbroke, the only index to his thought 
along this line is to be found in his full approval of Tracy's 
writings. It is true that Tracy was roughly in the same 
general tradition, at least, his extreme sensationalism would 
indicate such, but at best he was a poor French edition of the 
original and left much to be desired, Tracy's treatment of 
the will in his rational psychology prevents him from being 
labelled a positivist in the Humian sense. 
In characterizing Jefferson as a political positivist, 
no attempt is being made, even by inference, thus to 
characterize any other area of his thought, It is an attempt 
to point to the close similarity that exists between his 
theories and Hume 1 s Enquiry• Jefferson took a position in his 
political thought that might well have been expected from 
Hume 1 s writings on the state; Jefferson did to previous theories 
of the state what Hume did to previous theories of substance. 
By continually reiterating the theory that each generation 
must find for itself its own fundamentals of government and by 
admitting of no qualitative distinctions among individuals, 
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he denied historical cause and effect and identified national 
greatness with numerical and geographical superiority. A 
corollary may be found in Hume 1 s treatment of time and space. 
For Jefferson the state was nothing more than two or more 
individuals in temporary agreement on a common method of 
goverilJ!lent. 
Others, incl•1ding Cicero and Locke, had destroyed 
qualitative distinctions between individuals and to that 
extent had been positivistic but only Jefferson denied the 
accumuls.ti ve effect of history. The fact that other than 
Plato, Jefferson approved of Hume less than any other 
political theorist, and certainly would not have appreciated 
being linked with him, is an instance of historical irony. 
In his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume 
attacks the theory of cllusation; in his A Treatise of Human 
Nature he attacks previous theories of substance. If the 
doctrine of "impressions" inHume's psychology is equated with 
the doctrine of man in Jefferson's political philosophy, it is 
evident that Jefferson treated previous realistic theories of 
historical causation and political bodies in the same way that 
Hume treated realistic theories of causation and substance. 
Ideas are faint copies of impressions and are ato~ic in their 
structure; they are related to other ideas only by haoit.1 
"There is not in any single, particular instance of cause and 
effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or 
1. Hume, ECHU, 15f. 
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necessary causality."1 
Causality therefore is nothing more than psychological 
anticipation, the habit of expecting a cause for every event. 
Causality understood as a necessary connection or as an 
invisible force is denied.2 In the same way as has been shown, 
Jefferson denied the relevance of accumulative forces in 
history designed to shape and mold future social forms. At 
least, formal documents such as the Constitution were to be 
renewed with each generation and the state, as such, has no 
more self identity than Hume's concept of the human personality~ 
That is, its identity exists only in its memory, its record, 
not in an additive and accumulative tradition. The Constitution 
understood as a temporary crystallization of political 
aspirations was valid but as a compact with posterity it was 
an imposition on the generations yet to be born. For Jefferson, 
the state is nothing more than the individual people living 
within it at any given time.4 
As was mentioned above, Hobbes' theory of the state 
provided for the creation of a sovereign who in turn became 
the embodiment of the state. Hume, in his History and Burke 
were to identify the state not with individuals or mere groupings 
of individuals but with its tradition and history. These 
1. Hume, ECHU, 15fJ VII, i, 64. 
2. Hume, THN, I, vi, 241. 
3. Hume, THN, I, vi. 
4. Cp. Hume, THN, I, vi, 239. "For my part, When I enter most 
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light 
or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." 
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theories suggest a force or power, substantial and determinant 
somehow related to, yet, above, the individuals living within 
the state. From such a viewpoint the state may be spoken of 
as apart from the citizens, even opposed to them in some 
matters. 
Jefferson veering away from this viewpoint fell within the 
tradition of Cicero, Locke, and Tracy but went further than 
any of them in denying temporal self identify to a state when 
that identity is understood to be anything more than a bare 
record of events. The state is in no sense a corporate self, 
a force as such. 
From time to time throughout this dissertation the question 
of whether or not Jefferson was a philosopher has arisen. 
Obviously it cannot be answered categorically as at least one 
fundamental distinction is necessary, a distinction between 
his moral and political philosophy. It can be said without 
hesitation that he was not a metaphysician, perhaps because of 
a basic lack of interest. On the other hand, even though he 
was extremely interested in moral philosophy in this field he 
must be thought of only as a lay philosopher. His heterogeneous 
writings are scattered, contradictory, and loosely contrived. 
~hat is even more. important he made no contribution even by way 
of critical analysis. Although he read widely, his interest 
was passive rather than constructive. 
In the field of social philosophy however he did make a 
significant contribution and that contribution has been the 
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primary concern of this dissertation. To be sure, even at this 
point his thought suffers from the lack of a summation, a 
self-conscious attempt to consider his previous writings in 
orderly and coherent form. Nevertheless, it has become a guide-
post in American thought and has tended to prevent the 
creation of a state which was anything more than the people 
who are living within its geographical boundaries at any one 
time. 
CHAPTER X 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The general conclusions of the dissertation may be stated 
in the following manner. 
1. Jefferson cannot be spoken of as a philosopher in the 
classic sense of that term. 
2. Previous attempts to place Jefferson in a traditional 
philosophical school before the writing of the Declaration of 
Independence have been unrewarding. Even later in life, this 
is extremely difficult to accomplish. 
3. Jefferson was unsuccessful in his attempt to prove that 
true English law had its origin in a proto-democracy which had 
preceded the feudal era. 
4. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence 
found its origin in the varied thought patterns and needs of 
the American people and drew upon Locke's phrasing of a deistic 
metaphysics for support. 
5. The Declaration of Independence was not designed 
primarily to chart a novel course in government but to reaffirm 
the traditional political practices of the colonies which had 
gained considerable autonomy under British rule. 
6. Metaphysics, a.s such, interested Jefferson but little 
and his moral philosophy reaches an indeterminate impasse in 
his discussion of the moral sense and the principle of utility. 
7. Jefferson went to France not as a student but as an 
experienced instructor in revolutionary movements. 
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B. Jefferson's approval of Tracy's thought does not 
indicate a source for his own views. At best it is a partial 
index to Jefferson's previous theories. 
9. Jefferson's doctrine of the separation of Church.. and 
State rested on {a) the decision to sever the last remaining 
official tie with Britain and (b) to found the state on a 
deistic rather than a th~istic metaphysics. 
10. The Jefferson Bible did not constitute a ret~rn to 
Christianity. Rather, it was a careless attempt to revise 
Christian doctrine. 
11. Jefferson was in the general tradition of Cicero and 
Locke, but opposed to Hobbes, in the interpretation of Natural 
Law. 
12. Jefferson used the Natural Law theory for its 
instrumental value in unseating a government resting upon the 
divine right of kings doctrine. He did not attempt to define 
it positively as a basis for the new government. 
13. Jefferson's commentary on the American Constitution 
constitutes the key to his thought on natural law in practice. 
14. For Jefferson, the state was nothin~ more than two or 
more individuals in temporary agreement on a common method of 
government. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is that of tracing the 
philosopbj.cal presupposi tiona of .Jefferson 1 s social theories. 
This is done in two ways: (1) by determining his own implied 
presuppositions and (2) by tracing those presuppositions in 
the history of ideas. Although other aspects of his social 
thought are treated briefly, primary emphasis is placed upon 
his political philosophy. .Jefferson cannot be called a 
philosopher in the classic sense of that term. The attempts 
to place .Jefferson in a traditional philosophical school 
during the first twenty•five years of his life have been 
unrewarding if not misleading • 
.Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence when he 
was thirty-three years of age and there is little indication 
that he had developed a systematic political philosophy. He 
interested himself in the early foundations of English common 
law and attempted unsuccessfully to establish the doctrine that 
true English law had its origin in a proto-democracy which had 
preceded the feudal era • 
.Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence found 
its origin in the varied thought patterns and needs of the 
American people. Because of the importance of the step, a 
thoroughgoing philosophy was implied complete with a metaphysics 
to meet the demand for intellectual justification. Locke's 
Second Treatise on Government came in handily at this point, 
even to the phrasing. The colonies had possessed considerable 
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freedom up to the years immediately preceding the Revolution 
and the Declaration is, in part, a conservative document 
designed to reaffirm the former autonomy in self-government. 
Metaphysics, as such, interested him but little and there 
is nothing to indicate that he had mastered a metaphysical 
system other than that of Bolingbroke's rephrasing of Locke's 
thought until quite late in life. Jefferson's moral philosophy, 
his personal passion, reaches a high-water mark in his discussions 
of utility; it is an impasse that he never transcends and the 
attempts to do so on the part of subsequent interpreters have 
been misleading. 
Jefferson arrived in Paris when he was forty-one years 
of age and there is no instance of French influence before that 
time. Although the French culture had a considerable impact 
on the subsequent life of Jefferson, it did little to alter his 
political views. Jefferson went to !''ranee not as a student 
but as an ex-perienced instructor in revolutionary m,ovements and 
his French acquaintances accepted him on that basis. Jefferson's 
unreserved approval of Tracy's works serves as an index to 
his previous thought rather than an original source. Jefferson 
agreed with Tracy that government had a utilitarian derivation 
but he did not concur in defining society merely as an economic 
unit. 
Jefferson was reared in the church, was tutored by clergy-
men and attended a church school. Furthermore, he considered 
time spent in finding a religious basis for morals as time well 
spent. Jefferson had no quarrel with the morals of the church 
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or with the clergymen as individuals; he was opposed to the 
principle of the establishment. After the revolution, the 
established church constituted the one remaining institutional 
tie with Great Britain. This, rather than the freedom of the 
sects, motivated Jefferson's objection to the establishment for 
he had little in common with the sects and his claims that they 
had been persecuted by the church do not agree with the facts. 
Furthermore, he was not interested in separating the state 
from religion as such but only from the theistic churches; the 
preface to the bill for religious freedom is a deistic confession 
of faith. 
For the most part Jefferson accepted and lived by the 
Christian ethic thinking it much superior to the Stoic or 
Epicurean. Also, later in life he reaffirmed his belief in 
immortality. The Jefferson Bible is not a return to Christianity 
nor a rejection of it, but a careless attempt to revise its 
doctrinal content. 
As the author of the Declaration and as a noteworthy 
commentator and early interpreter of the Constitution, Jefferson 
played a unique role in relation to the two primary documents 
of the American government. The American Constitution is the 
logical and historical culmination of the social contract theories. 
The social contract is one of the pragmatic and positive assertions 
of the natural law theories held by Cicero, Hobbes, and Locke. 
Cicero, as the outst&nding thinker in the Hellenistic 
legal tradition aided in welding together the concepts of 
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jus gentium, jus naturae and natural law as it had been defined 
by the Stoic metaphysicians. From that time on natural law 
theories have constituted the golden thread of legal history 
and denoted a superior quality in legal codes. Natural law 
theory, although it is replete with overtones of authoritarian-
ism, has nevertheless usually been on the side of free and 
liberal thought. Throughout the middle ages Cicero's 
identification of natural law with the highest Roman legal 
tradition was accepted, approved, and given a subordinate 
position under divine law. With the breakdown of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the dominance of the Church, it was rediscovered 
and given an ultimate status. In practice Cicero's natural law 
embodied the principles of rationality, harmony, ethical 
absolutism, equality, and universality. Cicero did not mean by 
the phrase, primitivism, necessitarianism, or Epicurean 
hedonism. 
It was Thomas Hobbes who gave natural law the first 
metaphysically consistent and meaningful interpretation. 
Hobbes is employed here to indicate a pole of thought against 
which both Locke and Jefferson were to react. Hobbes contributed 
the element of historical necessity, determinism, or as it is 
sometimes termed, historicism, to the concept of natural law. 
The nominalism, equality and consistency also to be found 
in the Leviathan subsequently triumphed over the concept of 
absolute historical necessity. 
The writings of Locke are in substantial agreement with 
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those of Cicero; Locke likewise used natural law as an 
instrument of legal reform. Locke used natural law as an 
instrument to destroy the doctrine or the divine right or kings, 
but having used it, gave his attention to the explicit delineation 
of methods of government. 
Jefferson's commentary on the American Constitution 
constitutes the key to his thought on natural law in practice. 
The commentary may be divided into three chronological periods, 
before, during and after his terms in office. before entering 
office he treated it with skeptical regard, approving and 
disapproving of certain parts but never raising it to the 
status of ultimate and unquestioned authority. During his 
terms in office he did give it an apriori status and used it 
as a cornerstone for his own legal thought. After his retire-
ment he returned to the previous attitude giving it a liberal 
contextual interpretation. In this, he was not consistent but 
the most important part ot his commentary on the constitution 
is his claim that "the earth belongs to the living." 
This is Jefferson's primary contribution to political 
thought. Jefferson is a political positivist in the sense that 
he analyzed theories of statism in the same way that Hume 
analyzed substance and causality. By continually reiterating 
the theory that each generation must find for itself its 
own fundamentals of government and by admitting of no 
qualitative distinctions among individuals, he denied historical 
cause and effect and identified national greatness with 
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numerical and geographical superiority. For Jefferson the 
state was nothing more than two or more individuals in 
temporary agreement on a common method of government. Others, 
including Cicero &nd Locke, had destroyed qualitative 
distinctions between individuals, but only Jefferson denied 
the accumulative effect of history, the tendency for history 
to become History, tradition to become Tradition. The general 
conclusions of the dissertation may be stated in the following 
manner. 
1. Jefferson cannot b11 spoken of as a philosopher in the 
classic sense of that term. 
2. Previous attempts to place Jefferson in a traditional 
philosophical school before the writing of the Declaration of 
Independence have been unrewarding. bven later in life, this 
is extremely difficult to accomplish. 
3. Jefferson was unsuccessful in his attempt to prove that 
true English law had its origin in a proto-democracy wnich had 
preceded the feudal era. 
4. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence 
found its origin in the varied thought patterns and needs of 
the American people and drew upon Locke's phrasing of a deistic 
metaphysics for support. 
5. The Declaration of Independence was not designed 
primarily to chart a novel course in government but to reaffirm 
the traditional political practices of the colonies which had 
gained considerable autonomy under British rule. 
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e. Metaphysics, as such, interested Jefferson but little 
and his morel philosophy reaches an indeterminate impasse in 
his discussion of the moral sense and the principle of utility. 
7. Jefferson went to France not as a student but as an 
experienced instructor in revolutionary movements. 
8. Jefferson's approval of Tracy's thought does not 
indicate a source for his own views. At best it is a partial 
index to Jefferson's previous theories. 
9. Jefferson's doctrine of the separation of Church and 
State rested on (a) the decision to sever the last remaining 
official tie with Britain and (b) to found the state on a 
deistic rather than a theistic metaphysics. 
10. The Jefferson Bible did not constitute a return to 
Christianity. Rather, it was a careless attempt to revise 
Christian doctrine. 
11. Jefferson was in the general tradition of Cicero and 
Locke, but opposed to Hobbes, in the interpretation of natural 
law. 
12. Jefferson used natural law for its instrumental 
value in unseating a government resting upon the divine right 
of kings. He did not attempt to define it positively as a 
basis for the new government. 
13. Jefferson's commentary on the American Constitution 
constitutes the key to his thought on natural law in practice. 
14. For Jefferson, the state was nothing more than two 
or more individuals in temporary agreement on a common method 
of government. 
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